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SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

History: Is it Obsolete?

Hugh Trevor-Roper Ernest Gellner Morse Peckham

Poland & Czechoslovakia Today

Leszek Kolakowski Michael Costello Robert W. Dean

Foreign Policy East & West

John Pinder John R. Thomas

Soviet *Samizdat*

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The Historian between the Anthropologist and the Futurologist

Historical Knowledge ... ... *Hugh Trevor-Roper* 2
Our Current Sense of History ... ... *Ernest Gellner* 13
History in the 19th Century ... ... *Morse Peckham* 31

Poland Today

Hope and Hopelessness ... ... *Leszek Kolakowski* 37
Political Prospects ... ... *Michael Costello* 53
The Polish Economy ... ... *Jerzy Gambit* 74
One Kind of Magic ... ... *Tomasz Stalinski* 90

Czechoslovakia

Consolidation and Beyond ... ... *Robert W. Dean* 98

Latin America

Urban Guerrilla ... ... *Alexander Craig* 112

Foreign Policy East and West

Soviet Foreign Policy and the Military ... *John R. Thomas* 129
An *Ostpolitik* for the European Community ... *John Pinder* 157

Documents: Soviet Union

The Intelligentsia and the Democratic Movement *K. Volny* 180
A Word to the Nation 191

Document: Sudan

The Forgotten Massacres 200

Views and Reviews

The Survivors ... ... *Ronald Hingley* 202
Our Contributors 206

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Minerva

A REVIEW of SCIENCE, LEARNING & POLICY

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VOLUME IX NUMBER 3 **JULY 1971**

EDITORIAL

No Salvation outside Higher Education

ARTICLES

Science Policy in American State Government *Harvey M. Sapolsky*

The Support of Science without Science Policy in Australia *S. Encel*

The Urban University and its Urban Government *Kermit C. Parsons and Georgia K. Davis*

"World Leadership", the "Technological Gap" and National Science Policy *Richard R. Nelson*

DISCUSSION

Consultation or Voting Power *Eric Ashby and Mary Anderson*

Reflections on a Debate *James Drever*

CORRESPONDENCE

Letters from *Harold Orlans, F. E. Balderstein* and *Thomas Walsh, G. D. Parikh, Michael Moravcsik*

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Reviews by *Jürgen Habermas, Fritz K. Ringer, Norman Kaplan, John Ziman*

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The Historian Between the Anthropologist and the Futurologist

In April 1971 an international seminar convened in Venice to discuss the present position of history as a concept and a discipline. It was sponsored by the International Association for Cultural Freedom, the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, and the Giorgio Cini Foundation. As the chairman of the seminar, Professor Raymond Aron, explained in his introductory remarks, its theme, implied in its title 'has been suggested by Professor Alan Bullock, who was struck by two facts which may be unconnected, but which lead, in certain respects, to similar consequences. A fraction of the young generation manifests an indifference, even a hostility, towards things of the past, even of a relatively recent past and, desirous of knowledge which would concern it directly, a relevant *knowledge which would answer its problems and those of the society, rejects traditional culture and in particular the study of history. On the other hand, it seems that historians increasingly influenced by social sciences and by a desire to have a scientific status conferred on their profession, tend to despise what is known as the history of events ("l'histoire événementielle"), the kind of history that tells a story, and, as a consequence, they tend to give less importance to political history, compared to social and economic history.' There is indeed a growing trend among historians to borrow the concepts and the techniques of economists, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, anthropologists, and demographers. Recently this trend has even found an institutional expression in the establishment of the new* Journal of Interdisciplinary History *devoted to the 'cross-fertilization' of history and the social sciences. This development in the approach to history can be traced back to the French* Annales *school whose tradition was represented at the Venice seminar by Francois Furet. Yet the tendency to stress social factors in history does not necessarily mean to 'worship at the shrine of the bitch-goddess Quantification.' The seminar was very much concerned with the question whether political history still retains its particularity and its value. This in turn was an aspect of an even more fundamental question: what is historical knowledge for us today? In his introduction Raymond Aron asked the participants: 'What value do you attribute to it? A cultural or a pragmatic value? What is it? The hobby of a leisured class? A luxury of rich societies? An expression of piety towards ancestors? Curiosity which finds justification in itself?' We publish below three papers presented at the seminar which address themselves to some of these questions.*

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What is Historical Knowledge for us Today?

Hugh Trevor-Roper

THIS is a question which, in one form or another, I often put to myself. Any scholar, I believe, must ask himself the purpose of his own study, and keep reminding himself of his answer, in order that he may be conscious of his purpose in pursuing it. Otherwise his work may well disperse itself in irrelevancy or triviality, or sink into pedantry. When I ask myself this question, I always find it accompanied by another, its corollary. That corollary is, what would our life be without a knowledge of history? And I try to envisage an intellectual world from which the study of history is removed; a world in which, outside the natural and applied sciences, only 'modern subjects'—politics, sociology, economics—and languages and literature are academically studied. I admit that when I envisage such a world, my heart shrinks.

Life without history, and a sense of history, would be, to me, a sorry affair. Of this I feel certain. How could one move through the world in one dimension only, taking for granted all the graduated deposit of time and human achievement which we see around us? I would find such a life impoverished, thin, vulgar. It would be vulgar because of its implied immodesty. To take the world as we have inherited it, to assume that it is all ours, to acknowledge no debt to our predecessors, to please ourselves with the arrogant assumption that the labour and genius and suffering of the past is of no significance to us and that every mechanical invention that we use, every art that we acquire, every opportunity which we enjoy, is ours by mere right of birth, seems to be unbearably immodest, aggressive, complacent, and I find myself morally revolted by such an attitude when I encounter it.

And we do encounter it. No doubt, in some societies, or classes of society, it is natural, unreflective, innocent. History, after all, is itself an acquired art. It had to be invented or discovered. For long periods, men were content to remember only what they had been told by eye-witnesses: all else was 'time out of mind': 'the dark backward and abysm of time', through which no continuous path was to be found. Only occasional, half mythical figures, transmogrified beyond recognition, still stared, isolated, larger than life, through the distorting haze: Alexander the Great, whose Persian and Indian conquests would be narrated, centuries later, as a remote, romantic legend in the Far East; Alcibiades, whose name, itself strangely transformed, would be included by François Villon in his roll-call of those fair women whose beauty had dissolved like last year's snow.

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Even today, when the mist is dispelled and all the paths—or nearly all of them—are cut, paved and signposted, there are people who are totally indifferent to history. Sometimes, when I visit some place of tourism, some temple or palace or villa or amphitheatre, I watch the movements or overhear the remarks of the other visitors, and I realize that history is to them a complete blank. Behind the last frontier of living memory, one century is to them quite indistinguishable from another, and if they are told (as I have heard them told by an unhistorical workman) that an eighteenth century college quadrangle was built 'thousands of years ago', they are content with the answer. They walk through a gothic cathedral or a Palladian courtyard as a man walks through a picture-gallery who knows nothing of art, who cannot distinguish a Primitive from an Impressionist, a Rembrandt from a Goya. If one has no concept of the past, no guiding lines through it, no sense of graduated change, how can one do otherwise? All centuries are the same in time that has dissolved into timelessness, 'time out of mind'.

We may feel pity for those who lack this dimension of time. We may think them unfortunate, deprived of the opportunity to enrich their lives, forced by urgent daily mechanical pressures to forgo these luxuries of the mind. But there are today educated people who (as it seems) positively wish to join them, who look upon history, and even the sense of history, as an impediment to human progress, and who wish to see mankind emancipated from these constricting tentacles of the past. Marx believed that the historical process which he had himself studied so profoundly would lead, ultimately, to the end of history; and he wished to bring it to an end. The revolution, of which he hoped to be the midwife, was to introduce a society in which that painful process, the brutal contest of economic forces now rendered obsolete, would have ceased—just as the Christian revolutionaries of earlier ages had looked forward to a static millennium as the culmination of their worldly endeavours and doctrinal fidelity. And some of our modern sociologists take pleasure in informing us of their contempt for history: history which, perhaps, they define in terms which we, as historians, would not accept.

FACED by this revolt against history, this formidable alliance between mere philistinism on one hand and self-styled 'progress' on the other, I find myself a 'conservationist'. I want to preserve history. Why, I ask, should a few aggressive 'developers', aided by the apathy and indifference of the public, drive their unnecessary turnpike road through my ancient estate, demolish my historic house, root up my long planted avenue of living trees, in order to build, over its desolate ruins, their stinking modern petrol-station and their noisy road-house? But this, I soon realize, is too personal, too selfish an argument. It will hardly convert the floating voter to my side. Therefore, if only for technical reasons, I must contain my emotion and deploy instead my reason. I must give a rational defence of my property, showing that it

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is not only my own interest that I am defending but the interest of society: that historical study is not merely a luxury or a pleasure, the enrichment of a private life, but an essential intellectual discipline—indeed, more essential than the new disciplines which threaten to undermine it.

I recognize that this is not the view of everyone, or even of all historians. In the past, history has been defended, at the highest level, on other grounds. The men of the Renaissance looked to it for moral examples. The Romantics saw it as an escape from the present. The great German historians of the nineteenth century saw it as an end in itself, an undeviating fidelity to indispensable fact. But whatever we may owe to the work of these men, I cannot share their philosophy. Moral examples, as Sir Philip Sidney wrote, can be found more purely in literature than in history: Spenser's *Faery Queen* is more edifying than the Lives of the Popes. Romantic historiography can be a travesty of truth which numbs the understanding of history; what damage was done to medieval history by the example of Sir Walter Scott! The great Germans of the nineteenth century have been followed by the less great Germans of the twentieth century who have nearly killed history by their kindness to the dispensable facts.

Among my own colleagues I find historical study defended on what seem to me most unstable grounds. On one side, I am assured, by a well-known and very able English historian, that history has no meaning, no lessons: its only function is to amuse. On another, I hear a somewhat shrill voice pouring contempt on all those of us who ask historical questions: history, he insists, is not the asking of questions (he is clearly no Greek scholar) but the relation of stories, in vigorous personal style and patriotic narrative form. And the most learned of all my English colleagues will recognize no historian who is readable, no historian who seeks to interpret evidence except for its own sake. To him, it seems, it is the technique that matters, and the highest praise that he will allow to an historian is that he is an expert, praised by other experts, for his documentary expertise.

I am afraid that I dissent from all these views. To me history has lessons: I would find it hard to be interested in it otherwise. I simply cannot read history for amusement only, as so many people can. Equally, I find myself impatient of mere expertise: the expertise of Schoolmen exhibiting their own professional virtuosity without leading the layman to any interesting suggestion or conclusion. To me history is an intellectual pursuit, which entails the constant asking of questions. Of course the answers to those questions are provisional, not dogmatic, for the science is empirical, not deductive; and I regard interpretation as an inseparable part of the exercise. Philosophically, I find myself most sympathetic, in theory at least, to the 'philosophic historians' of the eighteenth century—or at least to the best of them: for admittedly their philosophy, being sometimes insufficiently ballasted with fact, could run away with them. I admire erudition, and enjoy penetrating

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to the evidence of history; but always it is with interpretation in mind. Historians who are not always aware of the questions which they should be answering, or of the laymen for whom they should be answering them, have little to say to me.

But I am not here concerned to weigh historians or identify myself with a particular historical philosophy. I am concerned to state the reasons why I believe that the study of history is not only a form of entertainment, at least to the writers, but also a necessary intellectual discipline: why I think that it should be not left as a private luxury to those who have leisure to indulge it, but taught as an essential academic subject.

Briefly, I think that the study of history is a necessary intellectual discipline for two reasons. First, it is an indispensable ingredient in other disciplines; secondly, it is, in itself, an intellectually stabilizing force. These two reasons are connected, and it is difficult to separate them in explanation. Nor shall I try artificially to separate them; I shall try to express my own conception of historical study and thereby allow them to disengage themselves.

FOR what is historical study in itself? I think that all historians would agree that it is not now (as it was in earlier times) a mere narrative of public events. Nor is it merely (as the Romantic writers treated it) a narrative of public events decorated and brought nearer to us by social illustration. It is an attempt to perceive the objective reality of a previous period, and to perceive it as part of a *continuum* which includes the present. Renaissance historians, for their moral purposes, selected from the surface of the past: great individual figures, or heroic episodes, or noble examples, were isolated from their trivial context of petty fact and temporary circumstance and seen all the more vividly in that isolation. Romantic historians made an artificial gulf between past and present in order that the one might provide an escape from the other. But a modern historian, whatever permanent lessons he may have learned and retained from his predecessors (and it would be a cheap form of modernity in any historian to refuse such lessons), does not seek such isolation or such escape. He sees any historical period as a totality. The politics of the past, to him, are real politics, like those of the present, taking place in a particular context—a social, economic, intellectual context—and that context is both glutinous and, in spite of all circumstantial differences, recognizable. It is glutinous in the sense that particular persons or episodes cannot be seen correctly if detached from it, and it is recognizable in the sense that it is the context of a real world, comparable with the real world about us. Of course in many ways it may be very different from our modern world; but the modern historian tries to recognize its differences as well as its similarities; indeed it is only by recognizing its differences that he can define and hope to understand the degree of its similarity, and make comparisons.

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The difference, of course, is that in dealing with the present we take the context for granted, whereas in dealing with the past we have to discover it intellectually. But the recognition that we cannot take it for granted, that we have to discover it, is one of the most important changes which have taken place in the study of history in the last century. In the Middle Ages, in the century of the Renaissance, there was no such sense of the past: the context of century after century was seen as a permanent theatre in which only the actors constantly changed. Just as the artists of the Quattrocento painted scenes from the Old Testament, or from the life of Christ, against a modern background of Tuscan or Umbrian villages, populated by the stirring coloured peasant life of fifteenth-century Italy; just as Shakespeare's actors represented the senators of Caesar's Rome, or the barbarian chieftains of Macbeth's Scotland, in the ruffs and doublets of Jacobean England; so even the boldest and most modern of Renaissance historians —even Machiavelli and his disciples—would see the political lessons of Antiquity, the political maxims of Tacitus, as directly transferable to their own times. Even the great historians of the Enlightenment, even Gibbon himself, who certainly studied society in depth, seem to us, too often, insensibly to place the events of the past in a modern, eighteenth-century context; and in 1834 Macaulay could write, with his invariable confidence, as one enunciating a truism, that 'a Christian of the fifth century with a Bible is neither better nor worse situated than a Christian of the nineteenth century with a Bible . . . the absurdity of the literal interpretation was as great and as obvious in the sixteenth century as it is now'.[1] On which one is tempted to exclaim with that great Dutch historian, the late Pieter Geyl, 'An extraordinary statement indeed! How can a man who expects the early Christians and the Protestants in the first flush of their fervour to read in the Bible what he, son of the Enlightenment and of Utilitarianism, finds there—how can such a man penetrate into the spirit of the past?'[2]

No historian today, not even the boldest and rashest, would dare to echo the words of Macaulay. In our less confident age—precisely because we live in a less confident age—we recognize the relativity of ideas, even of axioms. To us the liberal certitudes of the nineteenth century, the rational certitudes of the eighteenth century, are no longer certain. They are relative. They may contain permanent truths, but we are not sure. We see them as the assumptions of one age and, as such, they do but prolong, in another form, the devalued certitudes of earlier ages. This new relativity has transformed our approach to the past. What a world of difference there is between the Middle Ages of Augustin Thierry and the Middle Ages of Marc Bloch, between the Renaissance of Jules Michelet or even of Jacob Burckhardt and the Renaissance whose intellectual climate has been reconstructed in our own time by scholars like Fritz Saxl, Eugenio Garin, Frances Yates!

[1] Macaulay, *Essays*, 'Ranke's History of the Popes'.
[2] Pieter Geyl, *Debates with Historians* (Groningen and the Hague, 1955), p. 24.

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To me this sense of the past, this recognition of a constantly changing social context and a constantly changing set of intellectual assumptions, within which historical events, *l'histoire événementielle,* takes place, and by which apparent similarities may be turned into real differences, is one of the rewards of historical study. But it is also, I believe, part of the objective value of history; and it is at this point that I can begin to divide my argument into its two related strands. For, first, the study of history is, I believe, relevant to the present: it is not a mere academic exercise, or an enjoyable luxury; and because it is relevant, we cannot afford to take risks; it is important that we should appreciate its full depth and complexity. And, secondly, the historical context, as I have tried to describe it, is not exclusive to history. Other disciplines also partake, far more than our ancestors thought—far more than the specialists in those disciplines often seem to think—of the same context.

LET us consider first the relevance of the past to the present. This is an old theme on which scholars and statesmen have played many variations. But it is nevertheless true. The modern anti-historians speak and write as if our own age was post-historical, sufficient to itself: or at least as if the industrialization of the last half-century had so transformed society, even humanity, that no useful comparisons could be made with pre-industrial society, no useful lessons drawn from it.

To this I would answer that, on the contrary, in all subjects, the most useful comparisons are precisely those which are made across a contextual frontier: for it is only by comparing what is not exactly comparable that we can isolate the variable elements and come to tested conclusions. If I were considering (for instance) the ways in which small heretical movements can grow into political forces, I would not wish to study only the communist or fascist parties of the twentieth century. The common background being taken for granted, we might too easily fail to notice some distinguishing reason. I would wish to study also the Calvinists of the sixteenth century, the Christians of the Roman Empire. By comparing movements thus separated in time, movements whose very different contexts have to be separately and intellectually apprehended, we would be more likely to isolate the determining forces, less likely to be satisfied with superficial generalizations. In other words, we would be more likely to understand.

Again, circumstances change and sometimes, when they change, mere contemporary experience cannot provide a parallel, or a key, to the new events. For what is historically possible in one century may not be historically possible in another. As Voltaire wrote, in his *Lettres Philosophiques* (and the remark was taken over by Gibbon as 'an obvious truth'),[3] a Cardinal de Retz, in the eighteenth century, would not have roused ten women of Paris to riot, and a Cromwell would have been a

[3] Voltaire, *Lettres Philosophiques*, 7ème lettre. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. lxx.

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mere merchant of London. Who could have imagined a Hitler or a Stalin in nineteenth-century Europe? When they emerged, in twentieth-century Europe, the men of the nineteenth century, who still ruled in the West, could not recognize them. They had known nothing like them in their own time, and so, through ignorance of history, because their range of human examples was limited to their own time, they translated them into their own language. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, those great panjandrums of Fabian socialism, so insufferable in their omniscience and self-conceit—how they remind me of some of our more modern sociologists!—went to communist Russia in the 1930s and came back to complete a huge work on the subject, in which they assured the faithful that Stalin was not a tyrant, not a dictator, not even a monarch, but only a conscientious Fabian bureaucrat, the secretary of a committee, the Sidney Webb of the liberal social democracy of all the Russias.[4] Neville Chamberlain, that no less obstinate, no less well-meaning man, equally confident that all useful knowledge was contained in the experience of the present—of his present, of late nineteenth-century Birmingham—was just as convinced that he understood Hitler. Were they not both men of the industrial age, realists who, in spite of some differences of opportunity and upbringing, must have the same fundamental ideas? 'With the mentality of a businessman', writes Sir John Wheeler-Bennett,[5] 'he was used to striking a bargain by which, though the shareholders in some subsidiary company might suffer temporarily, the corporation as a whole would benefit in the long run'; and he assumed that Hitler, behind all the vulgarity and the rodomontade, had a similar mentality. It would have been better for humanity if these well-meaning men had been less confident; if they had recognized that Hitler and Stalin were phenomena whose like were not to be found in their own limited life-span, but must be sought where they would be found, in remoter history.

To make historical parallels is a dangerous game, and to suppose that the past provides an easy key to the present is a vulgar error. No historical situation ever recurs exactly: only the crudest historical autodidact would defend the study of history by so naive an assumption. The historian knows that no moment of history ever returns: that the determining forces of any situation are too many, too complex; that they are largely intangible, often unobserved, dependent as much upon elusive moral forces as upon calculable facts; and that it is inconceivable that the exact mixture and the exact balance should ever be repeated. But this does not mean that we should study history less: rather we should study it more, or more carefully, in order that we may be more aware of this subtlety and this complexity: that we may recognize the wide range of human behaviour, and not be surprised by the sudden contrast between that range and our up-to-date but rootless parochialism.

[4] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism, a New Civilisation* (1935).
[5] Sir John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich, Prologue to Tragedy* (1948), p. 40.

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The difficulty is, the layman wants quick answers. He has been told, by the pundits, that history is a science, and so he asks for exact answers. What, precisely, are the 'lessons' of history? What does it predict in this or that situation? We know, of course, that there are no such tabloid answers. History is a means of understanding, not a set of formulae. Those who claim more from it, claim too much. In the same way, we are often asked, about the great historians, what was their historical philosophy; and we are expected to give quick answers, or our critics will be dissatisfied either with us or with them. But the very complexity of history, which prevents it from giving short answers to the one question, disqualifies the other also. The historical philosophy of some historians can no doubt be expressed simply; but those are the system-mongers whose work seldom lasts long or provides a reliable guide. The great historians have always been those who have not sought either to extract too positive answers from historical evidence, or to supply too systematic a philosophy. And yet, what is history if it is not always looking for answers, tentative though they may have to be? Historical truth is not worth cultivating for its own sake: there are too many unimportant truths; and if truth once becomes secondary, we might as well read historical novels, or poetry. *The Iliad, Don Quixote, War and Peace* are a thousand times better than mere historical finality.

THEREFORE I will insist on historical philosophy. A work of history that is inspired by no philosophy, that despairs of answering any general question, that resigns itself to being a mere narrative, that buries itself in the ritual cult of its own documentation, seems to me a barren exercise. In this I agree with Polybius, the most inquisitive and philosophical of the ancient historians: 'Take away from History the questions Why, How and to what end things have been done, and whether the event corresponded to the intention, and what is left is a mere pageant, not a useful lesson; it may please us for a while but it leaves no lasting profit.' [6] The first of English 'philosophical historians', the founder of the chair at Oxford recently held by our modern Polybius, Sir Ronald Syme, made these words the epigraph of his most famous work of history [7]; and their sense was recapitulated, over a century later, by Gibbon, in a footnote on the historians of the Ottoman Turks: 'Dr Johnson praises Knolles as the first of historians, unhappy only in the choice of his subject. Yet I much doubt whether a partial and verbose compilation from Latin writers, 1,300 folio pages of speeches and battles, can either instruct or amuse an enlightened age, which requires from the historian some tincture of philosophy and criticism.' [8]

So, if I were to summarize my first reason for the study of history,

[6] Polybius, *Histories* III 31, 12–13.
[7] W. Camden, *Annales rerum Anglicarum et Hibernicarum, regnante Elizabetha* (1615), *Praefatio*.
[8] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. lxiv.

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I would say that it provides a necessary extension of the evidence for the social sciences. Such an extension is not only necessary in order to widen the range of evidence in a complex subject which its over-confident practitioners are too ready to simplify; it is also perhaps even more necessary in order to supply the movement which is an essential element in social equations. For history is sociology in movement: the empirical evidence of societies in action, and tested by action over a long period of time. I sometimes think that our modern sociologists see their social models as static constructions, and that the dynamic of time is needed in order to show how those models actually work—and whether they actually work. But this dimension of time, which alone shows us society in actual operation, is only ascertainable through the study of history; and as I cannot conceive of any useful historical study which does not include a study of the social context, so I cannot conceive of any useful sociological study which does not include an illustration of the model in action, subject to the driving force and obstruction of ideas, events, individual free will, human error: in other words, history.

But it is time to come to my second reason. It is a reason which stems from the same general conviction as the first, *viz.*: my belief that the study of history is today more complex than it has been thought to be in the past and that this complexity is due to what I have called its context; by which I mean, especially, the social and intellectual world which, at any given time, is taken for granted by those who live in it but which later historians must seek to reconstruct intellectually, because it supplies both the conditions and, in part, the explanation of those public events with which alone the older historians were concerned. My second reason for regarding the study of history as a necessary intellectual discipline, and not merely a luxury, is that without such a study, as I envisage it, the study of art, literature, ideas is incomplete and barren.

I am afraid that this may be thought an aggressive attitude. A few years ago, perhaps, I would not have expressed it thus. But I now believe that the specialization of studies has developed so far, and has been so exaggerated and distorted by external causes—by academic proliferation and pressure to publish—that only a greater deference to historical study can hold those other studies together and prevent them from dispersal into irrelevance. And I think that historical studies can so hold them together precisely because historical studies have that 'glutinous' context which I have described. But I shall try to explain myself a little less metaphorically.

It is a commonplace saying today—it has been a commonplace since Herder—that all the intellectual or artistic activities of men are rooted in the culture of their societies. This, to me, is an absolute truth. To me, also, as I have made clear, the history of men is the history of their societies and therefore of their culture. It therefore follows that, for me, the development in time of ideas, or of art, or of literature, is, to a large

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extent, not autonomous. Ideas do not breed ideas, nor art art, nor literature literature. The development of each is part of the development of society, i.e. it is part of history. To give a crude example, in order to understand how the classical poetry of the eighteenth century gave way to the romantic poetry of the nineteenth century, it is not enough to study the poetry of those two centuries, for the change was not purely internal to poetry: it was the reflexion, in poetry, of a change in society, a historical change, and therefore it is there, in history (as I have defined it), that the change must be studied, and its true motor found.

Having written that last paragraph, I feel almost ashamed of such banality. Surely this is a vulgar truism, hardly worth expression. And yet, it seems to me, it is a truism more often uttered than applied. Professors of literature write about literature and its history as if it were an entirely autonomous subject; they trace the pedigree of *language and style as if Herder had never lived, as if Ennius begat* Lucretius and Lucretius begat Vergil and Vergil begat Lucan and Lucan begat Statius in a pure and insulated Republic of Letters without any reference to the great social changes which were taking place in, and overturning, the Republic of Rome. Similarly 'historians of science' write about the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century as if one discovery, or machine, bred another in similar insulation, without reference to the wider intellectual revolution of which, to us historians, that scientific revolution is an integral part; and 'historians of ideas' ascribe a similarly self-contained intellectual pedigree to ideas themselves: the idea of the decay of nature, or the plurality of worlds, or the mixed constitution, or the social contract, is pursued in a rarefied intellectual world of academic parthenogenesis.

Of course I exaggerate. Of course there are some wonderful works of scholarship which disprove my jaundiced assertions. Joseph Needham's work on Chinese science (however contested by warring sinologues), Marcel Bataillon's incomparable work on Erasmianism in Spain, the writings on Spanish literature of Americo Castro, Erich Haase's posthumous work on the literature of the Huguenot Diaspora, the art-historical writings of Emile Mâle . . . it would be easy to compile a long list of books which have given new significance to the study of literature and art, science and thought, by re-annexing them to the historical context with which they were organically connected. But such a list, I think, would only prove my point: that it is the historical dimension which gives that significance and makes those subjects live.

BUT let us not be too historiocentric. The formula can also be reversed. History too can become detached from that cultural context which it shares with other humane studies, and by that separation can dwindle into insignificance. We have seen this happen in the past, and we have also seen the process reversed. Medieval studies, which seemed so prosperous in England a generation ago, have declined

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steeply since; and they have declined, I believe, precisely because they have become thus insulated, whereas in France they have been revived largely through the great work of Marc Bloch, who reunited them with the major, and continuing problems of society and culture. Detached from those human problems, history, like any other form of study, will always wilt; re-attached to them, it can always, I think, revive.

And I think that it is a duty, not merely a pleasure, to revive it and keep it alive. The study of history is, after all, the only study we have which effectively articulates the passage of humanity through time. Before history begins, we have no sense of time; and the future, I believe, is unpredictable except in the most tentative and conditional manner. Of its duration we cannot speak, and although we may make limited predictions for the next century at most, which are likely to be wrong (who could ever have predicted the events of the twentieth century?), we certainly cannot go beyond that. Therefore the few thousand years of history are the only period during which we can study, empirically, the forms and limits of the social behaviour of man. We talk easily about the future. The anti-historians wish to sacrifice the past to the future: knowledge about the past to speculations about the the future. But how can we guide ourselves through the future without the stabilizing experience of the past? Perhaps we shall not have a future. In that case past history will be the sum of human experience. But I prefer to agree with Bertrand Russell that 'it is not too late to hope that mankind will have a future as well as a past. I believe that if men are to feel this hope with sufficient vividness to give it dynamic power, the awareness of history is one of the greatest forces of which the beneficent appeal must be felt'.[9]

[9] Bertrand Russell, *Portrait from Memory and Other Essays* (1956), p. 193.

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Our Current Sense of History

Ernest Gellner

THE horizon is generally conspicuous, whereas the surrounding landscape, close to us, is taken for granted. Yet, in the social and historical world (and perhaps in some measure in the physical world also), the horizon we perceive depends on our more immediate environment and its general features. A forest or a savannah, a local hillock or a hollow, make a great difference to the kind of skyline that is seen. But it is in the nature of things that what is close and familiar should also be treated with familiarity and contempt, and that its importance should normally be ignored. It is its ordinariness, obviousness, which causes us to take it for granted: but the hold it has over us is immeasurably strengthened precisely by the fact that we do take it for granted. What is noticed can be queried, but that which seems utterly obvious eludes questioning.

The horizon, by contrast, errs in the opposite direction. It is often quite spuriously dramatic. If you walk to the point on the distant skyline, you may well find, when you reach it, that it is just as ordinary a place as your starting point. But as long as it remains on the skyline, it occupies the dramatic point at which the sky meets land or water, the point where the sun sets or rises. It has a striking suggestiveness, and symbolizes our deeper or more ecstatic aspirations—quite unlike the close and dusty immediate locality, which tends instead to remind us of our compromises, shabbiness and mediocrity.

The horizons of a society, or at any rate of many societies, consist of a cosmogony and an eschatology, of an account of how things began and how they will end. As the horizon is dramatic, it is often easy to pick it out: the locals know how to talk about it, and ritual occasions abound which remind them to do so. Thus it is unlike some of those daily occurrences which may remain unnoticed or which may even be systematically obscured. But, of course, that which is highlighted and that which is obscured may be all of one piece, or at least they may complement each other. It is a commonplace of anthropological method that by skilfully interpreting that which is made conspicuous on the horizon, we may be led to a great deal of that which is hidden under one's very nose.

TO ask about the manner in which history enters our vision is, in a way, to ask about the manner in which our horizons are related to the style of our daily life. This being so, one might as well begin with a typology of the kinds of horizon a society can have.

We can develop a typology by using the currently fashionable method of binary oppositions and seeing the types which are generated

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in this manner. The differences in attitude to history which one should expect to be relevant are these:

(1) Naturalistic/discontinuous. A society is naturalistic if it assumes that the events on the horizon are and must be similar in kind to the ordinary events of daily life. Modern societies are naturalistic in this sense. They do not take seriously either an Age of the Gods or an Age of the Heroes, in Vico's terms. But most societies are not naturalistic in this way.

(2) Within the class of societies which have non-naturalistic horizons, it is possible to distinguish between simple and ramified background stories. A ramified one will recognize two or more successive stages, basically dissimilar, within the general framework of the horizon story—such as, indeed, Vico's distinction between the Age of Gods and of Heroes. There is then a double skyline on the horizon—something that, after all, also happens in the physical world.

(3) Cutting across these distinctions, there is the difference between historical and a-historical societies. A rough criterion would be whether a society accumulates more and more generations with the passage of time, whether the ordinary world within the horizons *grows* in size with time, or whether on the contrary the size of the plain within the horizons remains constant, as happens when systematic omission ensures that the number of generations separating the present from the Founding Father remains constant. There will of course be borderline cases between historical and a-historical societies.

(4) The presence or absence of a sense of social structure. By this is meant whether or not a society recognizes a radical difference in type of event, or of sequence, of story, *within* the daily, ordinary, non-horizon part of the world—in other words, whether it has a sense of different epochs, of radically different patterns of social life, where the difference is natural rather than supernatural. A simple society which takes for granted the institutional and conceptual framework within which its members act, has of course no such sense of social structure. Its own structure is invisible to it, and others are barely conceivable. Naïvely, it absolutizes one particular set of conventions. But even quite sophisticated societies or historians are capable of this simplicity. It is arguable that Gibbon's vision was of this kind, and I have heard this claim argued. So clearly, holding such a view does not disqualify a man from the highest ranks of creative intelligence.

The four binary oppositions considered give us 12 possibilities (allowing for the fact that one of the four oppositions applies only to one half of the field, for it only arises if a particular answer is given to one of the other alternatives). It might be interesting to explore the resulting typology in relation to concrete historical and ethnographic material. Our present problem, however, is to isolate features of our own sense of history. For this end, we need only specify our own position within this range of alternatives and then seek to add further refinements to the resulting profile.

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Our society is secularized/naturalistic, it sees the world as continuous rather than discontinuous, in as far as it does not take the supernatural cosmogonies and eschatologies, which it has inherited, with any degree of seriousness. It has not openly and generally disowned them, it merely surrounds them with a cloud of ambiguity, according them 'symbolic' status or whatnot, and it has been obliged to invent a special term, 'fundamentalist', for those who actually claim to take them seriously.

This being so, the question whether the horizon is simple or ramified does not arise. In an important sense, we have no horizon. What is on the horizon is known to be similar in type to the ordinary stuff of daily life.

We are, clearly, an historical society. Generations are not spirited away by genealogical hocus-pocus, or by indifference, but, on the contrary, the slag heap of The Past is ever growing. Some have feared that the shadow it casts may tend to stifle us. Be that as it may: we clearly locate ourselves in a growing, cumulative temporal sequence, which does not obscure change, but records it. This, of course, is the first and most general reason why history is of interest to us. We are not alone in possessing this trait, but it is not a universal one either. Some simpler tribal societies quite independently possess it, and some complex, urban, literate societies do not.

Finally, within the horizonless and cumulative temporal setting, we do have a sense of successive and radically differentiated social structures. We do not suppose that men throughout history have played the same game, that they were like us, only (at most) wearing different clothes and using different tools and weapons. On the contrary, we know that the games played have changed drastically.

This, then, is the profile of our historical sense. It is a very abstract outline, and a good deal more will need to be said before it becomes really informative. But the additional points which need to be made may be approached through questions arising about this outline. The various questions are cross-related, and they are:

What is a social structure, as opposed to mere historical narrative? Be it noted that reputable thinkers exist who consider accurate narrative to be the only legitimate form of history, and who repudiate the abstract structures sought by sociologists and anthropologists.[1] To answer this question—concerning the nature and status of these 'structures'—is in effect to discuss the relation of history to anthropology and sociology.

[1] For instance, Mrs Shirley Letwin writes (*Spectator*, 9 January 1971, pp. 52, 54):

'. . . historians are not concerned with what might have happened, they try to explain what actually did happen. They do not explain an event in terms of its connexion with universal laws; they trace its connexion with other events. . . . as long as he remains an historian, he . . . [does not use] events to illustrate laws.'

Mrs Letwin, who clearly here speaks as the representative of a whole school, proceeds, rightly from her viewpoint, to repudiate Max Weber, ideal types, and the whole Kantian notion that rational explanation must mean subsumption under general law. The contrasted ideal appears to be accurate narrative, rational in some other, non-Kantian sense.

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Specifically, which particular structures, or classifications of structures, do we find relevant in categorizing our historical experience—and why?

Given that an important function was performed by the 'horizon' in societies which possessed it, and given that we are horizonless, at least in the old sense, what (if anything) performs that role for us?

If it should turn out that this role is now performed by the social sciences and/or 'futurology', just how do they perform it and what kind of sensitivity do they instill?

In the light of all this, how do we need to refine our initial classification of historical perspectiveness by a typology of horizons and horizon-surrogates?

VERY roughly, a story is a sequence of events fused not merely by continuity (ideally, there ought to be no gaps), but above all by the fact that they happen to an individual or a community which experiences and conceives them as a unity, as its own fate or destiny or adventure. Perhaps it is of the essence of a story that the sequence should be more than contingent and less than necessary.[2] Such a definition is no doubt question-begging, or rather buck-passing, in that it shifts the burden to the question of just how the individual (or community) comes to attribute unity to a sequence of events, and indeed, to how he himself comes to credit himself with unity. One may well suspect that the unity of a self and of a story are correlative, mutually dependent notions.

A very sketchy answer—which is all that we shall offer—to this question is one which invokes the notion of 'structure', which is both complementary and contrasted to the idea of a 'story'. What makes the sequence of moves in (say) a chess game into *one* game, which can (in the case of chess) be turned not merely into a narrative but into a precise and unambiguous one, is, over and above the fact that the moves happen consecutively in one place, the fact that they presuppose a shared set of rules which connect one move with the next. Naïve narrative history takes such rules for granted. Sociological history, at the very least, attempts to elicit and specify them. What is the status of these rules?

Some, but some only, are supplied by nature. When the hero of a story undergoes an adventure in which bodily survival is at issue, when he must avoid physical destruction, starvation or exposure, we understand the 'logic of the situation' without needing to presuppose any information about his specifically social environment, about the cultural conventions within which he operates. But these natural constraints only account for a small proportion of the connexions in a story sequence—for the need to swim to the shore when the boat capsizes, for the need to seek food and shelter on the island. The

[2] Cf. Bryce Gallie: *Philosophy and Historical Understanding* (London, 1964).

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natural needs also enter as partial constituents into many cultural requirements, without dictating their specific form. Nature decrees you must eat, culture decrees when, how and what.

By far the greater proportion of connexions in a story is made intelligible in a manner other than a simple invocation of a natural, physical law. The professional, ritual, familiar, political, and other activities of man are constrained by conventions and guided by ends which are not simply or at all derivable from shared biological needs. Those needs certainly set limits to the kind of connexions that a society can exhibit, but they most certainly do not determine their specific form. The nexus between an act and its consequences, or between the failure to perform it and another set of consequences, is dictated not by nature, but is somehow the consequence of a given social structure. A social 'structure' is, in a way, a system of such regular connections and the manner in which they are enforced. As stated, it somehow ensures that those consequences flow in a certain pattern (for a social environment is by no means wholly unpredictable). It somehow ensures it—but *how*?

One facile, occasionally popular, but empirically and otherwise quite inadequate answer is what might be called the 'Brave New World' solution—the view that concepts are so firmly internalized by members of given societies that they become, in practice, just as compulsive as natural necessity. The insulted man of honour 'must' fight a duel, the believer 'must' kneel, and so forth. But empirically, it simply is not true that men are quite so completely enslaved to the concepts and norms of their societies. Just as significantly, those concepts and norms are generally ambiguous and less than fully determinate in their requirements, leaving adequate loopholes for opportunism and variation in strategy. The socialization process is often less than homogenous in what it indoctrinates, and its effectiveness in ensuring the internalization of what it preaches varies a good deal.

WHAT, then, is the answer?

We know, roughly, the elements which go into the answer. The manner in which these elements combine and contribute to the explanation of a given social situation can only be worked out by a specific investigation into that particular situation. The elements are the various forms of restraint and quasi-restraint which delimit human conduct. Physical, natural constraint, on its own, accounts for a small part: in every society, much more is physically possible than is socially, 'morally' possible. A social system is a system of un-thinkables and un-doables. A sociological account of it explains how these limits came to be, but does not, like the society under consideration, take these for granted. Over and above physical restraints, it can invoke the range of available concepts, and, with great caution, the hold these concepts have over the members of the society. Pure unaided conceptual constraint

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may sometimes be adequate, though this needs to be carefully demonstrated in each case. But most generally, the constraint is situational: the institutions surrounding an individual limit his options. Some options are barred by a variety of social sanctions—punishments, ridicule, loss of social credit and standing which the individual knows he will need for many other ends, and which he must husband carefully. Such options as *are* open, are generally open only by grace of the social arrangement, so to speak: most actions involve effecting changes which require the co-operation of others, which are beyond the unaided physical powers of the agent. The enlistment of the required cooperation requires at the very least, that the act to be performed is recognizable and sanctioned within the local institutional framework. Most 'actions' can only be performed if they have a recognized local name and status. New 'actions' do indeed, from time to time, emerge *prior* to their social recognition and christening: this is the most interesting form of social change. But this process can also be seized and explained by the kind of sociological explanation under consideration.

A model of a social structure must sketch the situation in which the individual pawn in the game finds himself, showing the 'rules' which limit his possible moves—and above all, showing how those rules are sanctioned. The pawn cannot do *this* because it would arouse the wrath of his neighbours, he cannot do *that* because the idea of it is simply absent and, even if *he* could conceive of it, he could not enlist the required support because no one would know what he was up to, and he cannot do *the other* because it would ruin him economically, and so forth. In as far as the situation leaves him some choice, this must be taken into consideration in accounting for the constraints placed on his neighbours: what would happen to their position in turn if he, or he and too many others, took this option rather than that?

The 'rules' under discussion are of course not the same thing as the normative rules recognized within the society itself, though such normative rules, if well sanctioned, can figure amongst the constraints on conduct. What is at issue are 'rules' in the sense of *effective* limitations on conduct. As it is not generally possible to work out an adequate power-and-constraint balance sheet for every individual, in practice it must be sufficient to do this for typical individuals in standard situations, plus some reasons for believing that not too many individuals deviate from this, and that such deviations as do inevitably occur do not disrupt the system, but are somehow absorbed by it. It then follows that for similar 'ideal types', i.e. social situations defined by similar premises, similar consequences follow. This is a matter of simple logic: from similar premises, other things equal, similar consequences must follow. And as a matter of fact, there is some justification for such a strategy: patterns of constraint do not appear to be endlessly various, there seems to be some justification for the hope that similar premises are crucial for defining more than one society. There do seem to be

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'structural similarities'. Models exist which do illuminate large classes of societies.

Thus generalization enters indirectly, as a consequence of the applicability of 'ideal types'. Generalizations of a different kind also enter in as far as they are invoked to explain the connections between items within various models or ideal types. This kind of generalization, borrowed rather promiscuously from anywhere, is admittedly invoked ad hoc and in a rough and ready manner.

Thus generalization enters somewhat indirectly. On the other hand, the ideal types themselves are an essential, integral part of the method, and indispensable. There is no alternative to using them. The alternative is not some brave, tough-minded history, a pure unadorned narrative of 'what really happened', but only a childish narrative which takes the nexus between events for granted.

The account here offered of the nature of sociological method and of 'structure', its key concept, is a moderately materialist one. It is materialist in its insistence on starting from the physical constraints given by nature, and also in its insistence that conceptual constraints are never self-explanatory, that they can only be accepted as elements in an explanation if it is shown how they in turn are sanctioned, how a situation arises in which men cannot easily evade them. The account is moderate in its materialism through its clear recognition of the fact that the pattern of physical constraints given by the environment, by ecology and available technology, seldom if ever uniquely determines the rest of the system: in other words, there most certainly is no one-one correlation between 'base' and 'super-structure'. It does not exclude the possibility that on some occasions the socialization process inculcates some concepts so firmly that their internationalization and compulsiveness may be sufficient to explain some particular human conduct: but it is very suspicious of such explanations, on the grounds that, in most cases, concepts need to be sanctioned externally as well as internally if they are to be truly compelling. The protestant who follows his faith without external ritual, the revolutionary who defies the external political symbolism of legitimacy and recognizes only his own inner political light, may exist, but they are rare in their pure inner-directedness. Moreover it is doubtful whether, sociologically speaking, they are often quite so pure: apparently pure inner-directedness often has some covert external reinforcement.

THE structuralism here outlined and commended is meant to be an account of old-fashioned, square, not-with-it structuralism, which is not very close to currently fashionable *Structuralisme*. The latter movement, if I understand it rightly, is a crypto-epistemological doctrine, starting from a point which was once a commonplace in the Idealist polemic against empiricism: namely, that signs are not just echoes of things, trace-marks of experience, but that, on the contrary, they can only function as parts of a system, that to understand them one must

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see the system of alternatives of which they form a part. The essence of 'John' is not its relation to John, but its relation to 'Peter', 'Paul' and so forth. The system of terms faces the system of things, and *each* is to be understood more through its internal structure and its generation, than through some simple echo-relation between them both.

Modern *Structuralisme* differs from Idealism primarily by not contenting itself with formulating this, in the abstract, as a criticism of empiricism, but by endeavouring to be specific, concrete, operational, and showing just how these cognitive systems are constructed and how they work. Chomsky starts from the fact that the boundary between what is and is not an acceptable sentence in a given language can be indicated, and an abstract model can then be constructed which will show how the sentences within the range of acceptable ones can be 'generated'. Lévi-Strauss, using material which is ethnographic and less clearly self-defining than is the material of linguistics, and procedures which are suggestive rather than rigorous and precise, attempts something which is meant to be analogous in the more difficult, elusive and fluid spheres such as those of mythology.

It seems to me that the kind of old structuralism which I am sketching and commending is both narrower and broader than the currently fashionable *Structuralisme*. It is narrower in that one of its central concerns is not with what a society can conceive or say, but what kind of thing it actually does. It is concerned with conceptual limits in those cases in which they are crucial in limiting conduct; in those numerous other cases where the limits of actual conduct remain well within the limits of the conceivable, it is concerned with those other, non-conceptual constraints that were actually operative. The sociologist and the anthropologist must be concerned with many non-conceptual constraints, and it is not clear that (or how) these could have a logic similar to the generation of possibilities by (say) the combination of polar opposites. Moreover, the sociologist must also be very concerned with that most fascinating form of social change which occurs when conduct breaks through the conceptual barrier of a society, when people do something for which as yet they have no name, no niche within their system of classifications.

At the same time, the concerns of the sociologist are also broader than those of the *Structuraliste*. The range of what is thinkable and the way it arises is something which must itself be explained. The present *Structuraliste* vogue in sociology, with its idea—or jargon—of treating society as a 'code', is open to a number of suspicions or cautions. For one thing, the units of social life are far less clearly defined than those of language and much less homogeneous in kind. Linguists are fortunate in possessing a domain whose units are at least relatively self-defining and isolable. But actions seldom have the comparatively clear outline of a word or a sentence. They are certainly not all transmitted or experienced in more or less the same medium, as language is.

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Moreover, a society, if it is a 'language' at all, is a much more loosely defined one than is language in the literal sense. Its sanctions are forever breaking down. A 'transformational linguist' can separate, relatively easily, acceptable from unacceptable word sequences in a given language, and proceed to seek the rules which generate the former and exclude the latter. The sociologist has no such initial advantage. There is not much sense in describing any social event as 'unacceptable' (sociologically speaking that is, of course, not morally), and there is no clear equivalent in social behaviour to the incompetent user of a language.

Indeed, the whole *Problemstellung* is radically different. Though the sanctions are ever breaking down in social life, giving us but a hazy boundary between that which is acceptable and that which is not (sociologically, of course, nor morally), at the same time the concrete nature of those sanctions, despite or because of their frequent failure, is of central interest to the investigation. This is not so in linguistics. The linguist is quite content with an abstract model of the generative procedure and its enforcement, leaving its concrete identification to some distant future advances in neuro-physiology. For the sociologist, the concrete identification of the sanctions is central and cannot be postponed.

The nature of the questions also differs in other ways. The sociologist, though interested in what could happen, is quite particularly concerned with what does happen. In other words, if society were a language, he could be said to be more concerned with *parole* than with *langue*. Moreover, he is quite particularly interested in the actual sequence of 'messages' and the way in which earlier items constrain later ones. This is hardly so in linguistics, which cannot have very much to say about the way in which earlier members of long sequences constrain later ones. (Long soliloquies are seldom uniquely determined.) For the linguist, what is of interest is the so-to-speak vertical nexus between the rules and the individual utterance. (These rules, admittedly, may sometimes exclude certain sequences.) For the sociologist, this kind of interest (which can only very partially be satisfied owing to the looseness of these vertical rules, in sociology), is at least rivalled by the concern with the horizontal nexus between successive events.

Thus, although social actions are presumably generated from some kind of matrix, and are selected from a bounded range of alternatives whose possibilities are limited by the elements used by a social system and by the rules for combining them, nevertheless the relationships between social actions, and the relationships between messages, are in many profound ways very different. In the end, a society is a more complex thing than a language. The problems which need to be answered are different in kind. The tempting analogies which seem to inspire *structuralisme* are suspect. The sociologist must beware of

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two dangers: those supposedly hard-headed historians or realists who deny the need of any account more powerful and abstract than mere narrative, and those over-optimistic and eager souls who think they can easily borrow and fruitfully adapt a formal model from simpler and perhaps more fortunate fields such as linguistics or even phonetics.

OUR present concern is with the relation of history to anthropology and sociology. It may be useful to go back to the chess analogy. A game of chess is, most emphatically, a story, a sequence of events meaningfully connected. Moreover, a precise notation exists for telling the story, without ambiguity. A sociological account, however, is analogous to explaining the story to someone, say a child, who is unfamiliar with the rules of chess: the rules must be specified, and it must be explained why and how they constrain certain moves, why some moves are mandatory, others preferable, some forbidden, some allowed but disastrous. To begin with, a sociologist is like a man among a population of chess experts who are so familiar with the game that its rules are nowhere written down. He must elicit the rules from the games in progress and relate them to the development of each game.

But his task is harder still. The rules of chess are very stable, and they are imposed on each game by a convention external to that game, a convention which is a kind of absolute and extraneous datum as far as any one game is concerned. The account of the origin of that convention, and the processes by which it is sustained, is in no way part of the analysis of an individual game. Not so for the sociologist. The tacit rules or constraints limiting human behaviour are not stable, and the mechanisms which enforce them are not extraneous to the story in progress: on the contrary, from the sociologist's viewpoint, they are by far the most interesting aspect of that game. Many societies believe, of course, that the ground-rules *are* extraneously imposed: they shift onto the supernatural the responsibility for their own conventions. But this is an illusion from which the sociologist is professionally debarred. *The constraints, the 'rules' within which social life is played out, are themselves a consequence of the game.* (The only things given extraneously are the rules imposed by nature, but they are minimal and in an important way unspecific: they leave quite open just *how* their imperatives are satisfied. They only require *that* they be satisfied.) A 'structural' account of a society is an account of how this comes to be: how the game itself generates and sustains the limits within which it is played. This is the really crucial fact about sociological method. This manner of formulating it shows why the task is so much harder than that of a chess analyst, who has no need to explain just why the players will not knock over the board, why the rook will not move diagonally, and so forth.

It would no doubt be unfair to imply that 'pure' historians are like chess journalists who give accounts of the development of given games

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without realizing that the rules themselves must be specified and cannot be taken for granted. In fact historians do frequently explain the nexus between successive events in an historical sequence, and indicate what background factors sanctioned, so to speak, the particular connexion. But for better or worse, they do it ad hoc and unsystematically. I suppose that the most plausible case that could be made out for anti-sociological history would maintain that this can indeed be best done, or done only, in an ad hoc manner. Sociology is based on the hope or conviction that it can be done systematically and not ad hoc.

Social anthropology is interestingly contrasted to narrative history, in that everything is the other way around, as it were: narratives do occur within anthropology, but it is precisely the narrative which is ad hoc, illustrative, unsystematic, unbound by any obligation to be complete and rounded off. It is the structural account which is central —the specification of the constraining limits and their sanctions. The ideal sought is a kind of stalemate situation, the demonstration that whatever move is attempted by any participant, the resulting situation must needs remain the same. (This does not mean that the method is committed to some absurd postulate of universal social stability. Non-circular as well as circular situations can be constrained. Circular ones are only the simplest and most manageable ones.) The structure is the thing, the stories are incidental.

It is of course natural that anthropology should have developed these traits. It was initially concerned with milieux that were highly exotic, with games whose rules were far from familiar. At the same time, lack of historical records in the societies in question made long story-sequences hard to come by, and such records as happened to be available were highly suspect. Hence a concentration on eliciting the tacit structures was imposed both by the inherent nature of the material, and by the lack of opportunity for other concerns.

But why should a similar attitude be mandatory closer to home, where fascinating and well-documented 'stories' are available, and where at the same time the rules of the game are not so exotic and unfamiliar?

For one thing, it seems to me that the familiarity, or at any rate the intelligibility, of the local rules of the game is an illusion. Though a society is not nearly as similar to a language or a code as current fashion would have it, nevertheless I am sure that what Chomsky says in the abstract and negatively about grammar is also true about the rules of social life:

> 'Clearly the rules and principles of . . . grammar are *not accessible to consciousness in general,* though some undoubtedly are . . . what we discover . . . is that those principles and rules that are accessible to consciousness are interspersed in some obscure and apparently chaotic way among others that are not, the whole complex . . . constituting a system of a very tight and intricate design. . .'[3]

[3] John Locke Lectures, given in Oxford in 1969. Italics mine.

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No doubt we are in thrall to a kind of social Unconscious, to a set of partly obscured conventions or rules governing our own operations, though this unconscious is not at all of a Freudian kind (which was merely a weird and wild caricature of the kind of connexions we recognize consciously). Nothing is more false than the supposition that we have easy, direct, and privileged access to the conventions governing our own conduct simply because it is our conduct, because we 'live' through the concepts which accompany it. We have nothing of the kind.

What follows is that the whole notion of restricting history to an account of 'how it really was' is an absurdity. It is common to criticize this idea on the grounds that 'what really happened' needs to be selected and interpreted. No doubt. But the really crucial objection is that the connexions between events that 'really happened' are anything but self-evident, and that such self-evidence as they may seem to have for the participants is illusory.

In some measure, the rapid and dramatic nature of social change has brought this point home. Contemporary history is seldom a long story within a stable and familiar game. It does not encourage the illusion of the self-evident status of the rules of the game. It does not any longer make social structure invisible through excessive familiarity. On the contrary, it makes it painfully problematical. Our social environment is like the controls of a very unfamiliar vehicle. We gingerly press the accelerator, and find it to be a brake. We slam the foot on the brake and find it to be an accelerator. In such conditions, the illusion that there are no hidden mechanisms, that the role of the social levers is self-evident and inscribed into the nature of things, and that their instinctive mastery is our birthright—these illusions are no longer so tempting. Profoundly alien and barely intelligible conventions and connexions are not exotic and distant, but close to home—and sometimes they envelop us.

All this being so, the sociologizing of history, the acquisition of the kind of sensitivity possessed by the anthropologist, is natural and inevitable.

WITHIN its seriously held cognitive stock, our society possesses only naturalistic and tentative cosmogonies, whose role in charting current social arrangements is negligible; and, in the literal sense, it possesses no eschatologies at all.

But given that cosmogonies and eschatologies, or what we have called the social horizons, did in the past constitute an important part of the vision of societies, one may well ask—what performs their role today?

The answer is obvious. The horizons have, so to speak, collapsed into the present. The crucial events which are the charters of moralities, which mould the decisive features of our life, which limit, articulate and help evaluate our options, are not on the sky-line, but, on the contrary,

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very close to home. The distant horizons, though not necessarily shabby or dull, are not very relevant. Contemporary history is not merely very dramatic, but, more significantly, it is crucial for the formulation, selection, validation of such alternatives as humanity may face. I used to think that we at any rate were a generation which could actually witness the drawing of the Social Contract, by observing the manner in which societies chose to 'develop' themselves. So we are, but it is really even deeper than that. We can witness a Creation story. Genesis is something that we read in the present tense.

Let us recapitulate possible types of cosmogonies. The list may not be exhaustive, but it will include those species that make claims on our attention.

(1) Traditional Genesis-type stories. Usually located in the fairly distant past. Characterized by the fact that they are structure-blind—the rules of that distant game, the outcome of which was *our world,* are taken for granted. In this kind of story, the dramatis personae are introduced (or is introduced, in the singular) and perform acts which bring about our world. Who or what decreed that they should have the options which they appear to have, and that the options should have the effects which, according to the story, they do have? Answer comes there none, for the question does not seem to have been asked. Take one example: there must, it seems, have been a kind of meta-world within which a deity chose, for ends which must make sense within that world and which would seem to be somewhat vainglorious, to create *our* world in order to augment its own prestige by receiving the adulation of its own creation. A curious story, and one which hardly lives up to the highest moral standards recognized *inside* our created world. Teachers, or manufacturers of artefacts, who openly avow the aim of having themselves praised by their own products, are somewhat comic figures. But what is relevant for our purpose is that this strange meta-story moves within a framework, the rules of which it takes for granted.

Charles Lamb has some apt comments on this curious acceptance of mysterious rules (*Essays of Elia: Witches and Other Night Fears*):

> 'That the intercourse was open at all between the two worlds was perhaps the mistake—but that once assumed, I see no reason for disbelieving one attested story of this nature more than another on the score of absurdity. There is no law to judge of the lawless, or canon by which a dream may be criticized.
>
> Our ancestors were bolder or more obtuse. Amidst the universal belief that (witches) were in league with the author of all evil, holding hell tributary to their muttering . . . no simple justice of the peace seems to have scrupled issuing . . . a warrant upon them—as if they should subpoena Satan! Prospero in his boat, with his books and wand about him, suffers himself to be conveyed away at the mercy of his enemies to an unknown island. He might have raised a storm or two, we think, on the passage . . . We do not know the laws of that country.'

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Lamb is tactfully commenting on those episodes in which the Other world impinges on our own, but his point is doubly valid for the Opening and Closing scenes of our drama, when the Other world initiates or terminates our play as a whole. 'We do not know the laws of that country.' Nor do we know those of our own, though when they are stable we may take them for granted. But just as in stable conditions our own are taken for granted, so the unsophisticated take for granted both ours and those of the other country. It takes a Robertson Smith to spell out the tacit rules which the simple believer knows only through their unquestioned effects, whose ground-rules he does not query. But, once queried, this kind of cosmogony collapses.

(2) The Enlightenment. In its typical form, this is a clear ancestor of our own vision, in that the crucial event is close to home and not somewhere in the skyline. It takes the dualistic religious vision, and inverts and naturalizes it: where the Kingdom of God stood opposed to the world of the Fall from Grace, there now stood Reason and Nature as opposed to the illusion of the Kingdom of God. But, notoriously, the Enlightenment's understanding of the two crucial options was rather limited. It was the failure to implement its vision after 1789 that forced its votaries to develop a more serious sense of social structure.

(3) Evolutionist or Hegelian-type cosmogonies. The two-term vision of the Enlightenment was replaced by something far more ramified, and correspondingly less crowded into the historic present. Crucial things may indeed be happening now, but similarly crucial ones had been happening, it appears, for quite a time. *All* history and not just the elimination of infamy was the revelation of a Grand Design. The locus of crucial events remains the historic world, but the cruxes are, so to speak, far more dispersed. Romanticism is of course far less ethnocentric in time than was the Enlightenment. It naturally has a far better sense of social structure and a greater sensitivity to its variety. On the other hand, it tends to overrate historical continuity, the unilineality of development, and the identity of basic underlying plot. As a cosmogony, it is hardly acceptable to us, precisely because it overrates continuity, and uses this for facile and unacceptable solutions. 'More of the same', where what 'the same' varies between, say, Hegelians and Spencerians, is no longer a plausible formula when we come to choose our directions.

(4) The empiricist-atomist picture. Officially, of course, this is not a cosmogony at all, but merely an epistemology. In fact, it does tell a kind of story of how the world came to be built up—*Der Logische Aufbau der Welt*—as one of the authors in this tradition brazenly has it. Moreover—a fact not always noticed—this world-construction story does indeed perform the role of cosmogonies, and provides a premise and charter for a general world-outlook, for a view of human life. It says, in effect, that each man's world is built up anew, from homogeneous sensory constituents, which are the ultimate elements of all things. Its motto might well be—every man his own cosmogony.

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The corollary of this, which in fact we frequently find exemplified amongst modern representatives of this school, is an almost total lack of a sense of history. Though they are sometimes called positivists, they differ markedly in this respect from Comte who bequeathed them the name. Given the importance they attribute to their own vision, one might expect them to be interested in the differences between societies Before and After Positivism. As Christians were sometimes worried whether Socrates ought not to have been amongst the saved, notwithstanding the unfortunate dating of his life, these positivists might wish to face the same problem in reverse and be puzzled by the occurrences of genuine cognition prior to their own Illumination. But it is not so. In many cases, their blindness to history and society is total.

(5) The Neo-Enlightenment view—our own.

For a variety of reasons, since 1945 it has become difficult to begin a classification of societies with any dichotomy other than industrial/pre-industrial. This distinction, so platitudinous now, did of course require clear formulation before it became obvious, and Raymond Aron will remain associated with its brilliant articulation. A variety of factors made the categories which were still in use during the war—such as democracy, capitalism and socialism—visibly irrelevant. There is no need to rehearse once again the factors which contributed to this shift of vision.

The consequence was a view which was once again, like that of the Enlightenment and unlike the intervening Evolutionism, a two-term one, and one which located the crucial transition somewhere near the present rather than at the beginning or the end of time. But it is a vision less starry-eyed than that of the Enlightenment, incorporating romantic regret as well as progressive hope, and above all, a vision taking over from the nineteenth century a far richer sense of the diversity and complexity of social forms.

I have endeavoured elsewhere to spell out the presuppositions and consequence of this vision.[4] Perhaps, like other and earlier (and hence more excusable) writers, I over-rated the homogeneity and simplicity of the transition. Formally, I doubt whether the text could be convicted of such an error, and the same is probably true of other writers of the time, and earlier. But what is at issue is not anyone's prophetic record, but rather the recognition of a shift of perception in recent years. Whether or not one formally excluded it, one did not sufficiently stress the manifold, complex, multi-stage nature of the 'development' process.

The work of the economist Arrow on voting procedures is well known. A famous point is that given an electorate with a set of individual preference-rankings for a set of alternatives, if the alternatives are presented for voting in pairs, successively (with the loser eliminated in each case), the final option selected will depend on the *order* in which the choices have to be made. For reasons which cannot be so neatly

[4] *Thought and Change* (London, 1964).

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formalized, the development process seems to possess a similar characteristic. A number of various decisions need to be taken, in the economic, political, social and other fields. The order in which the various choices are made have important, perhaps permanent consequences on the way in which 'development' is attained. To take the most obvious example, it makes an enormous difference whether a society embarks on the developmental process with well-established liberal pluralistic institutions, or whether the attempt to acquire them is only made in the course of it. The two traits, economic development and liberal institutions, are not just parts of a syndrome which may be expected to turn up in one order or another: the sequence of appearance or option may be quite crucial for the final pattern.

It is hardly possible here to discuss specific theses in this area, but the kind of awareness described naturally leads to the formulation of question such as J. Barrington Moore's,[5] concerning the effect of the position of the peasantry on the subsequent pattern of development, or David Martin's[6] projected work on the quite diverse social patterns characterizable as 'secularization'.

Development is not a single path—unilinealism has by now died many, many deaths—it is a complex network of routes. Even Marx's 'Precapitalist Social Formations', if plotted on paper, would look not like a single great road, but more like the Southern Railway's commuter network. But the network is not endlessly permissive. Some early choices perhaps commit one, or damn one, forever. So we are witnessing not merely the Social Contract and Genesis; we are also privileged to observe what normally is transcendental and hidden, that great existential moment when large portions of humanity commit, or hover on the brink of, Original Sin and Eternal Damnation. Admittedly, even when we see them take the leap, we cannot be quite sure that we can reliably distinguish the Saved from the Damned. We may be allowed to hope that in the end God's mercy will prevail and *all* will be saved. But nothing entitles us to reject with confidence quite the opposite hypothesis. This also is an essential part of our contemporary historical sensitivity.

THE price of the collapse of horizons, of the shift of cosmogony and eschatology into the present, is that one acquires only too intimate an experience of the logic of an absolute Creation situation. To be eye-witness of Genesis is not altogether enviable. Creation out of nothing—in other words Creation rather than mere creation—presents some rather special problems. I am not referring to the technical problem of how such a miracle can be wrought. This need not worry us: we know *that* it is happening, and the 'how' can be left aside. The

[5] *Social Origins of Dictatorship & Democracy* (Boston, 1966).

[6] 'Notes for a general theory of secularization.' *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, Tome X, 1969, No. 2.

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problem which does concern us is how one chooses one's aims, one's course of action, in a Creation situation.

Ordinary, non-Creation situations have a fairly straightforward logic. A stable identity is assumed for the agent, which implies reasonably stable basic aims. Likewise, a reasonably stable, determinate environment is assumed. These two things being given, it follows, for any given level of information, and assuming consistency, that one (possibly more if things are evenly balanced) optimal course of conduct is indicated.

But the point is that a real Creation situation is not at all like this. *Everything*, and notably aims and environment, are themselves being created. What, then, can dictate, or even suggest, the course of action to be followed by the Creator?

Primitive cosmogonies evade this problem in their naïve way by covertly making the creation less than total, by tacitly or otherwise crediting the Creator with a given set of aims (such as a curious concern with his own glory, which apparently can be augmented when endorsed by his own, suitably programmed creation), and a constraining environment which must somehow limit his choice of means in the attainment of that rather peculiar aim. If such constraining circumstances were not present, he could presumably decree the end directly, without the cumbersome and troublesome intermediary use of an often recalcitrant creation. The story of religious creation mirrors the logic of action as we normally know it. It completely fails to give an account of the problem of what genuine Creation would be like. Perhaps this did not matter much, when a pure Creation situation was well outside the range of our own possible experience. My point is, however, that what is now known as 'development' has forced this unusual experience on us, and we must ponder its logic.

It may of course be objected that our situation is not a 'pure' creation situation at all, either because in fact we start not from void but from a complex pre-industrial civilization, or because we are not bereft of all directives, of all given aims, but on the contrary possess, incapsulated in our nature, some 'basic human needs' or something of the kind: the need to cater for these saves us from the moral vacuum, from the normative *premise-lessness* credited to a 'Creation' situation. These objections are invalid. Factually, it is of course true that our historic starting point was not some total void, but a complex social order. So it was. But that inheritance has no authority over us whatever. It is of the essence of the Development process, not that all of the past is abrogated, but that none of it is authoritative. It cannot be invoked; the fragments of it that survive, do so either because they were validated by other, non-traditional considerations, or because they came into no conflict, were involved in no issue, and were perpetuated from a kind of indifference. As for those 'basic needs' (a favourite philosophical ploy under a variety of names), they are so basic, elementary, minimal, and unspecific, that almost nothing can be

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inferred from the need to satisfy them. All important questions concerning the form of life that we are to mould are about *how*, not *whether*, they are to be satisfied—and on this, they can offer no guidance whatever. It could also be claimed that technology is not and will not be so powerful as to free us from all restraints. Certainly this is so. Nevertheless, the range of choice it now tends to offer is so wide that our problem is the choice within that range, and we are not much helped by the consideration that the range itself is not limitless.

The questions posed by a Creation situation have no determinate answer. The very terms of reference preclude it. Yet those terms of reference do, for reasons indicated, correspond pretty well to our general situation as it actually is.

So? In practice, the problem is evaded. It is true that the old values are suspended. The famous ' transvaluation of all values ' which preoccupied most nineteenth-century moralists in addition to Nietzsche (such as the Utilitarians or Marx, though they used other terms) was really only a suspension of the old values: those moralists are convincing enough when they suspend the old, and unconvincing, ambiguous and vacillating in their choice of new ones.

But in practice, all the new options turn up, as we stressed in the discussion of the complexity of the development process, not all together, not on one agenda, not in one fell swoop, but in dribs and drabs, one by one. Moreover, so far at least, and by all appearances also for quite some time to come, the options arrive well before we are in full and untrammelled possession of the new technological powers. They come when there are still strong pressures on very scarce resources, in circumstances which, by accident rather than from long-term and considered design, dictate this or that interim solution. So, by the time we do have full technological elbow-room, the options will have been prejudged by the more or less accidental pressures which operated when the relevant cross-roads was first reached. Interim solutions became parts of viable, habituation-hallowed cultures.

This, then, is another curious and ironic role history has within our general vision: it helps to prejudge questions for which, if we had to face them rationally, we could simply have no determinate answers. All the premisses would be too slippery. One great interest of contemporary history is just this: how does the sequence of alternatives, and the pressing circumstances in which they make their appearance in diverse societies, help prejudge the questions of value, which otherwise would be beyond the scope of rational decision? Traditional societies credited their ultimate choices, over which they had no control and which they did not much understand, to the nature of things or the whim of gods. We have (we like to think) some understanding of how the choices arise, and our history intrigues us by narrowing our range of choice, thus saving us from the embarrassment of excessive free will.

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The Function of History in 19th-Century European Culture

Morse Peckham

EARLY in Eça de Queiroz' comic and satirical novel *The Illustrious House of Ramirez* is a passage which illuminates brightly the function of history in nineteenth-century Europe:

> A colleague of his . . . had founded a magazine called *The Fatherland*, ' with the lofty intention ' (the prospectus sonorously affirmed) ' of reawakening, not only among the academic youth but throughout the country, from Cape Sileiro to Cape Santa Maria, the dying love of the beauty and grandeur and glories of Portugal! ' Devoured by this idea, ' his Idea ', and feeling that here lay his career, almost his mission, Castanheiro incessantly and with the stubborn ardour of an apostle, proclaimed throughout the taverns in Sofia Street, through the cloisters of the University, in his friends' rooms amid cigarette smoke, ' the necessity, *caramba!* of reviving tradition! of clearing Portugal, *caramba!* of the deluge of foreign matter inundating it! . . . [his aim was to] reawaken a consciousness of our heroism in this disheartened nation '.

Writing in the 1890s, Eça de Queiroz clearly regards such ambitions as absurd and, as he later indicates, old-fashioned, something properly belonging to the 1840s. Inspired by Castanheiro, the novel's hero sets out to write an historical novel, and Eça de Queiroz shows very well who was the most popular disseminator of historicism in the nineteenth century, and who more than anyone else was responsible for it—Sir Walter Scott, just as in the passage quoted above the capitalization of ' Idea ' suggests the great philosophical historicizer, Hegel.

The link between nationalism and historicism is perfectly obvious in both Scott and Hegel, and that link certainly is to be found in *The Illustrious House of Ramirez*, in which the author is particularly concerned with the transition from historicism to parliamentarianism by way of a self-seeking political corruption. That theme is already suggested in the phrase ' here lay his career, almost his mission '. Nevertheless nationalism and historicism are not necessarily linked. Indeed, the link may have been something of an accident. It is not with the nationalistic use of historicism that I am concerned here, but with something quite different. A hint may be found in the phrase, ' the necessity of reviving tradition, of clearing Portugal of the deluge of foreign matter inundating it '.

There is no denying the nationalistic emphasis here, nor would I suggest that that emphasis is other than the most reasonable primary

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interpretation of the passage. If, however, we put aside the nationalism and examine the pattern at a more remote level of explanation, an interesting pattern emerges. The phrases to be abstracted for a non-nationalistic interpretation are 'reviving tradition' and 'clearing X of foreign matter'. At a still more remote level of explanation the two ideas here are 'the restoration of an X's true character' and connected with that 'the purification of X of alien attributes'. Applying these formulas to historicism divorced from nationalism, one can interpret the function of nineteenth-century historicism as redeeming by restoration and purification whatever is subjected to historical explanation. The pattern that now emerges is 'redemption by history' or, more properly, 'redemption by historicizing'.

Whenever a pattern of redemption is encountered in secularized European culture, the reasonable assumption is that a secular pattern has emerged from a Christian pattern. The temptation to reduce the secular pattern to the Christian pattern may very well be a wise temptation to succumb to. It is not quite enough to cry 'Reductionism!' If no new factor in the pattern has been added, it may very well be that the innovative pattern is indeed nothing but the original pattern in which the terms have been changed but the structure remains unaltered. I believe this can be said, for example, of Marx in the 1840s and probably throughout his intellectual career. For 'God created Man, who sinned, and a necessary consequence of that sin, given the Nature of God, God sent his Son to redeem Man from sin', it is no perversion to substitute, 'History created Society, which sinned in producing Capitalism, and as a necessary consequence of sinful Capitalism, History will send the Proletariat to redeem Man from Capitalism'. The identity of the two patterns is made more probable by pointing out that both Christianity and Marxism promised an ideal world after redemption —the one in Heaven, the other on Earth, the State (or Satan, the instrument of man's sin, or Capitalism) having withered away. As in the sect of Universalism, even Satan is to be redeemed. In the same way, Marxist rhetoric is not merely an analytic rhetoric, whether that of historiography or economics, but a rhetoric which ascribes evil, even intentional evil, to its object.

However, the mere presence of redemptionism in a secular pattern that has succeeded a Christian pattern is not necessarily sufficient to justify a reduction of the innovative secularism to a traditional Christianity. 'Redemption' is certainly a concept of considerable vagueness, but, however vague, it is not exclusively Christian. Though it is doubtful if it can be said with sureness that it is a human universal—to be found in all cultures—it is common enough outside of Christianity to make it possible to assert that in secularized Western culture a pattern that includes redemption may exclude Christianity. The basic pattern of Marxism appears to me to be such that it adds nothing to the patterns of Christianity its departure from which involved little more than sub-

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stitution of terms. (I would not deny that that pattern enabled Marx to make a great many acute and valuable propositions.) On the other hand, the pattern of 'redemption by historicizing' can conceivably be so far from the patterns of Christianity that reductionism to Christianity is a temptation properly to be resisted.

It is the case, of course, that Christianity is a religion of history, in that it hinges on two unique historical events, the Revelation and the Incarnation, but is by no means to be identified with 'redemption by historicizing'. In the one the historical process is immanent in history itself, in this also being identifiable with Marxism. Redemption by historicizing is quite a different matter. In Christianity the historical process is revealed to the individual, initially by Biblical inspiration, subsequently, after the Incarnation, by the Church, or by a church, or by Grace. Similarly, in Marxism the immanent historical process is discovered by the inquirer; it is something to be found in the object by the subject. In redemption by historicizing the emphasis is not on a process immanent in history, in the object, but rather on the activity of historicizing; the emphasis is on the experience of the subject, on the subjective consequences to him of historicizing, not on the objective determination of immanent structure or teleology in history.

I believe that this, or something very like it, is the point of the final pages of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. History, to put it in non-Hegelian terms, consists of a series of interpretations of the world. Each interpretation is partially adequate and partially inadequate. As each interpretation is put to use and tested against actual situations, its internal incoherences are revealed. As they become increasingly intolerable, the next step is to preserve what was adequate in an innovated pattern of interpretation. Yet it is not this development itself that is important but rather the conscious realization of the structure of that process. That realization is the distinctively Hegelian contribution, not the structure of the process. Just as Hegel anticipated that he would be superseded, so the importance of the realization is that it prepares whoever grasps it to realize, in time, its not yet apparent incoherences and to transcend it. Thus to the sympathetic, the *Phenomenology* marks a period of peculiar importance in history, for the realization of the structure of the historical process makes it possible to transcend the historical process and to move into a larger freedom. From this point of view Marx did not, after all, as he claimed, turn Hegel right side up; he merely poured him into an already existing Christian mould.

Now I am not concerned with whether Hegel was right or not. For my personal taste, he is far too optimistic. Rather I am concerned with the pattern he appears to exemplify, that which historicizing of explanation does, or is felt to do, for the individual who engages in it. The very rhetoric, if nothing else—and there is a great deal else—of the final paragraph, on History, of the *Phenomenology* indicates that redemptionist interests are at work. Further, it is possible to apply at

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this point the formula given above: the function of nineteenth-century historicism is to redeem by restoration and purification whatever is subjected to historical explanation. In Hegel the 'whatever' is the historicizing subject. To use a word commonly found throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is the self that is restored and purified. Hegel disintegrates what today we would call culture, personality, and role. Only the pure self, or Absolute, free from all attributes, is left. Thus stripped naked, it has nothing to do but be engaged with concrete situations and re-create the world, that is, re-interpret it from this point of view. To be aware that we live in a world interpreted by our own interests grants us the freedom to innovate and manipulate interpretations not granted by the commitment to any particular interpretation. It is the freedom to maintain an irresolvable tension between subject and object. Be that as it may, the pattern to be observed is the transcendence of the current conceptions of society, personality, and culture. (For convenience this may be abbreviated as 'cultural transcendence', henceforth to be taken as including personality and society (or role) as well.)

THIS makes it possible to propose a new formula for the function of nineteenth-century historicism. The redemptive power of historicizing enables the historicizing individual to transcend his necessarily inadequate and even destructive culture. However—and this is particularly important for the comprehension of nineteenth-century redemptive historicizing—the transcendence does not precipitate the individual into a new cultural stability; rather it condemns him, or frees him—which is a matter of taste—to a permanent cultural instability. To put it another way, cultural transcendence becomes the mode of existence, rather than cultural commitment. Cultural transcendence as a mode of existence is another way of expressing the formula suggested above, the acceptance of an irresolvable tension between subject and object, old-fashioned as those terms may be. Very abstractly, the process involves several stages: recognition of cultural incoherence, alienation, historical explanation, cultural transcendence.

The basic pattern of nineteenth-century, i.e. Romantic, alienation was analysed by Hegel himself, though the grandiose scale on which he worked tends to conceal it. It is, of course, the recognition of a cultural incoherence and the transcendence of the culture discussed above. From this point of view his explanation of history is a projection upon history of his own self-alienation from his own culture, observing that pattern to have happened over and over again. This is not to suggest that his insight into the processes by which various interpretations of the world have succeeded is necessarily invalid. Quite the contrary. Like any theory of history it is necessarily selective and incomplete. Indeed, it may even be asserted that he did not write a theory of history so much as a theory of the relation of a few books, arranged in chronological

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order. The important point is his perception of the process of alienation and cultural transcendence because he had experienced it himself. More precisely, he had experienced the alienation. The *Phenomenology* is his effort, his voyage of discovery, as he called it, to transcend that alienation. Since he had experienced the incoherence of his own culture, it was, of course, impossible for him to transcend the incoherence by returning to commitment to his own culture. So what at first appears to be an explanation of culture by historicizing that culture, turns out, more deeply, to be an explanation of himself by historicizing himself.

In the early decades of the nineteenth century the solution of alienation by historicizing the personality is a phenomenon frequently to be found among the advanced thinkers of the time. Wordsworth is an excellent example. Goethe, in *Faust*, used a middle strategy of displacing the personality into history, thus combining in a single strategy alienation, historicizing the personality, and historicizing the culture. Scott moved from alienation to historicizing the culture, simultaneously presenting, with great incoherence, a pre-nineteenth-century ideology. It was to become a popular strategy. The subsequent realistic novels apply historicizing to the present, as the Goncourts were fully aware. It is as if it were first necessary to historicize the past—as opposed to moralizing it in the pre-nineteenth-century manner—before the same strategy could be applied to the present. In the work of Flaubert all modes can be discerned. From this point of view both the character and the tradition of Freud are quite obvious, as well as his conclusions. Experiencing his own internal incoherence, and consequent alienation both from himself and his culture—it amounts to the same thing—he subjected himself to a rather novel kind of historicizing; he found his explanatory mode for self-historicizing in family relations. Subsequently he accused his culture of sexual incoherence, and henceforth devoted himself to historicizing his patients. The result was consistent with the pattern: the patient is not cured but inured to a permanent mode of cultural transcendence. To be cured would mean to return to the culture as functional within that culture. And to be sure, that was the best he expected of the great majority of his patients. A few, however, entered what Philip Rieff has well named a ' covert culture '. That is, as others had discovered before Freud, Browning and Tennyson, for example, the culturally transcendent individual is both alienated from his culture and socially functional within it.

The emergent cultural problem, then, of the nineteeth century was alienation. The solution was cultural transcendence by historicizing, a strategy no doubt derived from Christianity but by no means to be reduced to it. In philosophy, in historiography, in the emerging social sciences, and in the arts, the advanced and advancing thought of the nineteenth century can be understood as lying along a continuum between two poles, one being historicizing the culture, the other historicizing the personality. Each instance on the continuum has its roots in

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the perception of incoherence within the individual's own culture, or within a special instance of his culture, his own personality. The perception of that incoherence is the source of alienation.

Alienation in this sense, however, is not to be confused with alienation as it is commonly used today in discussing, for example, alienated youth. At least this sense of the term is common in the United States. Such alienation should more correctly be called polarization by negation. One set of cultural values is perceived as incoherent and judged as unacceptable, and another set is perceived as coherent and judged as acceptable. This is mere moralizing, as both Hegel and Nietzsche were aware, for the perception of polar opposites or the juxtaposition of affirmation and negation is not the perception of incoherence but rather of reflective or mirror coherence. Polarization obeys the norms of logic, but the perception of coherence emerges when the norms of logic are judged to be failing or at best inapplicable. This is the source of the perception of the uncrossable gap between language and the world, so common in the nineteenth century, in Browning and Hegel, as well as Nietzsche, prefigured in the eighteenth century in Haaman and strongly realized in the first decade of this century in the recently recovered work of Fritz Mauthner. Hence moralizing is seen as a linguistic process, and as something to be transcended by historicizing. It is not surprising, then, that the polarized of today, the mis-called alienated, are profoundly and even violently anti-historical, for they have not reached the stage of alienation, the pre-condition to historicizing and cultural transcendence.

Perhaps, because of the weakening and disappearance for many of Christianity, and the weakening and disappearance of the historical component within Christianity, historicizing has become increasingly unavailable as a strategy, particularly within the popular culture, from which, more and more, members of high culture must be recruited. Whatever the reasons for the current antipathy to historicizing, the results are, to my mind, unfortunate, for my studies have shown me no mode of cultural transcendence yet available other than that offered by historicizing.

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Hope and Hopelessness

Leszek Kolakowski*

LET us summarize briefly the arguments which are most often advanced in support of the thesis that the communist social system in its present form is *unreformable*. These arguments hold that the main function of this system is to uphold the monopolistic and uncontrolled power of the ruling apparatus; all institutional or actual changes which have occurred, or which one could imagine occurring, will not undermine this basic principle, to which are subordinated all political and economic actions of the rulers. For the monopoly of despotic power cannot be partially abolished (this is almost a tautology, since by definition a monopoly cannot be 'partial'). Thus all past and foreseeable changes within the framework of the system are unimportant and can easily be reversed, for they cannot be institutionalized without destroying the whole mechanism. The satisfaction of the basic expectations both of the working class and of the intelligentsia is thus an impossibility within the limits imposed by the main function of the system. We are dealing here with a totally inflexible mechanism, lacking self-regulating devices and capable of change only in the face of violent catastrophes, which do occur from time to time, but which do not, apart from a number of superficial concessions and reorganizations within the ruling cliques, leave any scars on the physiology of the whole. Stalinism in the strict sense, i.e. the bloody and unrestrained tyranny of an individual, was the most perfect embodiment of the practical premises of the system; later changes, in particular the considerable attenuation of terroristic forms of governing, however important from the point of view of the security of individuals, have in no way altered the despotic nature of the system or limited the characteristically socialist forms of oppression and exploitation. Since the basic functions of this social system are directed against society, which in turn is deprived of any constitutional means of self-defence, the only conceivable change must thus take the form of violent revolution. Such a revolution, moreover, is possible only on the scale of the whole socialist world system, since, as experience has shown, Soviet military predominance will always be employed to crush local attempts at revolution. The result of this revolution is to be—according to the hopes of some—a socialist society in the sense defined by Marxist tradition (i.e. the social organization of the processes of production and distribution and the establishment of a representative system) or—according to others—the introduction of the Western European model of capitalism, which

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in the face of the economic and ideological bankruptcy of socialism would seem the only trustworthy path of development.

These are the basic peculiarities of the Soviet model of socialism which determine—according to this line of argument—that all hopes for its partial, gradual 'humanization' by the introduction of successive reforms must be vain (we refer here to 'structural' peculiarities which can be detected in all countries building socialism on the Soviet pattern).

(1) What is often called the 'democratization' of the system of governing is inconceivable in terms of this model. For political despotism and the monopoly of the ruling apparatus in controlling the means of production, investment, employment and the division of the national income are mutually interdependent. The political monopoly of the ruling oligarchy rests on its position as the sole employer and sole controller of the means of production. Thus every movement in the direction of political democracy, if genuine, no matter how partial, just involve the *partial expropriation* of the ruling class, which, though not the legal owner of the means of production, has all the rights and privileges of a collective owner. In this fundamental sphere, all departures from this principle are illusory: one can, without danger, allow workers' discussions about their place of work and one can allow commissions of the *Sejm*, a 'parliament' by the grace of the Party apparatus, to discuss the details of economic policy. All decisions will still in one way or another be made by the same bodies, which are in no way controlled by society. Any dissent from the desires of these bodies, revealed in discussion, will have no significance since as a result of the detailed control of information it will not be able to take the form of social pressure. All plans for reform proposed by economists aim at significantly weakening the monopoly over economic decisions possessed by the ruling apparatus and threaten its partial expropriation; they have thus no chance of success.

(2) A natural tendency of the system is the continual reduction of the role of experts, in particular in the sphere of economic, social and cultural policy. Groups of experts are tolerated, insofar as they do not claim for themselves any rights to take decisions, but even in this purely advisory capacity, as experience has shown, they are unwillingly tolerated and are done away with or replaced as far as possible by mock bodies chosen in advance according to the criterion of political servility. To allow experts any truly significant role in taking decisions would involve a reduction in the scope of the ruling elite's power. Thus inefficiency, the waste of social energies and of material, the rule of incompetents, are, as it were, built into the mechanism of government and cannot be seen as temporary defects corrigible in the future. The mechanism does not allow purely 'technical' criteria, not subordinated to the function of maintaining and strengthening the existing authority, to have any influence on its functioning.

(3) Freedom of information—the indispensable condition for the

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efficient operation both of the economy and of education and culture—is naturally unthinkable without the ruin of the whole system of government, which, in conditions of the free exchange of information, would inevitably collapse in a short period. In addition, the idea of limited information, made available to the rulers in doses corresponding to their places in the hierarchy is impossible to introduce. In other words, the rulers, though they might delude themselves in this regard, and even actively seek unfalsified information for their own use, will inevitably be misinformed and will, from time to time, fall victim to their own lies. The time is indeed past when Stalin dealt with insufficiently optimistic statistics by murdering statisticians, and obtained information about *kolkhozes* from propaganda films about them. Nevertheless, the doing-away with the most blatantly caricatural misinformation has not changed the fact that the misinformation of the rulers is built into the system. This is the result of at least two sets of circumstances. In the first place, the providers of hermetic information are most often the same people who, on the lower levels of the ruling apparatus, are responsible for the matters on which they provide information. It is thus a normal phenomenon, and not at all exceptional, that unfavourable information can prove self-denunciatory, which can hardly be expected to be practised by people on a large scale, and also that the bringing of desired news is rewarded while that of unfavourable information is punished. This system, as one would expect, spreads inevitably and affects all categories of information-providers. Examples of punishment for bringing bad news are countless and everybody knows them. Secondly, the gathering of information about social life, not affected by anything apart from the desire to establish the actual state of affairs, would require the creation of a considerable apparatus, free from any special political obligations and allowed to work in conditions of complete freedom at least to assemble, if not to pass on, information. Such an apparatus would not only be an unnatural freak within the system, but would also constitute a source of political insecurity, for it would, by its very nature, be an organism not subject to 'ideological' restrictions, and free from the necessity to pay ideological tributes and thus to be servile. In addition, a large amount of the information collected in this way would inevitably increase internal tension and conflict at the higher levels of the apparatus. For there is practically no information which is entirely neutral, and unfalsified information about social life is immediately exploited by all competing groups or cliques aspiring to higher positions against those who are the present holders of these positions. Thus, although the universal rule of self-delusion and self-deceit may seem at first glance to be senseless, it is, in fact, one of the means employed by the system in self-defence. The ruling groups do, it is true, sometimes pay for the lies which they themselves produce, but on balance it pays them to bear these costs (the more so since a greater part of the cost is borne by society) which seem to increase stability and the security of the government.

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(4) A further characteristic of socialism in its present Soviet version is the inevitable mental and moral degradation of the apparatus taking the most vital decisions affecting the life of society. This is also inherent in the functioning of the political mechanism and does not result from the bad or good will of the rulers. This mechanism demands a strict subordination within the hierarchy, which is closely related to the principle of the monopoly of power. In this way, as in all despotic systems, the positively effective characteristics in the career pattern of an individual (i.e. the characteristics which facilitate his advance up the ladder of the hierarchy) are servility, cowardice, the lack of initiative, readiness to obey superiors, readiness to inform on people, indifference to social opinion and public interest. By contrast, capacity to take initiative, concern about public good and attachment to truth, efficiency and social interest, with no regard to the interests of the apparatus, become negative characteristics for the individual's promotion. The mechanism of power produces thus a negative natural selection of the leading cadres in all parts of the ruling apparatus, but, above all, in the Party apparatus. The fourteen years of Gomulka's rule in Poland are the most striking confirmation of this truth. Their most outstanding characteristic was the systematic weeding out of individuals with competence and initiative and their replacement by cowardly and submissive mediocrities. The process which took place from March 1968 on—the massive promotion of ignoramuses, informers or simple louts (the 'invasion of the lice' as it was called in Warsaw) was merely the acceleration and intensification of phenomena which had been occurring for many years. As in all matters in this world, one can cite exceptions, but they are few. The reverse process can sometimes be seen at critical moments, but these do not change the basic tendency of the system, which, inevitably, must treat competence and the capacity to take initiative as phenomena hostile to itself. Different parts of the ruling machinery undergo this process of negative selection in different degrees, so that in the economic and industrial administration one can always find a significant number of competent and courageous people beating their heads stubbornly against the wall of indifference, fear and incompetence which encompasses the Party apparatus and its political and propaganda branches, where the principle of the selection of the worst elements achieves its greatest triumph.

(5) Despotic forms of government inevitably produce the need for permanent, or at least periodically repeated, aggression. That war is a grave for democracy has been known for centuries. For this reason it is also the ally of tyranny. In the absence of foreign wars, a similar function is performed by various forms of internal aggression, whose aim is the maintenance of a continuous state of threat and the preservation of the siege psychosis, using the most artificial methods and the most imaginary enemies. The renewal of acts of brutal aggression against successive groups of the population, selected by the most varied criteria, are not at all the consequences of folly, but an inherent function

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of the mechanism of power, which cannot do without mortal enemies, lying in wait to take advantage of its least weakness, for only in this way can it ensure the necessary readiness for mobilization. It thus invents its own enemies, creating real ones in the process, for the acts of renewed aggression inevitably promote hostility and resistance in the persecuted and lead to a situation where repression can be justified as necessary. The system of repression is thus self-propelled, and acts of internal aggression create of themselves the need for further repression.

(6) The same principle of the monopoly of power creates the necessity to encourage the disintegration of society and to destroy all forms of social life not decreed by the ruling apparatus. Since social conflicts are not done away with, but stifled by repression and camouflaged by ideological phraseology, they seek the most varied forms of expression, which consequently means that even the most innocent forms of social organization, if not subject to proper police control, can indeed transform themselves into centres of opposition. This fosters the need to 'nationalize' all forms of social life and leads to continuous pressure aimed at destroying all spontaneous social ties in favour of compulsory pseudo-associations, whose only functions are negative and destructive and which do not represent anyone's interests, but those of the ruling class. Although the system needs enemies, it mortally fears any form of organized opposition; it wants to have only those enemies which it selects itself and which it can fight in conditions of its own choice. The natural need of despotism is to frighten individuals by depriving them of the means of organized resistance. One method which serves this function is the creation of a criminal code which is consciously vague and ambiguous, so that the largest possible number of citizens can feel and be treated as criminals, and so that the scale of actual repression is not linked to rigorously laid down legal norms, but is subject to arbitrary manipulation and arbitrary decisions of the police and the Party.

(7) The ruling apparatus has, moreover, no freedom in the question of citizens' rights. It cannot, under the threat of its own ruin, widen those rights even if this were the intention of the rulers. Experience has shown that concessions in the face of demands for democracy, rather than causing satisfaction with partial gains, become, on the contrary, the reason for increased pressure from below which begins to grow like an avalanche, threatening the whole political order. The enslavement of society is so great and the feeling of oppression and exploitation so strong that the smallest crack in the system of institutionalized violence or the smallest reform which promises its relaxation immediately sets in motion huge reserves of hidden hostility and suppressed demands which threaten to explode and which it then becomes impossible to control. It is not surprising that, after so many experiences, the philanthropy of the rulers, even should it exist, could not relieve the political and economic slavery of the population.

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THESE are the most important arguments advanced in support of the thesis—which is moreover consistent with the spirit of Marxist tradition—that the characteristically socialist form of slavery cannot be partially done away with or reduced by partial reforms, but requires total and simultaneous destruction.

In my view this thesis is incorrect, and its propagation constitutes an ideology of defeatism rather than a revolutionary appeal. I base this conviction on four general principles. First, we are never in a position to decide in advance on the degree of flexibility of any social organization; events so far have not proved at all that the despotic model of socialism is in fact completely rigid. Secondly, the rigidity of the system depends *partly* on the degree to which the people living under it are *convinced of its rigidity*. Thirdly, the thesis of unreformability is based on the ideology of 'all or nothing', which is characteristic of people who have been educated in the Marxist tradition, but which is not at all confirmed by general historical experience. Fourthly, bureaucratic despotic socialism is entangled in contradictory internal tendencies, which it is incapable of resolving into any kind of synthesis, and which inevitably weaken its cohesion—a development which is becoming more acute rather than diminishing in intensity.

All the mechanisms which have been mentioned so far and seem to justify the argument that socialist despotism is incapable of reform do in fact operate within the system, have been noted on many occasions and can be personally confirmed by all who live in the socialist countries. They all reveal the logic inherent in this system whose basic forms of action are directed against society. What follows from these observations is that if the mechanism of the bureaucratic rule functions without any resistance on the part of society, it will be inevitably producing, in ever more intensive forms, all the phenomena which we have described, leading ultimately to a society organized on strictly Orwellian lines. It does not, however, follow from these observations that these tendencies cannot be countervailed by a movement of resistance capable of limiting and weakening their operation, which will not lead to any perfect society, but which will create viable forms of socialist organization capable of offering its members a reasonable life. The reformist position would be absurd if it was dependent on the goodwill of the exploiting class, on the philanthropic attitude of the apparatus of coercion or on the automatic mechanisms of the organization. The reformist position is not absurd, however, if it is understood as an idea of active resistance exploiting inherent contradictions of the system. All the characteristics of bureaucratic socialism described so far emphatically indicate that it has built-in tendencies leading to the continuous growth of police methods of government, to social disintegration and demoralization, to the persistence of economic ineffeciencies and to the perpetuation of all those negative social characteristics which are universally known and which make life a torment for working people. However, in this general

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respect, it has one feature in common with the capitalist system as analyzed by Marx. All the productive and social tendencies inherent in this economic system which were discussed by Marx, did not come arbitrarily out of his imagination, but were based on a detailed observation of society. There were reasons to believe that a growing class polarization was inherent in capitalism, along with the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat, a progressive fall in the rate of profit, anarchy and periodic crises of overproduction, massive unemployment and the disappearance of the middle classes; that all reforms which could be conceived within the framework of this system could not be lasting, since the fundamental laws caused by ' the wolf-like hunger for surplus value ' which determined the totality of productive processes could not be abolished within this framework; thus the real importance of reforms is in their political significance, as means for training in the struggle and for the consolidation of class solidarity before the final conflict. Marx, of course, was quite aware of all the counter-trends weakening the operation of capitalist laws of accumulation, the most important of which, though not the only one, was the resistance of the working class. It was not possible, however, to assess quantitatively the tendencies and counter-tendencies in the future evolution of the system. Thus, although Marx's analyses were well grounded, his belief that ' ultimately ' the laws of capitalism will always prove themselves stronger within the system than the resistance of the oppressed has proved to be only an expression of his ideological position. In fact, the failure of the expected progressive impoverishment of the proletariat and of the growing anarchy of production to materialize in the end was the result, not of the philanthropic attitude of the bourgeoisie or of its moral transformation. It was the result of long years of struggle and confrontations which forced bourgeois society to recognize certain principles of social organization as its permanent features. Exploitation was not done away with but was limited in an important way in industrially developed countries; the possessing classes agreed to the limitation of their privileges in order to preserve what could be preseved of them without bringing society to ruin.

NATURALLY analogies of this type are not completely satisfactory. It is true that socialist bureaucracy has learnt from the defeats of the bourgeoisie, i.e. how dangerous can be the freedom of information and assembly. Thus resistance to exploitation and oppression in the Soviet system of despotism takes place in worse social conditions than ever before; no oppressing class in history has had power of such scope at its disposal. But this concentration of power is not only a source of strength, but also of weakness, as has been revealed by the whole post-Stalin history of communism.

The very nature of this system demands complete concentration of power at the centre of command. That is why it is true that Stalin's power (and that of his local miniatures) was the most perfect embodi-

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ment of the principles of despotic socialism. However the impossibility of re-establishing it stems from the impossibility of reconciling two values, both important for the ruling apparatus; unity and security. The conflicts for power within the system cannot be institutionalized without threatening the ruin of the whole system, for institutionalization would mean the legalization of fractional activity within the Party, which would only differ in an insignificant way from the establishment of a multi-party system. Yet groups, cliques and cabals which organize themselves in accordance with various criteria of choice and with different bonds of interest are an inevitable product of social life. Therefore for a system facing a constant threat of political escalation, the ideal is the absolute tyranny of one autocrat with so limited an intelligence and morality that he will not be held back by any 'abstract' principles, yet so shrewd that he is able to prevent all crystallization of groups within the apparatus by periodic massacres and purges, and in this way maintain the instrument of government in a proper state of constant fluidity and fear. However this is drastically at odds with the need for security of the apparatus, which not surprisingly does not want to live in a situation where every one of its functionaries, including the members of the Party Secretariat and of the Politburo, can at any moment be transferred from his office to the dungeons of the police at a nod from his chief. Therefore the move away from one-man to oligarchic rule, the so-called 'collective leadership', was in the highest interest of the ruling machine. This is certainly not without significance, though it might not seem that it makes much difference to the oppressed whether the documents of their oppression are signed by one or ten individuals. Oligarchy does not, of course, involve any 'democratization' although it does involve a significant limitation of terroristic methods of government. Moreover it also involves a serious undermining of the stability of the government and its inevitable decentralization (still—no democratization), e.g. the consolidation of the positions and extension of the rights of the local *apparatchiks*. This apparatus is not able to prevent concealed fractionalism and to avoid creating competing bodies which continuously undermine its efficiency. Moreover, from another point of view, resistance is most likely and most effective not when oppression is at its worst and terror strongest, but, on the contrary, at moments of relative loosening caused by the disaggregation of the ruling apparatus: we have to thank Lenin for this perceptive observation. The present-day apparatus is not subject, it is true, to ideological shocks, as was Stalin's apparatus, which lost its balance for that very reason after the moral discreditation of the leader, but it is demoralized and suffers chronically from the internal conflicts of rival groups. It is true that it is in the interests of these groups to keep their existence a secret from society, but in this sphere concealment cannot be wholly successful and is wholly unsuccessful within the political machinery. The partial paralysis of the apparatus is thus

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becoming incurable and follows a natural course of successive remissions and deterioriations; its stability depends on several independent factors, whose interaction is difficult to predict. In this sense, one can say that the partial 'destalinization' which has been forced on the system has introduced a degradation of power into the mechanism and this makes effective resistance possible. In other words: as long as the apparatus is stable and immunized against political shocks it can, in general, disregard popular dissatisfaction. But once it has lost this stability and no longer fears its leader or its police so much, it pays for this by continual fear of society, of its competitors for power, of domestic and foreign bosses, of the working class, of the intelligentsia, and even of small groups of intellectuals.

THE next ineradicable internal contradiction of bureaucratic socialism is the conflict between the need for a radical change in ideology and the impossibility of getting rid of the Stalinist-Leninist ideology. As distinct from democratic political organizations, which can refer back to social consensus as the basis of their legality, despotism lacks any representative organs and must inevitably possess some sort of ideological 'system', even if of the most paltry kind, in order to establish the apparent legality of its existence. No state and no system can exist without legitimacy—whether it be the inheritance of royal charisma or free elections. In the absence of such possibilities, legitimization takes on an ideological character—the principle that the Party is the embodiment of the interests of the working class or of the whole nation, that the state is part of the great international working-class movement, consolidating its power in one part of the world in expectation of its further extension. Obviously ideology plays an entirely different role in this system of government than it does in the democratic states, no matter how pathetic may seem the clash of principles with reality. At the moment ideology in the socialist world is a burdensome hump which cannot be dispensed with in any way. Internationalist phraseology is indispensable to the Soviet authorities, since it offers the only legitimation of their rule abroad; it is indispensable to the local rulers who are dependent on the Soviets, as the justification of their dependence and of their own power. It might seem that the Soviet rulers can completely disregard the non-ruling communist parties, whom they hardly wish to incite to a real struggle for power, and that their splits and deviations are of no political significance. In reality, this is not the case, for an open and complete abandonment of the communist movement in countries which are not under Soviet control could only occur if they were to abandon the principles which justify this control where it exists. The rulers are thus the victims of their own ideology with all its nonsensical baggage. It is a paradox that this ideology, in which practically everybody has ceased to believe—those who propagate it, those who profit from it, and those who must listen to it—is still a matter of the most vital importance for the continuing existence of this

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political system. The dead and by now also grotesque creature called Marxism-Leninism still hangs at the necks of the rulers like a hopeless tumour, limiting their freedom of movement. This ideology has no force of persuasion in the countries of the Soviet bloc as the rulers well know; thus propaganda intended to make an effective appeal to the population, or even to the Party itself, uses ideology less and less, confining itself almost entirely to arguments based on the notions of *raison d'état* and of national interest. But this development brings forth another contradiction within the system. As we know, apart from articulated propaganda, there also exists in these countries an esoteric propaganda, which is sometimes more important, and which cannot be formulated in speeches and articles, but must somehow be conveyed to the people. In the Soviet Union it is the idea of being a great power, the glory emanating from an empire which rules over large parts of the globe more or less directly. In contrast to the official Marxism-Leninism, the imperial ideology can produce a certain real response. But in the countries of the People's Democracies this unspoken ideology is an ideology of the fear of Soviet tanks, imparted by the use of the most varied forms of allusion. Here also the unarticulated ideology, unlike the articulated one, can count on a certain success among the population: one does not need particularly subtle arguments to convince the people that the Russian leaders are capable of producing massacres in any insufficiently obedient protectorate. To some extent the two unarticulated ideologies —that of the centre and that of the periphery—converge in their effects, but it would be shortsighted to count on this convergence as a lasting basis for ruling: not only because in both cases the unarticulated ideology is not complementary but clearly contrary to the official ideology, but also because it can achieve its goal—temporary pacification—only at the cost of the perpetuation and intensification of national hostilities, which though advantageous in times of peace, are extremely dangerous in times of crisis. For the time being, there is no other solution, if the ruling apparatus is to retain even a minimal contact with society.

Among the historic quips of Stalin there was the famous question: 'How many divisions has the Pope?' The poverty of this question illustrates most clearly the poverty of a political system which has lost everything except divisions (no mean thing to be sure), which does not know how to believe in anything apart from divisions, and boasts of this as an example of healthy realism, forgetting that it emerged as a result of the Russian revolutions of February and October 1917, which were successful, not by virture of possessing many divisions, but as a result of the moral collapse of the Tsar's empire and army.

THE ideological paralysis of bureaucratic socialism is ever more extensive and irreversible; successive campaigns and conferences of Party officials on the theme of 'ideological struggle' may work out new methods of repression and intimidation, but they are not able to offer society anything apart from the usual insipid phrases. All attempts to

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reverse this catastrophic trend follow two courses—nationalistic phraseology or phraseology of order and efficiency, and around these catchwords loose factions form themselves. The first is of little value, since the central and basic question—real national sovereignty—constitutes by its very nature an impassable barrier. The second would be more effective, if it could demonstrate that it possessed a programme capable of being implemented on 'technocratic' principles. But the 'technocratic' programme implies the primacy of criteria of productive efficiency and of technological progress over political values, and as such could only be implemented as a result of the ruling apparatus progressively abandoning its power, or again, at the price of the partial expropriation of the ruling class. We touch here upon successive internal contradictions of the system of government: contradictions, often analysed, between technological and industrial progress and the system of political power which continually hampers that progress. This contradiction falls within the scope of Marx's classic definition of capitalist production, but has never manifested itself so strikingly as in the regime which, according to its principles emerged to end such contradictions. All the characteristics of despotic socialism which we have thus far mentioned are, for obvious reasons, powerful brakes on technical and productive progress and perpetuate the stagnation of the system. But technological progress (not limited only to military technique) and even the increase of consumption (in spite of certain political advantages which poverty and an inadequate supply of elementary needs give to the rulers) are in the interests of the ruling class for various reasons; the higher the general level of development, the more difficult it is to achieve outstanding results in one area of production, such as military production, treated as an isolated branch; the expectations of the population depend to a considerable degree on their comparison of their situation with that of highly developed countries, a phenomenon impossible to avoid because a complete blockage of information is, for many reasons, already impossible to achieve. Thus in a situation of stagnation or even one in which the level of consumption is increasing slowly, the level of subjective dissatisfaction and discontent can grow. One can indeed never foresee when it will reach the point of explosion in conjunction with other circumstances; in general it is impossible to avoid a situation of international competition even when this imposes an unfavourable situation, and the conditions of this competition are ever more difficult. Thus the rulers, when they stress their desire for technological progress and the improvement of the material situation of the population, are, in general, stating their true intentions. These intentions are, however, in conflict with a second group of intentions, related to the perpetuation of their own monopoly of uncontrolled power in all fields of social life.

But if this contradiction is unavoidable, this does not mean as Isaac Deutscher seemed to hope that the socialist system will 'democratize' itself as a result of the automatic pressure of technical progress. The contradiction between technological development and the system of

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political government and economic organization can only foster development where it emerges as social conflict: a conflict between all strata interested in maintaining the existing mechanism of exploitation, and the working class and intelligentsia, above all—though not exclusively —the technical and managerial intelligentsia.

The conflicts which we have mentioned are strengthened by an additional contradiction resulting from the national situation of the countries making up the Soviet Empire. The ruling apparatus aims at maintaining the dependence on the Soviet Union as a guarantee of its own position, but at the same time it wants to weaken it to increase its own freedom of decision-making. This situation inevitably creates tensions in the political machine and also creates a point where social pressure can be effective. National sovereignty is not sufficient in itself for the social emancipation of working people, but it is obviously an indispensable precondition of that emancipation. Fear of the fraternal guns from the East is, of course, not unjustified but it is consciously exaggerated as a 'patriotic device' for stifling the smallest demands and as a means of convincing the nation of the absolute hopelessness of all its efforts. In reality, the goal of Poland, as of the other nations of the Soviet zone, is not to provoke an armed conflict, but a ceaseless pressure aimed at diminishing Polish dependence on the USSR, a dependence which can only be weakened through pressure. In this sphere, too, thinking along the lines of 'all or nothing' is futile and the adoption of such a principle means in practice to accept 'nothing'. No one can be so blind as to argue that there is no difference between the national situation of Poland and Lithuania, or that the degree of dependence of Poland did not change at all between 1952 and 1957. Dependence and non-sovereignty can exist in different degrees and the difference in the degree of dependence is of enormous significance for the existence of the nation. The function of the humanistic intelligentsia and, in general, of the teaching intelligentsia is of key importance in this respect.

If the Polish nation was able to resist Germanization and Russification in the partition period, this was primarily the achievement of this social stratum. If it had not possessed this group, it would have remained in the same position as the Lusation nation, which did indeed preserve its language but because it has failed to produce its own original culture and its own intelligentsia has little chance of survival. Poland was preserved as a cultural entity thanks to those who created the Commission for National Education and those who continued its work, thanks to the teachers, writers, historians, philologists and philosophers of the nineteenth century, who, in very difficult conditions, worked to increase the nation's cultural heritage. The Czech nation, which was on the brink of being Germanized culturally, was saved thanks to the similarly conscious efforts of its nineteenth-century intelligentsia. Those who today stifle the free development of the national culture are the enemies of Poland.

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IF I declare myself in favour of the 'reformist' principle, it is not in the sense that I believe one can define reformism as a 'legal' means of struggle, as distinct from 'illegal' means. This distinction is simply without meaning in a situation in which the decision as to what is or is not legal is decided, not by the law, but by the arbitrary interpretation of ambiguous laws by the police and the Party apparatus. In conditions where the rulers can, if they wish, arrest and condemn citizens for possessing unorthodox books, for conversations between individuals on political subjects, for telling jokes and for the expression of improper ideas in private letters, the application of the concept of legality has no meaning whatsoever. On the contrary, the best way to counteract prosecutions of this type of 'crime' is their massive committal. I am thinking of a reformist orientation in the sense of a belief in the possibility of effective gradual and partial pressures, exercized in a long-term perspective, a perspective of social and national liberation. Despotic socialism cannot be seen as a totally inflexible system, for there are no such systems. Its capacity for a certain flexibility has been revealed in recent years even in fields as decisive as the scope of decision-making which is to be subject to official ideological control. The scope of this ideological control has diminished to a not insignificant degree: Party officials no longer have to know more about medicine than professors of medicine and more about philology than philologists. They do still, it is true, know more about literature than writers. But in Poland, even in this field, certain irreversible changes have taken place. The area subject to interference by the ideological authorities is still unbearable, but it is significantly smaller than it was, when compared with those times not long past, when state doctrine decided the width of trousers, the colour of shoes and the truths of genetics. One can perhaps say that this constitutes progress from slavery to feudalism. However, we are not confronted with a choice between complete decay and perfection, but only with the choice of agreeing to decay or making an unceasing effort to preserve in our national life such values and standards which, once preserved, will not easily be destroyed. The cultural pogrom of 1968 left a great heritage of discouragement because, though unavoidable, it was a confrontation which took place in conditions chosen and imposed by the coercive apparatus. But we are now witnessing in the world the breaking down of rigid orthodoxies, the abandoning of rules, taboos, saints and beliefs, which, not long before, seemed the absolute condition of their existence. It might seem that analogies with church history are beside the point since churches do not have police and prisons at their disposal. Nevertheless, churches have also lost their means of compulsion because of the pressure of cultural change, while the police have since time immemorial deluded itself as to its own omnipotence, and have attempted to delude others, because it retains its power only so long as others continue to believe in its omnipotence. If it has to face strong social pressures, the police reveals itself as ulti-

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mately powerless, and the fear of those wno live by spreading fear becomes greater than the fear of the persecuted.

Bureaucratic socialism has lost its ideological base. In spite of all the monstrous features of Stalinism, the Stalinist apparatus, at least in the People's Democracies, was incomparably more dependent in its activity on its ideological links with the system than the present apparatus. It might seem that a cynical apparatus, whose members measure the achievements of socialism by their own privileges and careers is more efficient, since it lacks encumbrances and restraints, is not threatened by ideological shocks, is capable of arbitrary and lightning transformations and is more subject to manipulation. But this is less than half the truth. Such an apparatus is not only weak in moments of crisis and unable to survive real tests, not only highly vulnerable to self-destruction through its tendency to form cliques, but itself appears as a symptom of historical decay of the system which it serves. A system which nobody serves disinterestedly is doomed—I quote this sentence from Victor Serge's book on the *Okhrana*—a sentence which no policeman will ever believe, until he loses his job. Despotic socialism is dying the slow death described by Hegel; it seems untouched but it is sinking down into an inert boredom and numbness, relieved only by everyone's fear of everyone else, a fear discharged in aggression. The loss of its ideas means a loss of its *raison d'être* for the system. Let us note some small changes in phraseology: the word 'freedom' was always on Stalin's lips when torture and massacres were the order of the day in his empire; today when the massacres have stopped, the faint cry of 'freedom' puts the entire police force on the alert. All the old-fashioned words—'freedom', 'independence', 'law', 'justice', 'truth'—can turn against the bureaucratic tyranny. All that is valuable and lasting in the present-day culture of the nations under the rule of this system rises against it. The international communist movement has ceased to exist; the idea of communism in its Soviet version has also ceased to exist.

Probably in conditions of freedom of choice the majority of the Polish working class and intelligentsia would opt for socialism as would the writer of this article. Socialism, as understood here, can only be implemented in a sovereign national organism, and it presupposes the control of society over the means of production and distribution of the national income and over the administrative and political apparatus, working as an organ of society, and not as a master for whom society is a hand-maiden. They would opt for an organism which would establish freedom of information and communication, political pluralism and a multiplicity of forms of social ownership, respect for the criteria of truth, of effectiveness and of public interest, freedom to form trade unions and freedom from the arbitrariness of political police, a criminal code under which prison will exist to protect society against anti-social behaviour and not in order to transform all citizens into criminals, so as to be able to blackmail everyone.

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To what extent a movement for the establishment of such a society is possible depends to a considerable degree, though of course not completely, on the extent to which society believes that it is possible. As the nature of a given society is dependent *in part* on its own self-image, there cannot be in social change a pure potential concealed in material circumstances alone and independent of the degree of awareness of potentialities by the people. Thus in the countries of socialist despotism, those who inspire hope are also the inspirers of a movement which could make this hope real—just as in society's attempts to understand itself, object and subject often coincide.

THE belief that socialism in its present form is totally inflexible and can only be destroyed at one fell swoop, and therefore that no partial changes are in essence changes in its social nature, easily lends itself to justifying opportunism and pure knavery. For if it was true, there would be no significance in any individual or collective initiative to counteract the monstrous behaviour of the neo-Stalinist bureaucracy, nor in any struggle to preserve in society respect for the truth, for competence, for honesty, for justice and for intelligence; in short, on this premise each individual act of knavery can be justified, since it can be interpreted simply as an element of the universal knavery, which 'for the moment' is unavoidable and is not the work of individuals but the result of the system. The principle of unreformability can thus serve as an absolution granted in advance for every act of cowardice, passivity and co-operation with evil. The fact that a large part of the Polish intelligentsia has been persuaded to believe in the complete inflexibility of the shameful system under which they live is almost certainly responsible for the regrettable passivity which they displayed during the dramatic action of the Polish workers in 1970.

The worst service one could possibly do to the cause of Polish independence and democracy is to perpetuate nationalist anti-Russian stereotypes. The Russian nation, which has been through a most terrible *gehenna* of recent times, is used by its rulers as a tool in their imperialist policies. But it is itself a victim of these policies to a greater extent than anyone else. Given the atrophy of internationalist ideology, the fostering of nationalism within the Soviet 'sphere of influence' is, despite certain inherent risks, an indispensable tool of the most traditional kind for maintaining power. 'The friendship of nations' in the official doctrine consists of the drinking of toasts of friendship by official delegations, and of visits by folk dance groups under strict police supervision. True friendship and understanding between nations, whose mutual distrust and hostility may have deep historical roots, can only be anchored in uncontrolled contacts and exchanges—but this the ruling strata fear above all. Polish anti-Russian nationalism, in provoking a natural reaction, only strengthens Great Russian nationalism and contributes to the prolongation of both nations' enslavement. It is a pity that it should be necessary to repeat this truth which already during the

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'Peoples' Spring' of 1848 was quite banal for the revolutionary democracy of that period, but, as long as it still applies, it will have to be repeated. Those people who, instead of seeking to know and understand the true national culture of Russia, perpetuate anti-Russian stereotypes in Poland are the unconscious spokesmen of the power which holds both nations in slavery.

In spite of the Soviet empire's military power and of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, decentralizing tendencies within the 'bloc' have not ceased and nationalism will continue to erode the organism evermore, lacking, as it does, any ideological cement. It is not in any nation's interest that national hatreds should provide the fuel for this disintegration, since such hatreds could end in apocalyptic massacres. One can only offset this fearful perspective by putting new life into the traditional, old-fashioned idea of the brotherhood of nations united against their oppressors.

TO conclude: all the internal contradictions of despotic socialism which we have described can be resolved in one of two ways. If left to its own inertia, in silence and fear, the system will always and inevitably tend to such a solution of its own contradictions which will increase, and not decrease oppression; tighten, not loosen the bondage. *The growth of police methods of rule is the result not of increased resistance, but, on the contrary, of its absence.* The flexibility of this social formation—a flexibility whose limits cannot be established in advance—will manifest itself in its re-Stalinization, if no effective forces to oppose this trend emerge. It can manifest itself in a form more in accordance with the needs of society only under pressure from this society; this is a lesson which follows irrefutably from our experience. Those who think that they can buy their personal tranquillity with small concessions will discover that the price of their tranquillity will rise continually. Those who today pay only with innocent toadying, will be compelled tomorrow to pay with denunciation of their colleagues for the same commodity; those who buy miserable privileges only by being silent in the face of knavery which they could oppose, will soon be forced to pay by actively participating in knavery. The natural law of despotism is moral inflation, whereby the distributor of goods compels people to pay ever-higher prices, if social pressure does not enforce cuts.

This perspective is perhaps not an encouraging one, but at least it is not a fantasy, in contrast to perspectives which would have us wait for a miracle, for help from outside, or for the automatic self-correction of the system's jarring machinery left to its own inertia. What is important is that instruments of pressure are available and are at nearly everybody's disposal. They consist in drawing obvious conclusions from the most simple precepts—those which forbid silence in the face of knavery, servile subservience to those in authority, accepting alms with humility or other similar attitudes. Our own dignity gives us the right to proclaim out loud the old words 'freedom', 'justice', and 'Poland'.

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Political Prospects

Michael Costello

> The drama which has occurred in the coastal cities must be taken as an alarm signal, pointing to a disease existing in the body and all the more alarming since it comes to light for a second time within a quarter of a century of the existence of socialist Poland.
>
> *Polityka*, 2 January 1971

ON 20 December 1970, Edward Gierek replaced Wladyslaw Gomulka as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). Less than a week earlier, the latter had prophetically stated: 'Sharp turns appear in the political sphere, although . . . elements have to accrue for a long time, whose sum causes a change in a given political course.'[1] No more apt description might be applied to the end of the Gomulka era. Its demise will be closely linked with the tragic riots, sparked by the sudden imposition of price increases on essential food items, that rocked Poland's coastal cities in the third week of December. But, just as the price increases marked the final folly of a regime whose past vacillation on economic reform had become proverbial, so too did the magnitude and intensity of the December disturbances reflect the strains in public life whose origin could, in many instances, be traced back to the frustrated hopes of the Polish October of 1956.

Such strains, while perhaps grounded in popular dissatisfaction over the meagre improvement in living standards, were the inevitable result of the system of rule established in Poland after 1956. Imbued with the sterile orthodoxy of Gomulka and resigned to the principle of *non movere*, this system soon repressed the spirit that had brought it into being. Moreover, though predicated on the maintenance of a certain 'distance' between rulers and ruled,[2] it was a fragile structure immune neither to periodic challenges 'from below' nor to the manipulation of competing factions in the PUWP leadership. Dubbed the 'small stabilization',[3] the system proved disfunctional in its potential for promoting socio-economic development and, given the virtual isolation of the leadership, was unable to respond to the needs of the population.

This latter failing was most dramatically manifested in December 1970, both in the insensitive decision to raise foodstuff prices just before

[1] Statement to the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, *Trybuna Ludu*, 15 December 1970.

[2] For a useful discussion of the gap between rulers and ruled, see A. Ross Johnson, 'The Polish Riots and Gomulka's Fall', *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1971.

[3] The original term 'little stabilization' was first coined in Poland in a play by Tadeusz Rozewicz. Cited by Hansjakob Stehle in William E. Griffith, ed., *Communism in Europe*, Vol. I (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 135.

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a traditional period of feasting and, more importantly, in the official reaction to the ensuing protests. Admissions of the predominantly worker composition of the rioting crowds notwithstanding, the regime spoke of 'anarchistic, hooligan, and criminal elements' and of 'enemies of socialism, enemies of Poland'.[4] That Gomulka subscribed to this thesis—despite his dictum of earlier years that 'never and nowhere can *agents provocateurs* determine the attitude of the working class'[5]—was a measure of the extent to which the man who had appeared on the scene 14 years earlier as the symbol of a national revival had lost touch with the aspirations of his countrymen.

ALTHOUGH the removal of Gomulka and his closest associates in itself represented 'a change in a given political course', the circumstances surrounding the political crisis of December 1970 were not the most auspicious for the beginning of a new era in Polish political, economic, and social life. Unlike Gomulka's 1956 rise to power on a wave of genuine popular acclaim, Gierek's elevation to the post of First Secretary came at a time when smouldering resentment continued to grip the country, particularly its working class. Moreover, in the initial development and implementation of policies designed to de-fuse the widespread tension, Gierek could hardly claim to preside over a united leadership. In addition to his own supporters, the Politburo and Secretariat (elected at the Seventh Plenum) included former associates and protégés of Gomulka, regional Party leaders, representatives of the young 'technocrats' and *apparatchiks*, and, in the person of Mieczyslaw Moczar, the hardline element that had unsuccessfully waged a struggle for supreme authority in the PUWP in 1968. All of these groups, especially the last, would have a major stake in the success or failure of Gierek's normalization policies. Nor would Poland's Warsaw Pact allies, primarily the USSR, be any less interested in his ability to stabilize a potentially explosive situation and restore order in the country.

In the six months since his installation as First Secretary, Gierek has shown himself to be both aware of and responsive to the concerns of these constituents—population, possible contenders for power, and Eastern neighbours. Indeed, his performance to date, mixing conciliation with firmness, has seemed in part an attempt to reach compromise solutions that would concomitantly resolve immediate popular grievances, pre-empt the position held by domestic advocates of a different policy, and convince the USSR that the situation is well under control. That Gierek has achieved differing degrees of success in each of these endeavours is an indication of the divergent demands and expectations with which he has been confronted.

Given the critical economic situation and its close connection with

[4] See, for example, Premier Cyrankiewicz's speech to the nation, Radio Warsaw, 17 December 1970 and *Trybuna Ludu*, 18 December 1970.
[5] Speech to the October Plenum in 1956, *Trybuna Ludu*, 21 October 1956.

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the December unrest, the new leadership has devoted much of its attention to this vital sphere. In his first address to the nation,[6] Gierek coupled an appeal for calm with assurances that the former regime's 'ill-considered concepts of economic policy' would be eliminated and that immediate economic grievances would be examined and resolved 'only in accordance with the economic possibilities'. A number of short-term initiatives were subsequently announced, including: (1) an increase in the monthly minimum wage from 850 to 1,000 zlotys and increases in pension benefits and family allowances; (2) an increase in purchase prices on meat and milk products delivered by peasants to the state; (3) a two-year freeze on prices of non-seasonal foodstuffs; (4) several measures to ensure enhanced consumer goods supplies; (5) an accelerated housing construction programme; and (6) a campaign to improve working and social conditions in plants and enterprises.

As regards 'ill-considered concepts', the regime immediately undertook to revise the economic plans for both 1971 and 1971–75. The changes to be effected are designed, in Gierek's words, 'to ensure dynamic and at the same time harmonious development'.[7] The key words here, of course, are 'harmonious development'. Since December 20, this slogan, emphasizing the twin goals of economic growth *and* an improvement in living standards, has become the watchword of the new leadership. Several commissions have already begun work on the redrafting of the five-year plan, while 'the socio-economic strategy for the country's development over the next 10 to 15 years' is being mapped out by a special Party-government commission set up in late February. The revised plan for 1971, approved by the *Sejm* on March 19, incorporated a number of revisions intended primarily 'to improve the living conditions of the population and [to ensure] a considerable increase in market supplies'.[8]

The importance of the latter provision had increased markedly as the result of the regime's *ad hoc* concessions to popular pressure. Despite the official claim that the above-mentioned ameliorative measures exhausted the government's resources, the workers had continued to press for a further resolution of economic grievances. Awareness of their new-found strength—in the words of one Gdansk worker, 'we convinced ourselves in those December days that power is with the people'[9]—was soon reflected in an outbreak of major work stoppages, in the coastal cities in late January and in the major textile centre of Lodz in mid-February. In both cases, the strikes ended only after the leadership had personally negotiated with the workers and had made significant concessions.

On January 25, it was revealed that the former regime's controversial material incentives system, linking bonus premiums more closely to

[6] Radio Warsaw, 20 December 1970.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Statement of Acting Chairman of the State Planning Commission Witold Trampczynski, *Trybuna Ludu*, 4 March 1971.
[9] Radio Gdansk, 18 January 1971.

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qualitative rather than quantitative factors, would not be introduced in 1971. The new wage scheme was felt by many experts to be too complicated, while most workers feared it would have an adverse effect on earnings.[10] Of even greater significance, on February 15, Premier Jaroszewicz announced that the December price increases on foodstuffs would be rescinded as of March 1.[11] This decision, taken in direct response to the work stoppage in Lodz, brought to 25,000 million zlotys the sum earmarked for improving living standards. As the prominent journalist Mieczyslaw Rakowski subsequently noted: 'It must be clear to all of us that as of this moment we are beginning to live on credit.'[12] A good part of that was owed to the USSR, whose $100 million loan had made possible the price rollback.

CHANGES in economic policy have formed only one aspect of the regime's concerted attempt to gain the trust of the population and to restore the authority of the Party. Gierek's initial speeches to the nation in December and his report to the Eighth Central Committee Plenum in February both pointed to societal crises,[13] the causes of which extended far beyond the economic sphere. Attributing much of the responsibility for this situation to the autocratic actions of a small clique around Gomulka, the new First Secretary proclaimed that the nation's confidence in the highest authorities, 'a tie without which it is impossible to govern in a socialist state', would be renewed and that subsequent policies would be 'clear and understandable to all', with decisions being made only after a 'frank, direct dialogue . . . with the whole nation'.

The 'consultation' pledge was initiated almost immediately, factory conferences being organized in late December to decide on the distribution of government funds for low-income families. Later, the regime was to make a virtue of necessity, citing Gierek and Jaroszewicz's negotiations with striking workers in Szczecin, Gdansk, and Lodz as further proof of the 'dialogue' with the nation. Changes in information policy were evidenced by the appointment of a government spokesman in March and the inauguration of televised series of question-and-answer sessions with prominent leaders in June. Moreover, for the first time in Party history, brief communiqués described the activities of the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat, which, in the new spirit of 'collective responsibility', were convening regularly.

This practice of regular meetings was held up as an example to the lower Party echelons, while the PUWP newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, almost daily invoked the necessity for 'constant modifications and improvements of the mechanisms of Party activity'.[14] Criticism of

[10] As was subsequently confirmed by Premier Jaroszewicz, Radio Warsaw, 27 January 1971.
[11] Statement over Radio Warsaw. See also *Trybuna Ludu*, 16 February 1971.
[12] *Polityka*, 20 February 1971.
[13] See, in particular, his speeches to the nation over Radio Warsaw on December 20 and 31.
[14] For example, *Trybuna Ludu*, 16 January 1971.

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Gomulka's violation of 'Leninist norms' was accompanied by demands for the restoration of 'democratic centralism', based on greater discussion at all levels of the PUWP. The regime also censured the former Party leadership for its interference in the work of government bodies and promised that henceforth the latter's functions and responsibilities would not be infringed upon. In a rather similar vein, Premier Jaroszewicz stressed that the Council of Ministers would confine its attention to 'questions of essential significance for the state' and allow greater authority for specific decisions to the individual ministries and to the People's Councils.[15] Within the framework of increased emphasis on 'socialist democracy', other representative institutions were also reproached, including the *Sejm* for its 'uncritical admiration of draft laws and government reports'[16] and the Socialist Youth Union, accused of organizing nothing more essential than 'mushroom hunts and dancing soirées'.[17]

The most discredited 'representative' bodies of all, the trade unions, have also been the subject of critical concern. Indeed, the failure of this institution—the epitome of the classical 'transmission belt' under the direction of Gomulka's close associate, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski—to provide a mechanism for airing worker grievances was one of the principal reasons that the December confrontation degenerated into violence. Since that time, trade-union reform has been one of the most persistent and vociferous demands of the workers. Their pressure secured the removal of Loga-Sowinski in January and the subsequent acknowledgement by the new trade-union leadership that the organization's main function was to defend the interests of the workers. The new labour code to be presented to the Seventh Trade Union Congress in early 1972 will apparently accord the trade unions a limited right of veto over management decisions.

In addition to the initial appeals for calm addressed to the nation, the new leadership also sought to secure the cooperation of the powerful Roman Catholic Church, expressing on December 23 the desire for a 'full normalization' of state-church relations.[18] This concilliatory nod was subsequently followed by a genuine concession, the initiation of legal moves to grant the Episcopate ownership rights to former German church property in the Oder-Neisse territories, and a meeting between Premier Jaroszewicz and Cardinal Wyszynski in early March, the first such summit conference in eight years. While responding positively to the government's proclamations and issuing his own call for popular restraint, Wyszynski, in a series of statements, once again confirmed the importance of the Church as an articulate and independent spokesman for political, economic, and social rights, reiterating at the same time the specifically institutional grievances of the clergy.

[15] Speech to government functionaries on January 21, *Trybuna Ludu*, 22 January 1971.
[16] *Trybuna Ludu*, 18 March 1971.
[17] Radio Warsaw, 21 February 1971.
[18] Contained in Premier Jaroszewicz's speech to the *Sejm* on December 23. See *Trybuna Ludu*, 24–27 December 1971.

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The Church has not been the only recipient of conciliatory gestures. The decision to rebuild the royal castle in Warsaw, announced personally by Gierek, was the most obvious appeal to national sentiment. In addition, there have been signs of a more tolerant attitude toward intellectuals,[19] and several prominent writers silenced by Gomulka—e.g. Stefan Kisielewski and Antoni Slonimski—have been allowed to publish again. Considerable attention has also been devoted to the problems of students and young workers, which are to be discussed at a forthcoming Central Committee plenum on the basis of a report currently being prepared by a committee of experts.

WHILE details on the political machinations prior to the dramatic Seventh Plenum on December 20 are contradictory, the selection of Gierek as Gomulka's successor was hardly a surprising one. Although a member of the Politburo since 1959, his reputation was built on success as an efficient political and economic manager for 14 years in Silesia rather than any identification with the central leadership. Indeed, Gierek had often clashed with the latter on economic questions and was thought to be opposed to several aspects of the economic reform that was to be introduced on January 1. This was clearly an opportune image to project in December, given the fact that both the December price increases and the new wage scheme were explained by the former leadership as integral parts of that reform. Similarly, Gierek's genuine, albeit paternalistic, interest in the working class and pragmatic approach to decision-making further recommended him for the sensitive task of dealing with an aroused proletariat. Nor was there anything in his make-up suggestive of a Polish Dubcek. During his rule in Silesia, there was never any question as to the Party's 'leading role' or his willingness to resort to ruthless tactics when such were deemed necessary.

Since assuming the post of First Secretary, Gierek has sought to downplay his past association with the Gomulka leadership[20] and, simultaneously, build up the national stature and support he lacked owing to his long years in Katowice. Gierek's pragmatic side has been most evident in pursuit of the latter goal, as has been reflected not only in the conciliatory measures and concessions already mentioned, but also in his reversal of the former regime's interpretation of the worker demonstrations. His negotiations in January with the strikers on the coast and several of his subsequent visits to various regions in Poland have had almost a charismatic quality.

Gierek has not, however, courted popular support in a way that might weaken the foundations on which his position ultimately rests. For example, while asserting that the participants in the December riots

[19] For details, see Polish Situation Report No. 13, *Radio Free Europe Research*, 17 February 1971.

[20] One of the first comprehensive press attacks on Gomulka portrayed Gierek as having 'presented the necessary decisions in the forum of the former Party leadership' to no avail. Significantly, the article was published in the Katowice Party newspaper *Trybuna Robotnicza*, 27 January 1971.

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were 'inspired by honest feelings', he has also claimed that 'those [i.e., the security forces and certain military units] who were instructed to restore order were guided by devotion and discipline toward the policy of the Party and the people's power and were led by supreme concern for the highest interests of the country'.[21] Regarding the individuals who issued the 'instructions', Gierek has proceeded very cautiously, despite the demands of the workers for retribution. Although a number of personnel changes have been made in the Interior and Defence Ministries, no official in either branch has been held publicly responsible for the brutal suppression of the demonstrations on the sea-coast.

The leadership's unwillingness to see the forces of 'law and order' humiliated has been more than matched by its hesitation in assessing the political responsibility for both the tragedy of December and its fundamental origins. Such dismissals as occurred were due less to popular demand than to the usual mechanics of a leadership change or to post-December 20 internal Party politics. Of the discredited members of the former leadership, only Zenon Kliszko and Boleslaw Jaszczuk—the chief ideologist and economist respectively under Gomulka—have been publicly censured,[22] while an evaluation of Gomulka's role has been postponed so as not to allow, in Gierek's words to the Eighth Plenum, present 'bitterness' to detract from an objective estimate of his 'personal services to the Party and state'.[23] The Eighth Plenum also accepted the resignations of Politburo member Loga-Sowinski and Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Stanislaw Kociolek. The latter, entrusted—first by Gomulka and subsequently by Gierek—with a key role in dealing with the situation in the coastal region, had incurred the wrath of the workers by seeking initially to defend the price increases and later to excuse the actions of the security forces.

Kociolek's resignation, the most significant example of concession to popular pressure, has been the exception to the general rule. Thus, in the initial reshuffle on December 20, Premier Cyrankiewicz and Foreign Minister Jedrychowski remained in their Politburo posts, while Moczar was elevated into that body. Despite strong demands for their ouster, all three have continued to hold these positions, although Cyrankiewicz subsequently lost the Premiership to Jaroszewicz. The same situation prevailed at other levels of the Party as well. Quickly countering the appeals for purges emanating from both the workers and hardline elements in the Party, Gierek, while leaving his future options open, affirmed the 'tremendous importance of the stabilization of cadres'.[24] Similar to its virtual whitewash of the security service actions

[21] Speech to the Gdansk regional Party report-and-election conference, *Trybuna Ludu*, 21 April 1971.
[22] In the resolution of the Eighth Central Committee Plenum, *Trybuna Ludu*, 8 February 1971.
[23] Report to the Eighth Central Committee Plenum, *Trybuna Ludu*, 8 February 1971.
[24] Speech to a Warsaw Party conference on February 9, *Trybuna Ludu*, 10 February 1971.

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in December, the leadership sought to absolve the Party rank-and-file of responsibility for the mistakes of the Gomulka era: 'It is clear that one should not blame the whole Party for the distortions [of the past], as its activists and members were acting in the best of faith.' [25]

These assurances have in part reflected Gierek's healthy respect for the strength of the mass of *apparatchiks* entrenched in the Party and state system during the Gomulka years. Eschewing the type of wholesale purge that might lead to a confrontation with them, the First Secretary has instead chosen to court their favours, while simultaneously strengthening his hand through selective dismissals of officials in the central and regional Party organizations. Gierek's position has been further bolstered by the natural tendency for careerists of all persuasions to gravitate toward the side with the greatest strength.

The Strzelecki-appointed bureaucrats do not constitute a factional grouping per se, but they are a powerful force for the vested interest that Gierek will have to confront and control if even limited change is not to be undermined at every level. His failure to do so to date may in part be attributable to his concern with the more immediate threat posed by Moczar. The latter, though defeated by Gomulka in a power struggle more than two years earlier, had politically recovered to such an extent that his influence, particularly in the Interior Ministry, was an important factor in the palace revolution of December 20.[26] In apparent recognition of his support for Gierek, Moczar was awarded a Politburo seat at the Seventh Plenum and retained his responsibility in the Central Committee Secretariat for security and military affairs.

The compromise and coincidence of interests that prompted the Gierek-Moczar alliance proved, however, to be a short-term arrangement. Although not manifested in an overt split in the top leadership, signs of disunity in the Party emerged in early January. In particular, a number of individuals and newspapers closely associated with Moczar adopted a position opposed to the conciliatory stance of the new Party leader, openly calling for a return to the 'policy of March'—a euphemism for the free-for-all purge advocated and practiced by the Moczarite faction in 1968. This hardline posture was, in turn, sharply countered by the pro-Gierek press and by the First Secretary himself. Of even greater significance, Gierek moved very quickly to neutralize the personal influence of his rival—an effort that, after the Eighth Plenum, achieved considerable success. In February and March, Moczar made only a few token appearances and seemed to be only nominally exercising his Party duties. In April, he dropped from sight altogether—reportedly as a result of a slight heart attack—and his responsibilities in the Central Committee Secretariat were transferred to Stanislaw

[25] Statement of Stefan Olszowski, Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary, over Radio Warsaw on February 6. See also *Trybuna Ludu*, 7 February 1971.

[26] For a discussion of the 1968 power struggle, see A. Ross Johnson, 'Poland: End of an Era?', *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1970. For a more comprehensive treatment of Moczar's recent decline, see Michael Costello, 'The Political Fortunes of Mieczyslaw Moczar', *Radio Free Europe Research*, 2 June 1971.

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Kania, who was elected to that body at the Ninth Plenum in mid-April. Moczar's reappearance in public at the end of May was marked by a demonstrative show of Party unity, but the leader of the hardline forces had not made a political comeback. At the Tenth Plenum in late June, he was formally removed from the Central Committee Secretariat, an action preceded by (and officially attributed to) his appointment to an unimportant supervisory post in the government.

Gierek's success in neutralizing the influence of the Moczarites was in a large measure made possible by the fact that the events of late 1970–early 1971 did not lend themselves to regeneration of the Partisan faction. Gierek held a dominant position in the leadership, and his cautious attitude toward the Party apparat clearly indicated no intention to allow Moczar the opportunity to exploit this potential source of opposition. In retrospect, the Partisan leader was very much a man of the Gomulka era, his stature and authority being primarily derived from the opposition to, or impatience at, the immobilism of the former Party leader. With the latter's departure from the scene, Moczar ceased to be a viable alternative except for a small group of supporters. In view of the measures taken to date against this hard core,[27] the odds are that Gierek will further press his advantage and that Moczar's continued representation on the Politiburo will not be of long duration.

LITTLE is known of either Soviet calculations during the rioting in the third week of December or involvement in the subsequent changes in the Polish Party. However, the course of events strongly indicates that the Soviet leaders were quite prepared to discard Gomulka when it became evident that to support him further could have led to greater instability and the possible necessity of Soviet military intervention. Gierek's assumption of PUWP leadership, if not in fact proposed by Moscow, was immediately endorsed by the Kremlin. In a congratulatory telegram, the Soviet Party General Secretary Brezhnev hailed the new Polish leader as 'a sincere friend of the Soviet Union, a staunch communist, and an internationalist'.[28]

The emergence of renewed labour unrest in January undoubtedly heightened Soviet concern over Gierek's ability to control the situation. On January 30, *Pravda* condemned a Western news agency report from Vienna that 'Russia is prepared to invade Poland'. Although asserting that 'the difficulties that erupted at the end of last year are now being overcome', the article itself seemed less a confirmation of Moscow's support for Gierek than an oblique indication to the Polish leadership that the circumstances (i.e. continued instability) warranting such a denial should be altered. However, when the Lodz strike broke out less than two weeks later, the Soviet leadership clearly opted in favour of

[27] The security apparat, Moczar's principal stronghold, has been a particular target. In June, a number of high-ranking officials in the Interior Ministry were either summarily dismissed or transferred to less sensitive positions.

[28] *Trybuna Ludu*, 22 December 1971.

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Gierek's conciliatory approach, coming to his aid with the substantial credit that made it possible to rescind the December price increases. Soviet confidence in the course of action adopted by the Polish leadership was apparent in other economic commitments as well. As if to justify the correctness of such economic, as well as political, support, in his report to the 24th CPSU Congress in late March, Brezhnev noted with 'profound satisfaction' that 'the difficulties which had arisen [in Poland] have been overcome'.[29]

Brezhnev's formulation was slightly altered by Gierek, who, in a subsequent address to the gathering in Moscow, stated that 'we are overcoming these difficulties', not least due to Soviet 'understanding of Polish problems . . . [and] friendly help in solving them'.[30] In lauding the new CPSU programme as a document guided by concern for 'the prosperity and development of man', Gierek deliberately sought to emphasize those aspects of it which bear resemblance to the Polish effort 'to ensure a considerable increase of the standard of living of the people'. These statements, as well as his assertion that the PUWP had been strong enough 'to overcome, relatively quickly, the complex situation in which Poland had found itself', were clearly intended to convey the impression that the Polish 'renewal' contained no ideological deviations.

Such assurances to its allies have formed an integral part of the policy of the new Polish regime.[31] Thus, soon after the December 20 reshuffle, the leadership was quick to point out that the demonstrations had not been directed toward 'our international alliances', while Rakowski emphasized in *Polityka* that 'our nation does not live in a vacuum, that the expression *raison d'état* is not an abstraction, but something very real'.[32] In his first speech to the nation, Gierek stressed continued reliance on the Soviet alliance and affirmed that 'Poland is and shall remain a permanent link in the forces of socialism, democracy and peace'. Subsequently, he has maintained that this 'link' was not in the least weakened in December: 'We can say that in an extremely complex situation we succeeded in solving the crisis by our own means, that the defence position of People's Poland, resulting from the alliance obligations within the Warsaw Treaty, was not shaken even for a single moment.'[33] Leaving no doubt about the future, Gierek posited the following 'truths' at the important February Plenum: 'Poland can develop only as a socialist state, inseparably united with the Soviet Union and with our neighbours and allies . . . [and] our

[29] *Pravda*, 31 March 1971.

[30] *Trybuna Ludu*, 1 April 1971.

[31] Gierek and Jaroszewicz visited Moscow on January 5, East Berlin on January 11, and Prague on January 16. In addition, between January 4 and 8, other high-ranking officials were dispatched to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania.

[32] 2 January 1971. See also the January 1971 issue of *Nowe Drogi*.

[33] Speech to the PUWP report-and-election conference of the Silesian Military District, *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, 20–21 March 1971.

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Party is and will remain the historically tested leading force of the Polish nation. . . .'

BY late June, the available evidence suggested that the PUWP had successfully weathered the immediate shock of December and that the initial stage of consolidation had ended. Of perhaps cardinal importance, the leadership had regained the initiative from the workers, whose militancy in January and February had kept the regime on the defensive and forced notable concessions. Although strikes and protests continued in certain factories at least into April,[34] the majority of workers appeared to realize the potential political, as well as economic, consequences of continued chaos. Moreover, Gierek had contained the advocates of the harder line and sharply limited Moczar's personal influence, thereby enhancing both his authority in the Party and ability to manoeuvre against unrepentant supporters of the 'old' style.[35] Finally, as reflected in a new series of economic agreements signed in Moscow in early June, the Polish regime was assured of Soviet support, particularly in the vital economic sphere.

These advances were in turn accompanied by signs of increased confidence and assertiveness on the part of the leadership. While reaffirming the need for 'renewal', the latter has increasingly sought to impose its own definition of the prerequisites and parameters of that process. Reliance on the opinions and advice of experts, it is argued, will in no way lessen the Party's responsibility for and control over the management of society, a principle brought home during a series of economic meetings in late May and early June.[36] As for the rejuvenation of the Party itself, previous stress on the dangers of centralization gave way to Gierek's far more orthodox formulation at the Ninth Plenum in April: 'Anarchistic loosening [of social discipline] which amounts to a parody of democracy is just as harmful as bureaucratic centralization which paralyses the development of Party organizations. . . .'[37]

Similarly, some of the earlier signs of relaxation and conciliation seemed replaced by a tougher regime stance. For example, in addition to curbing the Partisan spokesmen, the leadership has placed clear limitations on press discussion in general; although the newpapers are supplying more information to the public, the transmission belt continues to function primarily in only one direction. Similar retrenchment is to be seen in the official concept of the 'normalization' of Church–state relations. In early June, Politburo member and Central Committee

[34] As admitted by Politburo member Edward Babiuch in his speech to the Ninth Plenum, *Trybuna Ludu*, 18 April 1971

[35] In late May, premier Jaroszewiz revealed that a 'war between the old and the new' was still being waged over the 'renewal' process. See his interview with *Express Wieczorny*, 22 May 1971.

[36] For one of the more orthodox views, see the article by Tadeusz Jaroszewski in the March 1971 issue of *Nowe Drogi*.

[37] *Trybuna Ludu*, 17 April 1971.

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Secretary Jan Szydlak asserted that this depended on the Church's 'full recognition of the socialist character of the state and its socialist perspective'.[38] Exactly a week later, Cardinal Wyszynski explicitly criticized the regime for continuing to harass the Catholic population and refusing to allow the construction of new religious buildings, stressing (in a clear reply to Szydlak's statement) that by 'normalization' the Church understood 'the recognition of the Church's rights'.[39]

While it may be premature to assess these diverse signs as indicative of the regime's overall intentions, the trend of developments since December does revive memories of the fate of the short-lived reform programme initiated some 14 years earlier. That programme, generated at a time when the Stalinist edifice throughout Eastern Europe was crumbling before the twin forces of liberalism and nationalism, contained the promise of a specifically Polish 'road to socialism.' Thrust into power by the national revival, Gomulka, in his initial approach, appeared to identify himself with it.

IN the famous speech to the Eighth Central Committee Plenum on 20 October 1956, Gomulka denounced the past leadership for having dissipated the 'credit of confidence' and for a 'bad economic policy'. Recommending essential changes in 'the democratization of our life', he advocated the restoration of 'democratic centralism' in the PUWP, less interference by the Party in the work of the government, a greater role for the *Sejm,* and freer information policies. Economically, Gomulka's proposals embodied a practical guarantee of the indefinite continuation of private ownership in agriculture, support for the workers' councils as self-management bodies in enterprises, encouragement for private artisans, and various measures 'to raise the living standards of the working class'. Other prominent features of the 'October' programme included the curbing of police terror and the virtual disappearance of 'administrative methods', a quickly reached modus vivendi between state and Church, relative freedom of cultural and press activity, the initiation of plans for a far-sighted economic reform, and a more assertive foreign policy, which, in emphasizing Poland's traditional ties with the West, sought to redress previous submersion in the Soviet bloc.

In his initial articulation and support of such policies, Gomulka was guided not by the precepts of reform communism but rather by the necessity to compromise with forces and circumstances over which he had little or no control. As has been aptly noted, this former victim of Stalinist persecution was 'not the creator of October but its product',[40] who, once firmly in power, manifested a deep distrust of the spontaneity that had placed him there. That Gomulka's essentially orthodox view of Poland's 'road to socialism' had little in common with the aspirations

[38] In a televized statement on 3 June 1971.
[39] For additional details, see Polish Situation Report No. 33, *Radio Free Europe Research,* 14 June 1971.
[40] J. F. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe* (Praeger, New York, 1966), p. 50.

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of the population became steadily apparent in the erosion of both the spirit and the substance of the 1956 regeneration. Among the landmarks of the 'retreat from October'[41] were: the Party's reassertion of hegemonic control over the political system; the decisions to modify rather than to reform the Stalinist command economy; the abolition of the workers' councils and the degeneration of the trade unions into an instrument of official policy; the imposition of severe restrictions on cultural and academic freedoms; and the return to 'respectability' of the security forces, the result both of the fears of an increasingly defensive regime and of the rising influence of Moczar. While farming remained overwhelmingly in peasant hands and the Church continued to be a strong alternative of power, the regime inexorably sought to whittle away the prerogatives and the strength of each.

Given the anti-Soviet mood inherent in the ferment of 1956 and manipulated at that time by Gomulka, it was not surprising that his subsequent effort to turn the clock back was facilitated by Moscow. Although his doctrinaire conceptions would inevitably have taken their toll, the pace and extent of the retreat were in part attributable to the trend toward retrenchment throughout Eastern Europe following the Hungarian trauma and the Soviet decision to tighten the reins within the 'socialist commonwealth'. By the early 1960s, when Gomulka's credibility and prestige in Poland had never been so low, his stature in the communist world had never been so high. However, the leverage gained from domestic orthodoxy was in part offset by continued Polish reliance on the Soviet guarantee of the Oder-Neisse border and, as the 1960s wore on, by increasing dependence on Soviet support in the face of a stagnating economic situation.

The year 1968 revealed the utter bankruptcy of the 'small stabilization', as the Gomulka regime violently responded to critics at home and willingly lent military support to the repression of reform abroad. The Polish leadership sought to justify participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia largely in terms of the spurious danger of West German penetration of that country (and the subsequent threat to Poland's strategic interests), but, clearly, the domestic course of the Prague spring was not only anathema to Gomulka personally, but also provided an extremely dangerous threat of 'infection'. This had been demonstratively brought home in February and March, when intellectuals and students alike had invoked the example of Czechoslovakia in protesting against the encroachment of cultural freedom and academic rights.[42] Showing little toleration, the regime dispersed student demonstrations by force and arrested the leaders. The ensuing attempt to root out their mentors was to be manipulated by the hardliners—led by

[41] For an analysis of the 'retreat' as seen in the mid-1960s, see ibid. pp. 50–64. For a more recent discussion, see A. Ross Johnon, 'The Polish Riots and Gomulka's Fall', op. cit.

[42] See A. Ross Johnson, 'Poland: The End of the Post-October Era', and the accompanying 'Documents' in *Survey*, July 1968.

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the Partisan faction—in a campaign that was anti-Semitic as well as anti-intellectual, and subsequently developed into a struggle for authority within the PUWP.

The Partisans' defeat notwithstanding, Gomulka's reconsolidation of power at the Fifth Congress in November 1968 was a Pyrrhic victory: 'his own re-election to the post of First Secretary marked, in effect, the end of his personal domination of the Party, creating new limits on his political power'.[43] Although outmanoeuvring the hardliners, Gomulka failed to win the support of those frustrated Poles for whom espousal of the Partisan cause, as a force for change, had seemed the only logical alternative to pervasive stagnation and bureaucracy.

THIS same frustration and alarm regarding Poland's national interests were reflected in a press discussion conducted by prominent journalists and academicians in the summer months of 1970.[44] In providing the framework for the discussion, the distinguished sociologist Jan Szczepanski argued that the era of *détente* has led to a 'shifting of forces within the blocs', in which 'the problem of the place of individual nations and states will arise anew'.[45] Frankly observing that, among the communist nations, 'political and economic interests are not completely identical', Szczepanski posited that Poland would be able to assert and defend her external interests only in so far as she is internally strong. Relatedly, the noted foreign affairs expert Ryszard Wojna stated that 'competition between the political systems, as well as within them, is being transferred in an increasing degree to the fields of economy and technology'.[46]

In the opinion of most of the participants in the discussion, it was in just these 'fields' that Poland seemed to be lagging behind. Moreover, in examining the socio-economic and psychological health of the nation, the majority found serious cause for concern. Indeed, the references to almost total socio-economic stagnation, the absence of innovative leadership, inadequate structures for the transmission of initiatives 'from below', and policies reinforcing the tendency to think in terms of 'one's own small stability' rather than that of the nation constituted a strong indictment of the regime's record. That such views could be articulated in Poland (and given implicit support by one of the younger members of the Politburo [47]) several months prior to Gomulka's ouster pointed to encouragement at high levels in the leadership, and, in retrospect, indicated the extent to which the 'small stabilization' had already been breached.

If, as Szczepanski asserted, Poland's position in the world were to 'depend on her economic power', the prospects in late 1970 appeared

[43] Johnson, 'Poland: End of an Era', op. cit.
[44] For a review of the press discussion, see Michael Costello, 'The Poles Look at Their Country and at Themselves', *Radio Free Europe Research*, 16 September 1970.
[45] *Zycie Warszawy*, 4 June 1970.
[46] Ibid. 30 July 1970.
[47] See Josef Tejchma's statement in *Kultura*, 4 October 1970.

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very bleak indeed. Reflected at the macro-economic level in a declining rate of growth, the deterioration of the Polish economy was even more pronounced in terms of the effect on the individual worker. According to even official statistics, his real wages had increased by an annual average of only 1·7 per cent during the 1961–70 period. Toward the end of the decade, problems associated with the stagnation of personal income were compounded by inadequate market supplies. With Poland's factories still working on principles only slightly related to supply concepts, the inventory of unwanted goods in 1970 increased at roughly twice the rate of growth of overall industrial output. Moreover, two consecutive years of bad harvests owing to adverse weather—coming on top of earlier official measures that had significantly reduced the profit margin for meat production—produced a major food shortage.

In these circumstances, the preparations for the introduction of the reform proved merely an additional source of aggravation and discontent. In line with the rapid transition to 'intensive' economic development, the leadership had already begun to crack down on the problem of surplus manpower; by December, the number of jobless and those facing the prospect of unemployment was estimated to have reached the half-million mark.[48] Moreover, for those not affected by the cutback, the new material incentives system offered slight promise of an increase in wages. Given these factors, the December 12 announcement of the price increases, threatening to raise the cost of living by some 10 to 15 per cent, was the 'straw that broke the camel's back'.[49] On December 14, the day on which the demonstrations in Gdansk began, the Sixth Central Committee Plenum was convoked to discuss the economic situation. In what was to be his last speech to that body as First Secretary, Gomulka imperiously remarked that 'price increases always meet with criticism, no matter whether this criticism is justified or unjustified'. He then described the Plenum as a crucial 'turning point' which 'closes the old and opens a new stage of economic development'.

ALTHOUGH Gomulka's departure from the scene was greeted in Poland with widespread relief, such feelings have since given way to those of passivity, if not scepticism. For most of the population, the economic concessions of the new leadership merely signified a return to the pre-December situation, which was hardly an optimistic one. Moreover, to a large number of Poles, the slogans and promises of early 1971 bore remarkable similarity to those of 1956; the re-run has evoked considerably less belief and enthusiasm. Having once seen their hopes for a fairer and more responsive system of rule go largely unfulfilled, people of all persuasions were less likely to extend to Gierek the support and benefit of the doubt accorded earlier to Gomulka.

Popular feelings aside, far more than fourteen years separated the events of 1956 and 1970. Unlike the Polish October, the Polish

[48] See *Trybuna Ludu*, 15 February 1971.
[49] *Trybuna Robotnicza*, 27 January 1971.

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December was almost exclusively a workers' affair and, while the latter were not isolated in their militancy, they were certainly not joined by other sections of society. The explosion of accumulated working class frustration and discontent was not matched, as had been true in 1956, by the involvement of students and intellectuals. The latter, whose full participation in such a situation was essential for a consistent and durable articulation of the nation's demands and sentiments, remained very much on the sidelines. What is more, even before the leadership had restored censorship, the quality and range of press discussion were but a pale shadow of the free-wheeling journalistic debates in 1956. Thus, with the exception of worker 'spontaneity', which proved self-sustaining for only a brief period, the Gierek team has faced slight pressure 'from below', a factor which in turn enhances its ability to define the character of the 'renewal' process.

The failure of the other societal groups to make common cause with the workers suggests another element in the current situation. In 1956, Poland both contributed to and drew from the general atmosphere of ferment and relaxation (or collapse) of controls throughout Eastern Europe. Given the repudiation of the myth that had held communism and communists together, the scope for reform appeared endless and a more equitable definition of intra-bloc relationships possible. In contrast, for any politician coming to power in Eastern Europe after August 1968, the limitations on reform were well defined, while the idea of divergent paths to communism had been largely subordinated to the conservative conception of 'the defence of common socialist achievements'.[50] Thus, the quiescence of Poland's intellectual and academic communities in December 1970 and since, although perhaps due to their ordeal during and after March 1968, may also be attributable to their negative estimate of the possibilities for change, no matter how reform-minded Gierek might be or how much he might be influenced by pressure from the society as a whole.

The Polish leadership's sensitivity to such external constraints—and awareness of the lessons of the Czechoslovak experience—has been apparent in its vigorous defence of the PUWP's 'leading role', particularly in the area of economic reform. In spite of his reliance on expertise, Gierek has recognized the political risks inherent in according specialists an unrestricted hand in this sphere. As *Trybuna Ludu* asserted in early January: 'Under the socialist system, where the state shoulders the task of directing the country's economic development, the problem of economics becomes, in all its aspects, a political problem'.[51] Accordingly, the choice of Politburo member Jan Szydlak, a close

[50] If the case of Hungary seemed to expand these limits, it must be considered that the reforms emerging there in the late 1960s were the product of a regime that had been in power since 1956.

[51] 10 January 1971. This statement was in fact an accurate summation of the Polish experience with economic reform. For a useful discussion of earlier reform attempts, see Michael Gamarnikow, 'The Polish Economy in Transition', *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1970.

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associate of Gierek's and the regime's principal ideologist, to oversee economic issues at the Secretariat level could raise few eyebrows among Poland's allies. It was intended to enable the First Secretary to maintain political control over the work currently being done at lower levels by economic experts. Wladyslaw Kruczek's appointment as the new head of the trade unions should be seen in the same light. This 60-year-old Politburo member, whose previous experience had been exclusively in the regional Party apparat, was unlikely to be swayed by the arguments in favour of decentralizing the trade union organization or of letting it maintain a posture distinct from that of the PUWP.

Any limitations on the Polish leadership's latitude of action imposed by the ideological concerns of its allies are, however, minor in comparison with the inhibiting factors contained in the domestic situation itself. Indeed, Gomulka's legacy was such that the replacement of the system and style of rule associated with his name, as well as the reversal of certain of his policy decisions, in the best of cases could only be a long-term proposition. In early June, Gierek alluded to this fact by stating that 'in 1976–80 [i.e. during the next five year plan] we should be able to carry out deeper transformations in the structure and level of modernity of production than are possible within the next four years. To a certain extent, this also applies to the social programme.' [52] Similarly, the twin problems of inertia and bureaucracy within the Party and government apparatus remain what they were. As Rakowski has recently revealed, at many of 'the intermediate levels of power' the *apparatchiks* continue to hold the view that 'we shall also outlast this renewal'.[53]

Another restraint on the new leadership is the country's desperate economic situation. Any comprehensive attempt at reform will inevitably disadvantage certain segments of the population and, as Gomulka belatedly discovered, aggravate existing socio-economic discontent. The measures proposed by Jaszczuk, however well-founded economically, were politically disastrous in the given circumstances. In repudiating Jaszczuk and revising important aspects of his programme, e.g. the shelving of the material incentives programme and the decision to regard full employment as one of the cornerstones of the new plan for 1971–75, the regime has clearly sought to relieve the tensions that exploded in December. However, although political expediency has been served, these and other decisions have in fact merely deferred and, in certain instances, made more difficult the necessary transfer from 'extensive' to 'intensive' forms of development.

THE influence of these external and internal factors notwithstanding, Poland's future prospects will depend, in the final analysis, on the intentions and aims of the new leadership. But, because of the special situation prevailing since Gierek came into office, these intentions

[52] Statement to a Party conference in Katowice on June 5, *Trybuna Ludu*, 6 June 1971.
[53] *Polityka*, 29 May 1971.

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and aims are as yet difficult to isolate and identify clearly. The redress of certain economic grievances, concessions to popular pressure, and the establishment of commissions—while in themselves a welcome change from Gomulka—do not add up to a policy. To date, the long-term problems of the viability and growth of the Polish economy have been largely subordinated to the immediate ones associated with the restoration of stability in the country, as well as the attempt to consolidate the authority of both the Party and its leaders. As such, the heralded 'new style' of the regime has primarily borne the mark of *ad hoc* improvization in the face of changing circumstances rather than of substantive reform, while the delineation of a specific political and socio-economic programme presumably awaits the PUWP's Sixth Congress, which has been rescheduled for late 1971 or early 1972. Nevertheless, an interim prognosis may be hazarded on the basis of the flow of events to this point.

In the economic sphere, the main preoccupation of the leadership, Gomulka's attraction to ideological dogmas and well-known proclivity for austerity, have been in large measure replaced by a strong dose of pragmatism. This has been reflected, for example, in the shift of investment and production priorities in favour of consumer goods output, encouragement and support for the private artisans and for the service sector as a whole, the import of previously unavailable consumer articles, and the acknowledgement that Poland will seek investment credits and co-production agreements abroad—in the West as well as in the East. Gierek's pragmatic inclinations to produce results have been most evident in the sphere of agrarian policy. In addition to raising the purchase prices for meat and milk products, the regime has also announced a package of reforms including the abolition (as of 1 January 1972) of the system of compulsory deliveries, changes in the present tax laws to facilitate the expansion of private holdings, and the introduction of a social health insurance plan for the peasants.[54] Clearly, the intent of these initiatives is to end the recurrent food shortages, which, while arousing domestic discontent, have also negatively affected Poland's hard currency earnings.[55] However, in enhancing the profitability of private farming, the reforms will also provide the peasants with both an incentive and a sense of security denied them by Gomulka. The leadership has sought to minimize the ideological implications of this guarantee by paying lip service to the eventual 'socialist transformation of the countryside', but the concessions that it has made will serve to consolidate private ownership in the countryside.

The vigour of the regime's agricultural policies contrasts with its cautious and in part contradictory approach toward the industrial sector, where the legacy of the command economy is most pronounced. On the

[54] See, in particular, Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary, Edward Babiuch's speech to the Ninth Central Committee Plenum, *Trybuna Ludu*, 18 April 1971.

[55] As late as 1968, exports of agricultural produce accounted for more than 60 per cent of Poland's total hard currency earnings.

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one hand, the archaic practice of 'production pledges' has been revived, while 'violations of work discipline' continue to be cited as the main explanation for various breakdowns and the sluggish growth rate of labour productivity. At the same time, however, the leadership, utilizing the services of experts, has been cautiously groping for a system of planning and management in which 'the harmonious development of the population can be ensured and the standards of living of the population systematically raised'.[56] The review of 'socio-economic development in the years 1971–1975' at the Tenth Plenum contained a qualitatively new approach toward the concept of planning. In discussing the long-term plan for this period, the main speakers at the Central Committee session emphasized the importance of satisfying consumption and social needs rather than of simply meeting quantitative production norms, a development that the economic journal *Zycie Gospodarcze* hailed as a major alteration of 'the whole logic of planning'.[57]

Another prime discussion topic has been the new reform model presently being worked out by a special commission of 230 experts. Outlining an initial blueprint at a meeting in late May, the commission concluded that 'the dynamic action and development of enterprises, as the units which decide not only about production but also about inter-human relations' is the basic premise to which 'the whole reform must be subordinated'.[58] Relatedly, direct links 'among separate units and between them and the consumer market' are to be 'streamlined', while 'assignments and directives' from the centre are to be cut back; central planning, as 'one of the basic rules of the socialist economy' is to be strengthened and 'simultaneously improved'. Thus, the reform, which is to be discussed at the Sixth Congress, appears to envisage a decentralization of economic authority, the enterprise being accorded greater rights of initiative and decision-making within the framework of a less demanding central plan.

Notwithstanding the promise in the recognition of the advantages to be derived from greater enterprise autonomy, the success of any reform scheme in Poland still awaits resolution of the dilemma of ensuring the kind of freedom whose need is recognized by technocrats for the sake of efficiency and modernization in the face of the politicians' concern that the Party's monopoly of power remain unquestioned. Despite the strong representation of the technocratic element in it, the Gierek leadership has thus far given no indication of relinquishing that monopoly. Not only does the manager remain responsible for factors over which he has little or no control, but, in the sphere of 'inter-human relations' at the enterprise level, the respective institutions of labour 'representation', the trade unions and the workers' self-government, have not been accorded the rights which would permit worker co-determination and participation.

[56] *Trybuna Ludu*, 29 May 1971.
[57] 4 July 1971.
[58] *Trybuna Ludu*, 29 May 1971.

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The self-government organizations, an ineffective successor to the workers' councils of 1956, have been dominated by both the individual Party unit and the trade union apparatus in the enterprise—a situation that the leadership has not seen fit to alter. As for the trade unions themselves, the pledge that they will henceforth regard the defence of workers' interests as their main duty has not been accompanied by any structural changes that would actually allow them to do just that. The new trade union leadership has maintained that the present rights (and structure) of the organization are adequate and that past shortcomings had resulted from that body's failure to utilize them. Countering the workers' demands for organizational reform, it has asserted that 'the Party ensures [for the trade unions] conditions for the implementation of their statutory rights and observance of their powers . . . [which constitutes] a guarantee for the independence of trade unions'.[59]

The unwillingness to sanction the introduction of institutional safeguards has been even more marked in the political sphere. At the Eighth Plenum, Gierek asserted that 'the nation's guarantees for the future boil down to this: that the Party fulfil its function of a guiding force in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist ideology'. This attitude has not been motivated simply by the leadership's feeling that the time is not ripe for innovations or by sensitivity to the concerns of Moscow regarding any diminution of the PUWP's 'leading role'. Rather, it would seem to reflect Gierek's orthodox conception of the Party's role and his conviction that the proper functioning of the institutions and processes at hand is a sufficient guarantee in itself. Thus, he has muffled earlier demands for the reform of Party and state organizations —e.g. the rotation of high-ranking officials—while asserting that a few individuals in the former leadership had distorted the essentially 'correct' policy of the PUWP.

Even if it was true, as the official press was quick to state, that December's protests were directed against the Gomulka, rather than the socialist system, for those who had lived under both for 14 years the distinction might seem academic. In effect, the new leadership has faced the delicate problem of discrediting the former without impugning the latter, a task made all the more difficult by its own association with the fallen Party leader. Given these circumstances, Gierek has sought to 'depoliticize' the charged atmosphere in the country, eschewing a comprehensive purge (complete with criticism of the past) that might further undermine the Party's authority, encourage pressure for systematic change, and precipitate a sense of insecurity throughout the Party machine. Similarly, the removal from the leadership of Moczar and several of Gomulka's former associates has been delayed so as not to be misinterpreted as a concession to public opinion, one that might serve to escalate dissatisfaction with other members of the leadership and demoralize the Party cadres.

[59] Ibid. 25 February 1971.

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Although the outlines of a political and economic programme have not yet been clearly defined, Gierek has demonstrated that he is willing to make some concessions in order to restore and increase productivity and that his leadership will seek to ensure such goals as higher living standards for the population, a consumer-oriented economy, and better working conditions. However, the evidence strongly suggests that he feels these objectives can be attained without far-reaching reforms that would reduce the Party's pre-eminence in all aspects of public life. At this point, the leadership seems to have committed itself to 'making the system work better', an effort that, while offering some relief in the short term to certain elements of the population, is no substitute for the fundamental changes that are required.

In late 1970 and early 1971, the workers on the sea-coast and elsewhere downed their tools not only in protest against deteriorating economic conditions but against a political system that provided no effective channels for the transmission of legitimate grievances. In effect, they demanded to negotiate as equals with a Party that proclaimed itself to be the leading representative of the working class—a development without precedent in Eastern Europe. The response of the PUWP, under Gierek's leadership, has been confined to the alleviation of certain of the workers' hardships, ignoring their demands for institutional representation and self-expression. This issue could provide the seeds of further conflicts, for the leadership is confronted with a new generation of workers who succeeded in removing one regime and can easily resurrect the strike committees that arose spontaneously in December (and were finally dissolved only in April).

For the moment, the new leadership has secured the breathing space it requires to work out policy in various sectors. Given the shift in the political centre of gravity in favour of the young 'pragmatists' and 'technocrats',[60] the chances are less likely that Polish policy will be characterized by the unending compromises and half-measures of the Gomulka years. However, political development will not progress beyond that point at which it poses a potential threat to the leadership's authority. Indeed, as long as the Party continues to envisage itself as the nation's sole guarantor, there is no assurance that what happened under Gomulka could not happen again.

[60] Under Gomulka, the average age of Politburo members was 57·3 and of Secretariat members 54. After the changes on December 20, these figures dropped to 51·7 and 46·5 respectively.

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The Polish Economy: Models and Muddles

Jerzy Gambit

THE commonly accepted assumption that the Polish economy is based on a system of economic planning is not correct. Such a system does not exist; the existing system has one overriding purpose: to concentrate all economic potential in the hands of the administration whatever the cost. The pseudoplanning system acts as a brake on economic development. This point has an important bearing on the argument that follows.

Immediately after the war no specific economic programme was worked out, there were merely general policies such as the nationalization of industry and the dividing up of the larger agricultural properties. During the next period, between 1948 and 1955, these slogans were replaced by calls to develop heavy industry and to introduce collective agriculture. During the period after 1956 heavy industry was no longer accorded this priority and its future became the subject of doubts and disputes. It is necessary to add that both the nationalization of industry and the dividing up of the land (often incorrectly described as agrarian reform) were carried out haphazardly, without any planning at all.

There are of course many other retarding factors apart from the existence of our pseudo-planning system: our economic dependence on the USSR, the uncritical acceptance of Soviet methods of administration, the fact that we let pass the opportunity to obtain investment loans and rejected Marshall aid, our unfavourable trade relations with the Soviet Union and so on.

In the Gomulka years, after the short-lived hopes and illusions of 1956 and 1957, the situation reduced itself to a state of affairs where the leadership hardly knew what to do: all possible manœuvres were tried, but there was nothing that one could describe as a policy for development. Stabilization soon became stagnation, the disorganized economy supporting a vast police and Party machine, capable only of terror. The Party kept on repeating slogans about the necessity of a planned economy yet was unable to understand or maintain it. The lack of purposeful planning was striking and widespread. The following will provide some examples of its effect on industry.

On cement without sacks

After the war we started on an ambitious and complex task of reconstruction which was to be based on the principles of planned economy. However, it soon became evident that we did not have

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enough cement. Two different solutions to this problem were tried: importing from abroad and building more cement factories at home in Poland. When the cement started to arrive, it transpired that we had no means of getting it from A to B. We had no sacks and no transport suitable for moving it in bulk. There were no sacks because there was no paper; there was no paper because there was no timber and no paper mills. There were no suitable trucks available and no installations for pneumatic transport; such things were not manufactured in Poland. Orders had been given that production should start immediately, but no provisions had been made for the storage of the cement. Only when faced with large quantities of unprotected cement left on building sites did those responsible start thinking of producing containers. And so on, and so forth—problems were tackled only when they became glaringly obvious, they were not anticipated.

Another similar case was that of the provision of fertilizers for agriculture. After the peasants had clamoured for them for years, the Party, utterly helpless and unable to influence the development of agriculture, decided to tackle the problem. Factories were built. But again, there was no transport available, no storage and no spreading machinery. Furthermore, chemicals needed special storage, non-corrosive spreaders, etc. The factories produced fertilizers, but the peasants could not use them all, as they had to spread them by hand. The railway stations, storage sheds and warehouses were full to overflowing. The unintended result: the toxic nature of fertilizers meant that slowly but surely, in a 'planned' way, the countryside was being poisoned.

On the punishment of a shop manager

'Planning cannot exist without accountability'

Let us have a look at a typical example of the system of planning and accountability. A shop manager plans to sell 100 litres of milk a day. He is planning for 100 because in his opinion the demand fluctuates between 110 and 120 litres a day. In this way he makes sure that his shop will always sell all its milk and fulfil the norm 100 per cent. Let us assume that an ambitious manager, who wants to satisfy the demand, asks for 120 litres a day to be delivered. If he sells 120 litres, he will have fulfilled the plan 100 per cent and no more; but if he sells only 119, he would not have fulfilled the plan and he would risk losing his premium and other benefits. In short, the manager would be penalized and not rewarded for selling 119 litres. It would only happen, of course, if the manager and his staff were prepared to increase the turnover at the risk of losing some of their own earnings. But the only result of this would be that after a few months they would be dismissed for constantly failing to meet the plan. This explains why so often cheese, bread, milk, etc., are not available in shops in the afternoon, although warehouses may have them.

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All the institutions working within the plan work on this principle, the principle of a self-imposed brake. The practice has even acquired a name of its own: the 'anti-incentive'.

On Kowalski's car or the Polish Volkswagen

The problem of providing the population with a popular car has been discussed for years. The pressure of public opinion in general and of the bureaucracy in particular has been too much for the government who finally decided to tackle this pressing problem. After a cursory survey of the world motor-car market, it was decided that a licence for production should be obtained from Fiat. There has been no attempt at a detailed study of Fiat products.

The licence covered the right to produce the Fiat 125 P. That curious vehicle, despite similarity with other Fiat cars, is unknown either in Europe or anywhere else. The idea, widespread in Poland, that it is the best Fiat model is a piece of propaganda misleading public opinion. It is, in fact, the old 1300 engine, now out of production, with the 125 body. The combination of the two had not been sufficiently tested and has proved defective in practice. The body is too heavy for a light chassis and a small engine. The 1300 has always been known to have weak front suspension and a poor engine. For these reasons Fiat stopped production of the 1300 and designed two new models: the 124 for the Russians and the 125 to be produced by themselves. Polish industry was completely unprepared to produce the 125 P. All the production machinery had to be bought in the West: the moulding presses for body production, welding plant, complete paint workshop equipment, complete equipment for the assembly lines for the engine blocks, gearboxes, machine tools, etc. The equipment was expensive to buy and of good quality, but the net result is a factory producing only a few indifferent motor cars. The 125 P requires high octane fuel, good lubricants, frequent and competent servicing. These are precisely the things most difficult to come by in our country.

We should not underestimate the effort made by the Zerań factory and the component manufacturers who employed their experts in production. Yet the initial Party mistake in choosing that particular model could not be put right or overcome.

Last, but not least: the price. It costs 180,000 zlotys, while the average pay amounts to 2,400 zlotys per month. In world markets the 125 P would be unable to compete and even the Russians have now acquired a licence for quite a different model and they are looking to Czechoslovakia rather than to us for industrial cooperation. There is no chance of a sizable export market.

The original decision was taken by the highest echelons of the Party, yet only a year later the Party position was basically modified and the idea of 'selective production' introduced. This really means that, in principle, a proposition as doubtful as the choice of the 125 P

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should not have been entertained. The decision to buy the licence and to produce the car is worth examining, and so is the practice of arranging special purchase terms for high Party and government officials at a time when the car was still assembled from Italian parts of high quality. The terms were so advantageous that the dignitaries received the car for next to nothing.

On investment

The problems of investment are of paramount importance to our economy. The losses brought about by the sluggishness of the investment cycle are notorious. Industry in the West needs one or possibly two years to build and equip for production a factory for which we require four to five years: two for planning and another two or three for building it and fitting it out. On top of this we need a minimum of two years to recruit and train the labour force. Our investment cycle amounts therefore normally to six or seven years but it can sometimes be as long as 10 years. This means that we take up to five times longer than developed countries to make a new installation fully productive. The return on investment presents another problem: in Poland it is frequently nil or nominal and more often than not uncertain. It may not have been calculated at all, and even if it has been calculated the methods employed lack precision because of the absence of objective criteria of measurement.

The economic erosion of Silesia

The problems of Silesia require separate mention. The name covers the whole southern region of Poland with its industry based on coal and its by-products. A serious crisis threatens coal mining as the demand for coal decreases dramatically throughout the world. To maintain the existing financial turnover it has been necessary to increase production and to sell at lower prices. Despite apparent growth this amounts to wasteful exploitation of resources and requires vast sums for investment in an industry which will clearly never be able to pay its way. This investment is both economically unprofitable and politically irresponsible. To invest in any other industry, for example engineering, would be more profitable whereas investing in such things as mining only perpetuates the problem of unemployment rather than solving it. This is also irresponsible politically because it forces the country into the role of producer of raw materials. It is quite clear that a number of mines should be closed immediately, but for the moment the mines employ workers who are on the point of retiring and rely on natural wastage. Silesia is crying out for more money to be invested in it, but such money should be invested in engineering, the metal industry or the chemical industry based on coal. However, Silesia's problems obviously require urgent and thorough attention. A number of people may have been misled as to the true nature of things by the luxury trappings

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with which the authorities have decked out Katowice, the capital of the region: neon lights on the luxury hotel and restaurants, while behind this façade the real problems remain untouched. Economic development in Silesia generally has not come up to expectations and it is quite possible that this region will have to be supported by the less developed areas of Poland, at least until some new industries are created. Thus Silesia, with all its resources, now acts as a brake on the economy instead of being a catalyst. As there is no long-term planning of resources and power requirements, our industry still relies on coal when the rest of the world has changed or is in the process of changing to oil.

On the machine-tool industry

In the fifties we began to create the industrial base for the production of machine-tools, on the correct assumption that this type of machine would be in great demand in a developing country and that it would provide a foundation for further economic growth. However, the development of the machine-tool industry was both slow and haphazard with the result that it was only in the middle sixties that we attained a certain production level, not very satisfactory at that and only in certain lines. The greater part of machine-tool production is obsolete and of poor quality. Technically speaking the differences between Polish and Western machine-tools is now greater than 15 years ago; thus, relatively speaking, the level of our production has fallen off rather than advanced. We still rely on metal-cutting machine tools while the rest of the world has already progressed with metal-forming techniques. We are still busy grinding, milling, boring, cutting, while everyone else is forming, forging, shaping, and, as far as old methods go, only retaining and improving polishing methods. As a result of technological changes there has been a general shift in the world market away from universal machine-tools towards complex automatic lines and machine-tools for metal-forming techniques. Our industry produces neither one nor the other. There are very few exceptions to this. Obviously, productive processes based on old technologies are costly and lead only to low productivity, poor quality, and non-competitive prices. All this is symptomatic not just of the lack of coordination in the development of individual branches of industry, but of the absence of any direction in industrial development as a whole.

On the myth of Warsaw well rebuilt

Industrial installations are frequently built in totally inappropriate locations resulting in unnecessary costs. Inadequate urban planning is particularly evident in the rebuilding of Warsaw and its further development. After the war we had the unique chance of building a modern capital. Instead we have produced a collection of residential districts in varying styles devoid of any coherent plan or any attempt

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to find an over-all solution to the general problems of transport, plumbing and sanitation in the city.

On the structure of the economy and the economic administration

The basic structure of the economy is faulty quite apart from its being badly administered. This is true of every sector of the economy but it is strikingly obvious in both heavy industry and agriculture.

Industry

Most industrial concerns run by the state vary in size from 300 to 3,000 employees. There is, however, a considerable number of larger enterprises, mostly in engineering and the metal industries, employing more than 10,000 people, which tend to be the units with the greatest production potential. All of them are organized on the same principle and follow the same administrative practice. Thus it is possible to consider them together. In this connexion we shall consider three problems: low productivity, low quality, and malfunctioning in the field of industrial cooperation and in the supply of raw materials.

1. Productivity in Polish industry is extremely low, although Polish workers have longer hours and the nature of their work is harder than that of their Western equivalents. Also they are badly paid for their work. Their earnings amount to between 10 and 12 per cent of the value of industrial production and to about 20 per cent of the total industrial cost. The equivalent figures in the West are 40 and 80 per cent. In Polish industry workers are employed in industry to perform functions which should be carried out by machines. It is inane to expect any increase of productivity merely on the basis of greater muscular effort: all the so-called 'voluntary' extra-performances in industry and the productivity campaigns only serve to disorganize and demoralize the workers. It is clear that given the general situation, neither massive investment nor the so-called mobilization of the labour force would be a solution.

One of the effects of faulty economic structure and badly directed investment is a scarcity of purpose-built machinery and machine tools, so that even mass-produced series are manufactured on general purpose machinery. Take nuts and bolts for example: they are made by practically every factory on universal lathes. Not only that, very often bolts and nuts of 10 mm. diameter are manufactured on lathes designed to produce diameters up to 400 mm. This will help to give some idea of the situation. Specialized equipment for industrial personnel hardly exists and specialized attachments are scarce. For instance, there is a serious shortage of pneumatic grips in industry, yet for the last 15 years world industry has been using this type as it is the most efficient. They considerably reduce the time needed for fixing and provide an efficient replacement for human muscles in a cumbersome job of that type. Although industry in the West has been using them for a long

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time we have only just started producing them. Indeed there are only two factories engaged in this: one produces grips and the other makes pneumatic tools. The quality of their products is poor and the pneumatic tools, apart from intrinsic faults in design, make so much noise that factories refuse to buy them and try to obtain Western tools for which they must have a special foreign currency allocation.

One of the main reasons for low productivity is thus inadequate working equipment (as exemplified above), despite the fact that many factories have expensive basic machinery, whether produced in Poland or imported. The amounts invested in these increase amortization costs, but productivity still remains essentially dependent on manual handling.

2. Low quality is intrinsically linked with low productivity and it is due, among other reasons, to a total lack of concern on the part of the employees for output and to the almost total indifference of both manual and white collar workers to general industrial and social problems.

It is important to realize that apparently similar phenomena in Western industry are due to different causes. In the West production is less linked with the work-attitudes of employees because well-organized and equipped factories make production less dependent on the average worker's skill. Often this has been made possible by the introduction of automated production based on automated production lines. The management is better qualified and has a vital interest in the results of production for reasons connected with the company structure, the pay structure, and in general with the existence of market determinants.

3. Poor industrial cooperation and the defective organization of supplies are yet other symptoms of structural faults in industrial organization. Factories need supplies of high quality which are delivered on time. Neither requirement is met. The fault does not lie with any particular industry: the metal industry is as badly off as the engineering industry. Cooperating industrial establishments are not flexible enough and are so restricted by the system of planning and accountability that they are not interested in producing parts and assemblies as subcontractors. Above all, such work is made unprofitable because the existing system puts a premium on the production of finished goods.

Too much machinery is another by-product of poor cooperation; to ensure their production capacity factories over-equip themselves with basic machinery which tends subsequently to be underexploited. In practice many expensive imported machines stand idle for months, only adding to amortization and production costs.

All this wastage is being camouflaged under the term 'disclosure of economic reserves'.

The malfunctioning of cooperation and delivery systems is due to a lack of competition and to the fact that manufacturers are not allowed to change their suppliers. The losses caused by poor cooperation are

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really great and frequently all production is held up on account of the non-delivery of some part, which though perhaps negligible in financial terms is essential all the same. Non-dispatched goods fill warehouses, factories, passages, and even roads, causing yet more indirect loss.

On overmanning assembly units and the administration

Yet another example of low industrial standards is provided by the fact that there are too many production workers employed in assembling goods. In the engineering industry between 25 and 45 per cent is considered normal. In some cases this rises to 60 per cent while the figure in the West is between 10 and 15 per cent. This vast army of some several hundred thousand people acts as a brake on the efforts of even the best specialists.

It is only too obvious that the course of Polish industry has not been plotted in any way and that there is no hand on the tiller (the 'directives' of the Party plenum mean nothing at all). On the one hand it is restricted by an absurd system of planning and accounting, on the other it is being disorganized by its own management whose attitude to workers and technicians deserves a separate study. On occasions, industry thus imprisoned tries to break its bonds but so far without success.

Unsalable goods ('boobles')

A sizable percentage of goods produced is unsalable. These are officially known as production reserves and unofficially as 'boobles'; they are an obvious result and also a conclusive proof of unsound economic organization. These 'reserves' grow from year to year and their total is reaching 20 milliard zlotys. This sum does not cover the whole of industry and the full figure is probably double this sum. This is indeed a monument to the Party's blunders in planning.

Agriculture

In order to understand agricultural problems it is necessary to think in sociological as well as economic terms. It is also necessary to go beyond vague generalities on peasant mentality, peasant wisdom, and peasant inability to adapt to Marxist dogma.

Agricultural production in Poland relies on the individual's work on his own holding. This applies to nearly 90 per cent of the arable land. It is therefore essential to know something about the peasant as an individual. Peasant mentality and attitudes vary from region to region and depend largely on the degree of agricultural development in any given part of the country. This determines the peasant's attitude towards progress and improvement in agricultural production.

The differences are the direct results of different historical experiences in a country which until 1918 was partitioned between Russia, Germany, and Austria. Until the Second World War there were three clearly

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discernible types of peasant: western, i.e. from ex-German territory; eastern, i.e. ex-Russian territory, and Galician, i.e. ex-Austrian territory. Since the war, and as a result of post-war changes, there have appeared to be four groups: the western region remained basically unchanged, the eastern group shrank as the frontiers moved west, while the Galician group lost importance because of the growth of industry and also as a result of territorial changes; the fourth group, perhaps the least homogeneous, lives and works in the Recovered Western Territories. Despite the fact that the partitions came to an end in 1918 and the last war in 1945, the peasants of the four regions still differ a great deal. But they all have in common their attitude to the ownership of the land. Private ownership is a desideratum not open to discussion.

The structure of land ownership also reflects the past but the problems of today are those of small privately-owned holdings. Agricultural production depends on units of between three and 15 hectares of land.

At the end of the war everyone was for agrarian reform and all the political parties in existence at the time desired it. But the way that the idea was actually put into practice only consolidated the disadvantages of the existing agricultural structure; it slowed down production and damaged Polish agriculture.

The succeeding period was dominated by attempts to introduce collectives. These were introduced as soon as the private estates had been divided up and parcelled out. The Party did not take any account of peasant psychology, brutally forcing the idea of collectives onto the peasants, alienating even those who had been engaged before the war in the organization of agricultural cooperatives. In this way the Party managed to destroy the whole tradition of peasant radicalism which dated back to the period immediately preceding the 1863 insurrection.

In this struggle between the peasants and the Party, the latter was the loser. After several years of terror the Party has been virtually banished from the countryside and merely retained enough control to continue a war of attrition. This included the principle (now abandoned under Gierek) of compulsory deliveries by the peasants at nominal prices. Also 10 per cent of the arable land remained under state control in the form of the notorious state farms, well-known for their economic bankruptcy.

The next stage, which is still with us, started with the creation of the Agricultural Development Fund. Its role was to provide financial facilities through the village Agricultural Circles for the purchase of agricultural machinery. A large bureaucracy has been assembled for this purpose in the best Party tradition. To begin with, the idea was to finance investment leading to the replacement of horses by machinery, but this did not work. Later there was talk of financing the purchase of heavy machinery for cooperative use which would free the peasants from the worst drudgery and enable them to devote more time to more sophisticated crops and livestock.

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None of these schemes worked. There are as many horses as ever and the peasants are more in debt than before. For a peasant to owe money is not the same as for an industrial unit: economically speaking they are different phenomena. A debt has no effect on factory production, but in our type of economy it would certainly lead to the slowing down of production on a farm. The kind of debt we are concerned with here should also not be confused with an investment loan.

In some villages the Fund and the Agricultural Circles did a good job, but it does not alter the fact that they failed to fulfil their more ambitious programme.

On horses behind ploughs and tractors on the roads

All the problems mentioned and other factors determining the low agricultural efficiency resulted in a signal lack of progress in all the four regions described, although the situation in the west is better than elsewhere. But even there old crop-rotation methods are used and there is a shortage of machinery everywhere. Too much rye and too many potatoes are still grown, although wheat and fodder crops are gaining ground. However, improved cultivation is rare because peasants still use the horse and plough while the tractors bought with money from the Agricultural Development Fund are used for transporting people and goods. As a means of transport tractors are, of course, both wasteful and expensive.

The quality and design of agricultural machinery are quite inadequate. The development of horse-drawn machinery is being deliberately neglected, but the machines designed to work in conjunction with tractors are too large and too complicated for the small peasant holdings, while it is a matter of policy not to allow larger farmers to buy tractors. The doctrinaire approach has triumphed over economic common sense: it was considered that the private ownership of tractors would delay progress toward socialism in the countryside. As a result the agricultural engineering industry is in a state of bewilderment and does not know what kind of machinery to produce. In practice any horse-drawn machinery, whether good or bad, is immediately snapped up, while tractor attachments fill the warehouses.

Spreaders for one season only

Cattle husbandry and grazing present their own problems. Relatively good progress has been made in this sector with the introduction of selective breeding, compulsory medical inspection, and artificial insemination. But further progress depends on the availability of crops which produce the greatest quantity of fodder using the smallest possible area of arable land. In other words, crops requiring intensive cultivation and greater agricultural investment—another example of a vicious circle. There are still other examples of this. Take the problem of artificial fertilizers. The peasants had been clamouring for them till the early

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sixties when they became available, especially potash, nitrate, and lime, but the shortage of spreaders continued unabated. The few that are produced last for one season only as the fertilizers corrode the untreated metal. The peasants refuse to buy machines that last one season only and so it goes on.

The price-scissors and agricultural investment

The agricultural population is exploited through the price differential between industrial and agricultural products. To give but one example, before the recent changes in compulsory deliveries the government price for pigs amounted to a quarter of the price charged for pork by the butchers.

The situation in agricultural building construction is almost desperate. The barns, pig-styes, and granaries are inadequate more often than not and they lack such exotic equipment as milking machines, refrigerating plant, running water, and automatic feeders. Agriculture still depends on the peasants' brawn and their proverbial common sense. But to achieve results agriculture must change over to technical intensive methods. If the present situation continues agriculture will remain a retarding factor in the economic life of the country.

The social deprivation of the rural regions

Agricultural earnings are very low. Peasants often work a 16-hour day, are not insured, cannot avail themselves of the health service, do not get pensions or paid holidays, live only too often in old, damp, and inadequately heated houses, and do not eat well. They cannot afford to give their children higher (or even secondary) education. Although a premium is added to the examination marks of applicants of peasant origin (a factor which contributes to enmity between the peasants and other classes) the percentage of peasant children in the secondary schools fell from 30 per cent in the fifties to 15 per cent in the sixties. Peasants are poorly clothed, have no access to entertainment and have no time for reading and self-improvement.

The pre-war tradition of grudging the peasant his supposed wealth has survived and has been taken over by the Party's whispering propaganda. Another example of propaganda is provided by the slogan about the 'great progress of the peasant population'. It seems quite extraordinary that so many commentators in Poland and abroad should have accepted it at its face value and refer to it constantly. The only people who do not fall for it are the peasants themselves.

On the worker-peasants or the millions misemployed

The unsound structure of agriculture has a detrimental effect on the whole economy. Let us take a phenomenon from the borderland between agriculture and industry, the newly-emerged group of worker-

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peasants, i.e. people whose earnings come partly from agriculture and partly from industry. This large group owes its existence to a misdirected economic policy: its existence has become a burden to both agriculture and industry, bringing down the quality of industrial production and the volume of agricultural production. The growing size of this group terrifies even the most hard-headed among us: if today there are three million underemployed, i.e. people who could leave tomorrow without affecting agricultural production at all, unless there are basic changes in the economic structure, there may be 10 million of them in 1985.

If we assume that the nationalized sector of the economy will be able within the next 20 years to find employment for the natural increase in the urban population plus the three million worker-peasants we have at present, plus another two million representing new rural unemployed, this will still leave eight million for whom there will be no work either in agriculture or in industry. We will again have, as we did under the Austrians at the end of the last century, a mass of underemployed rural population, producing a quarter and eating a half of what their urban brothers produced and ate.

The isolation of the research establishments

To make this situation of economic incompetence even worse, research has been very much isolated from both industry and agriculture. The history of the research institutes is one of the saddest fragments in this tale of waste. The institutes worst affected are those engaged in technological research as opposed to the pure research conducted under the auspices of the Polish Academy of Sciences. For one thing the technological institutes are not numerous enough, although it is true that numbers are not necessarily a guarantee of quality. Their influence on practical developments is extremely limited and they tend to gravitate more and more towards academic research because they are financed directly from government funds and are therefore subject to the usual pressures.

Even if potentially of value, the results of their research are hardly ever utilized and no amount of administrative pressure can alter the situation, although it may look different on paper. In practice the institutes play a very insignificant part in economic life. One can take the welding industry as an example: the Polish plasma burner for cutting was a unique and indeed sensational invention, preceding its American equivalent. Its marketing potential both in Poland and abroad seemed very promising, but it has never been put into production and only prototypes exist to this day.

None of the existing institutes conducts research into the theory of industrial and agricultural development. There is little systematic research into the interdependence of economic and industrial sectors. In general any attempts to alter the existing economic model are limited

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to marginal problems and any initiative by experts in this area is cut short if it threatens to draw fundamental conclusions of any kind.

The appropriate form or a punched card?

The research institutes together with the rest of our economy are not equipped with sophisticated calculating methods. Punched cards, not to mention the punched tape, not only are not used, but they are unknown among the higher Party echelons directing the economy. Statistics are based on fictitious data written out by hand on the ' appropriate forms '. The best of the few computers available belongs to the police who use it to keep track of ' politically unreliable elements '.

The research institutes and the problems of the future of technological progress, which are instrinsically linked with them, are victims of the general paralysis induced by the ruling bureaucracy.

Our place in world trade

What has been said about our economy so far also determines our place in European and world trade. This is becoming increasingly marginal: during the period of post-war reconstruction, from the point of view of economic dynamics we belonged to a group of states like Austria, Norway, and Italy, whereas at present we find it difficult to equal the performance of Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece. Our agriculture is slightly better placed than our industry, as it still manages, although only just, to retain its traditional export markets. These are mostly in the free currency areas and represent considerable potential currency earnings, even if these are likely to shrink owing to the constantly progressing economic cooperation among the free exchange countries. In any case the export of food products only is not enough because its volume is limited and because excessive specialization of this sort makes us too dependent on fluctuations of demand in that sector of trade.

The efforts of exporters are often frustrated by frequently contradictory regulations which seem designed to make success impossible. Nevertheless the policy of economic incentives in this field represents an important, though half-hearted step forward. The administrative machinery of the Ministry for Foreign Trade interposes itself between the producer and the potential customer, making negotiations cumbersome and reducing the Ministry to the role of a selling agent, while it removes the opportunity for direct contacts between the producer and the purchaser. In addition planning and accountability systems are constructed in a manner which discourages exports.

Prospects

It is much too early to draw up a balance sheet of Party economic policy after the tragedy of December 1970. But it is difficult to avoid the reflection that so far no concept of an overall strategy of develop-

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ment and of economic reform has emerged. The new Party leadership does not seem to be considering any serious alternative to the old economic system. There are no indications that any structural changes in industry are being contemplated or that a new economic model is to be adopted.

This does not mean, of course, that the urgent problems making such changes desirable are not under consideration by the new Party leadership. For many years now in all the communist countries there has been a feverish search for new solutions to the difficulties created by Party administration of the economy. The acute dilemma which presents itself is, of course, how to preserve the dominant role of the Party apparatus while at the same time promoting economic development, how to retain full totalitarian power without hampering economic growth through political controls. In East Germany and Hungary the centralized Soviet model has evolved into two distinct models but—their desirability apart—neither of them could be easily adopted in Poland. Besides, from the point of view of the Party, each of them has certain important faults. The former requires a highly disciplined population and a lot of highly qualified specialists who can direct the new economic centres. These conditions are less apparent in Poland than in East Germany and thus in Polish circumstances the model might endanger much more easily the dominant position of the Party *apparatchiks*. For different reasons this also applies to the Hungarian model which gives greater scope to decentralizing tendencies which may be released by the market price mechanism.

It is therefore difficult to imagine the new Polish leadership embarking on a course of radical change which might eradicate the basic structural deficiencies of the present economic system. However, on a smaller scale some positive improvements are possible and, as the past six months have shown, even likely. They are not so difficult to push through at the present moment when the consequences of the December crisis are still felt and when the Party apparatus is still shaken by them.

One such positive measure is undoubtedly the introduction of a new agricultural policy: the abolition of compulsory deliveries by the peasants and the decision to permit them to consolidate their holdings by purchasing unused farmland. However, on many points the new policy is not yet clear. Its effect will depend on how the peasants are to be taxed following the abolition of compulsory deliveries, on the new role of the Agricultural Development Fund which has been retained, and on whether the old law relating to the so-called 'agro-minimum', which was in abeyance, will not now be used against the peasants if they fail to fulfil their 'productivity minimum'.

Another characteristic move by the Gierek regime has been the transfer of some prerogatives from the Ministry of Foreign Trade to the so-called Central Boards for Foreign Trade, and not to the productive enterprises themselves who have been clamouring for this for a long time.

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A View from Inside

THE direct causes of the workers' manifestations in December 1970 in Poland were the economic difficulties and the attempt to overcome them at the expense of the working masses. But what were the causes of the economic difficulties and of the choice of this rather than that way of overcoming them? The present author thinks that the fundamental causes of the trouble were in the political mechanism. . . . In a sense the story of all the failed attempts of the last 15 years to promote economic reform in Poland can serve as an illustration of the negative effect of the existing political mechanism on the economic processes. . . . In 1970 the previous leadership of the Polish United Workers Party tried to exploit the idea of economic reform in order to conceal a rigid deflationary policy aiming in practice at the freezing of wages and salaries for the minimum period of two years. The so-called new system of economic incentives which was to enter into force at the beginning of 1971 (and was abolished after 20 December 1970) could only compromise the idea of economic reform in the eyes of the public. . . . The contrast between the needs of economic development and the inadequacy of the political mechanism is dynamic, not static; it leads to embitterment if it is not solved by an adequate adjustment of the political mechanism through its progressive democratization. From this point of view it is necessary to look back at the events of March 1968 in the light of the events of December 1970. . . . The students' slogan of March 1970, 'There is no bread without freedom', expressed in a synthetic form the view of the links between economy and politics in a socialist country. The events of December 1970 have confirmed this view very soon and unfortunately in a very painful way. . . . After March 1968 no critical voice on the policy—including economic policy—of the then leadership of the country could be heard in Poland, although—as it is generally and officially admitted today—various decisions then made were mistaken and arbitrary. Yet the close link between the absence of criticism and the scope for arbitrary and mistaken decisions is evident. The triumph of March 1968 gave its creators and beneficiaries the feeling of absolute freedom to act in an autocratic way which has as its end result December 1970. . . . The fact that workers' manifestations brought about the change of political leadership in Poland is by itself positive, but only if it is going to be interpreted in the right way. The point is that the change of political personnel is to be considered as the beginning and not as the end of an evolutionary process, as opening the possibility of the solution of conflicts which have become overripe, and not as their effective solution. . . . But let's have no illusions. The conservative forces oppose the implementation of such steps, used as they are to repressive methods instead of the conventional political methods which consist of more workers' participation in the solution of important problems of today and tomorrow. This is the reason why it is so important to eliminate all that in the recent past made it impossible to express freely a critical attitude towards the problems which concern the whole of society and which in a socialist regime should be close to everyone's heart; if this is not going to be the case the people will still feel impotent to influence the decisions taken in their name.

Wlodzimierz Brus: Six Months after the Gdansk Crisis

(*Rinascita*, 25 June 1971)

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The economic policy of the new leadership cannot be analysed or judged yet for the simple reason that it does not yet possess a programme for such a policy. So far its decisions have been haphazard and mainly dictated by immediate political considerations. The real test will come only when the new Gierek team has consolidated its power. The shape of things to come will probably not be clear before the Sixth Party Congress. But it is unlikely that the Polish economic system will be allowed to deviate too much from the centralized model, still directed from above through the Party apparatus as the hub of political power.

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One Kind of Magic

Tomasz Stalinski*

IT is amazing how absolute is the power of politicians and how quickly their ideas disappear, leaving only the buildings they raised as their sole memorials, monuments which now testify to and serve quite different purposes than was—often not long before—originally intended. In the Middle Ages rulers built grandiose cathedrals, unsurpassed to this day, castles and fortresses with eternity in mind. They believed that their authority came from God and that the dynasties they founded would go on forever. The communists believe that their system will last for ever because it is based on the laws of history, correctly understood and put into practice. At this moment in time History decided to cast a new social group (or class in communist parlance) in the leading part. It is the class which the communists allegedly represent, the class whose name they have written across their banners. History and class have thus replaced God.

Roman did not believe that any human authority came from God; he thought it came and went according to its own mysterious ebb and flow. The laws which govern its movement in the long run are beyond human understanding—assuming such laws exist and are not simply figments of imagination, man-made working hypotheses or, more fashionably, ' structures '. Of course, apart from their belief in their historic and scientific mission, communists also had a good deal of pessimism about man and human nature, rather like the Christians.

It is precisely this pessimism which has led them to adopt a concept of government, a system under which all institutions and organizations are but particles of the central authority which embraces politics, culture, economics, psychology—in fact everything. The nervous system of the power structure consists of a network of Party secretaries, a close-knit spider's web enmeshing the whole country. The provincial secretaries play a crucial part in the system, each of them commanding dictatorial powers in his own region. In the centre of the web, at the top of the hierarchical pyramid, stands a small group of men known to the nation only by their names and their faces, unfailingly shown on television, and by their speeches, unvarying in content and form. There is of course no question of knowing these people in any real sense; they follow good old Tallyrand's example and employ

* This is an excerpt from a novel by a Polish writer whose two books have been published in Polish by the Institut Literaire in Paris by whose kind permission we are printing the translated part here. He lives in Poland and for obvious reasons prefers not to disclose his identity but uses a pen-name, Tomasz Stalinski. His novel *Shadows in a Cave*, like the previous one, *Seen from Above*, abounds in acute observations about the socio-psychological mechanisms of communist rule in Poland. The method of ' inner monologue ' is often used by him to express his own reflections through the person of the hero of the novel, Roman B.

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a strictly conventional manner of speaking the better to hide their own thoughts.

So far the whole political set-up has worked faultlessly, brilliantly organized in sharp contrast to the surrounding bedlam—as if all the nation's organizing ability had been exhausted in maintaining the government and the Party hierarchy in power. Any attempt at removing this authority appears to be out of the question, as it would put millions of its unwilling collaborators out of work. A vast army of faithful praetorians relies on the state for its keep; they depend on the authority and on one another in a thousand ways. They would be incapable of doing anything different and they would have no heirs: no one could take over their present functions as all social groupings and associations except the official ones have been carefully and thoroughly destroyed. Anyway this process is taking place in Poland where for centuries political power has depended on secret cabals rather than on social movements. The present system is a perfect monument to the rulers' pessimism and their distrust of the ruled. Their pessimism tends to be catching, it infects the humblest clerk with timidity and caution towards things new; the ruling dialecticians try to forestall the danger of a revolt or a *coup* of any sort by inculcating in the people a wariness of risk and any kind of adventure. For their caution the people are rewarded with the famous 'little stabilization': for the lack of any quality in their lives they are compensated by a mediocre but safe standard of living. Our rulers also turn to their own advantage the constant appearance on the scene of new generations, providing them with new recruits. Our magicians are pleased with the results of their work, they are sure that they have taken adequate precautions and rendered their own prescription for history foolproof and free from all surprises. In 1945 they uncorked a bottle known as Eastern Europe. It had been kept closed until then, monstrously compressed beneath Hitler's terror (a terror relatively naïve in its naked bestiality). Having opened it, they corked it up again, discretely but thoroughly. For how long? They themselves believed, or at least they said they believed, it to be for ever. Roman remarked to himself that the most effective cork applied so far to the old continent, the one administered by the Holy Alliance, lasted barely for a hundred years. A hundred years was of course quite a long time: long enough for one to be sure of not being there to see the final explosion.

The philosophic magicians have invented yet another security measure: they were not altogether free from secret fears and their pessimism concerning history and the nature of society went deeper than one would suppose at first glance. They were not content to rely on the perfection of the system they had constructed for their own security, they have added a spiritual line of defence built with the aid of well-tried psychological methods. They wished for a guarantee subtler than power and its material attributes could provide, they wished for general, voluntary and unanimous acceptance and approval on the part of the whole nation. That is how the amazing concept of Elections was born.

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THE attention paid in Poland to elections and electoral campaigns has been puzzling Roman for a long time. Clearly voting itself has no real meaning whatsoever as the actual choices are made long before the elections take place. Yet, even in trifling matters, the rulers insist on the expression of unanimous agreement. They have harassed and persecuted those bold enough to voice doubts or simply not to vote until the victims are ready to disgorge a 'yes' against their own convictions. Why on the earth did the authorities wish for this absurd unanimity, if a decision carried by a majority of voters would have looked so much more probable and convincing? This mania reaches its height during elections to the *Sejm* and other pseudo-political bodies. On those occasions the authorities display such a loving solicitude about the procedure that one might almost believe that a genuine choice was at stake.

Before the war odd stories circulated in Warsaw about Soviet elections: stories about people being forced to vote for a single candidate nominated from above to some council or other, about invalids being driven for hundreds of miles across the steppes only to register their vote, about the enormous effort and efficient organization mobilized to mount this crazy spectacle, a gigantic parody of the real thing. It would, after all, have been so much simpler to copy all the names in the electors' registers and to declare that those people had actually voted. No one would have minded; on the contrary people would have been thankful not to have had their Sundays ruined (elections took place on Sundays, just as the Russian church service used to). And now, only a few years later, that legendary ritual considered in Warsaw to be a product of the deranged oriental mind, flourished right here in Poland, and with time has acquired a kind of universal and all-pervading spontaneity, almost a serenity. People no longer even notice the grotesque mockery of this surrealist joke, sensible men accept the whole thing as something obvious and ordinary in its enforced simplicity, something which could not be done differently. The psychosis took hold without a hitch, acquired a momentum of its own; there is no longer any need to crack whips, to threaten or round people up to get them to the polls. They have been conditioned, crazed, duped. They have been made fools of (only fools would address themselves with such avidity and despatch to voting on issues settled well beforehand). The make-believe spontaneity of the thing, its apparently peaceful ordinariness attracts people and helps to speed up the process of psychological conditioning. The springs of coercion are kept carefully hidden and secret within each centre or institution. It has taken Roman many years to understand the working of the mechanism, which has got better and better as old incorrigible sceptics, who still insisted that two and two made four, have died out and been replaced by the young whom nothing can surprise.

It may be said that only those with a past of their own are capable of being surprised: they have a basis for comparison. However,

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the psychological treatment doled out by the government in the non-elective elections works wonders with all, old and young alike. Roman has observed the effects on himself: despite their intricate nature the methods used are really quite simple. What matters is that this is an act of acceptance, witnessed by other similarly two-legged animals. One commits oneself quite specifically by not having protested in the first place. After all, it is possible to skip voting or to cross out the names of all the candidates; it would also be quite legal. Poland is not Russia, and *noblesse oblige* despite everything. But once committed, one is done for. It would be foolish to protest on some later occasion, disavowing one's own past, only to discredit oneself. It is better to pretend even to oneself that all is well, that it is all normal, that it is all part of the ordinary course of things. And then one begins trying to convince others, trying to persuade them that it is not too bad, that it is not a problem, that there is anyway no other way out, that it simply is not worth another thought. With some people it tends to be a complicated, repetitive process; for others it is simple—but the final result is always the same: acceptance alters the man who accepts, making him plead for the accepted cause, nay, campaign for it. Having once stifled in himself the knowledge that he has been made a fool, he will not allow others to remain untarnished and will not allow them to remind him of his own loss of virginity. On the contrary, he will make them follow his example, they will in turn infect other people, everyone will infect everyone else and the process of self-deception will go further and further, with more and more people becoming able to see the gorgeous clothes of the naked emperor. And whose was this invention of genius? Some think it was the Wandering Jew, losing his way on the paths of history, others credit the moustachioed Georgian and his little-known assistants with the invention. There are some who consider it a typical product of the age-old Russian despotism, persisting for centuries under the tsars, the priests and then under their successor, the black-bearded philosopher with protruding cheekbones. But whoever started the whole thing (maybe no one did, it may just have been human nature and anyway all those who witnessed its emergence died a long time ago) has managed to cast a spell. His method has proved more effective than war, tanks, guns or bayonets because it involves minds, not bodies, and because it alters the mind irreparably. A man who has been broken internally will not only never recover, but is ready, indeed quite willing to help break others—as foreigners visiting the country during these witch-elections have noticed. How very odd and yet how orderly the methods of magic, its techniques and mysteries!

The magic of the system does not lie in the fact that the authorities force their subjects to do something or to forgo doing it. That has been a common feature of many political systems at all times. But it is magic indeed to try to disguise all coercion yet not to be afraid of the fact that everybody knows about it; to make the people declare loudly and clearly that they are coercing themselves voluntarily, and, what is

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more, to declare that they are their own masters. If knowledge of these strange happenings were ever to reach countries as far away as Canada or Australia, the simple-minded inhabitants of those lands might ask how such things were possible. Even in Poland itself, in small villages away from the beaten track people do not worry overmuch about all this. They continue to live in a simple fashion, on the material level, concerning themselves with making money and with work as long as it is worth their while.

BUT how, in fact, was it all possible? Simple: the rulers based the system on a psychological phenomenon known to all. Nobody, but nobody, likes to admit that he has been made a fool of. Instead people are prepared to make others join them in their discomfiture and shame. They come to enjoy the skill required to succeed in that operation, they feel part of a serious and important activity, in the end they genuinely forget about having fooled themselves, the whole rigmarole appears genuine to them. And after all, what is genuine is only a product of a generally accepted belief, nothing more, nothing less, as has been proved with great ingenuity by that outstanding thinker Casimir B——. Yes, the system has been very cleverly thought out (if indeed it was thought out and was not rather an outcome to be expected of sinful, tainted and irrational human nature . . .) and its fruit is the universal accord, it is the social unity long dreamt of, about which the same Casimir raves, forgetting that this particular unity had been achieved by fraud. Yet perhaps Casimir B—— understands the problem rather better than some: he knows that a thing can be fraudulent at the start and yet become true and natural in time (consider the well-known experiment involving ants and a stick). Yes, Casimir knows, he understands it for sure. Roman found that more and more often his own thoughts and those of Casimir tended to become one, as if, on some matters at least, they ceased to have a separate existence. This was another proof, if proof were needed of the effectiveness of the magic method: even absurd lies, if repeated often enough, end by altering the language. By itself, language is concerned with rhythm and sound rather than with meaning. Yet language in turn determines our thoughts. The more outrageous the mental acrobatics that people are subjected to under the system the more alike they become. The individualists of this world are not born in collectives but in the solitude of the desert. The unanimous vote and the repetition of slogans are both symptoms of the 'structuralism' which Casimir B—— sees as an instrument of national unity. Casimir considers the unity of minds to be the only national advantage that might be used to counter the cybernetic impetus of the Western, American part of the world. In the West automation means surrendering people to computers, here it means the whole nation becoming a computer, a centrally programmed mind free from all unnecessary diversity of ideas and views. The language had to be computerized first in order then to computerize the mind,

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and a limited vocabulary is a sign of an already conditioned mind. Probably the meaning of those cryptic pronouncements uttered by Casimir B——, the disenchanted lover of the world's most advanced techniques, was just that. He has failed to see that in Poland the cybernetic unity with which he had hoped to compensate for his unrequited love of the electronic mind has only served to maintain the power of the magicians, those virtuosos of the computerized language of politics and ideologies.

AT this juncture it is impossible not to think of Orwell's Newspeak, the 1984 language capable only of expressing ideas approved by authority and lacking words for protest, disbelief, criticism or mental reservation. By becoming inexpressible these ideas lost their validity, practically ceased to exist and clearly nobody would be likely to battle for non-existent causes. Roman has found that the press, television, radio, the declarations, resolutions and statements were all full of Newspeak. The journalists and the public speakers no longer seem able to perform without it.

Given the circumstances it was a superb idea to programme the national mind with the new language. The rhythm of an unceasing daily litany extolling the system might prove to be as affecting as the muezzin's chant glorifying Allah. Sometimes, when walking in the shadow of the 'great structures of socialism' and looking up to the unending airborne walls criss-crossed by a multitude of rectangular windows, Roman experiments with his own mind in order to find out whether it had become similarly patterned. The experiment has two stages: first, he tries to translate typical propaganda catchwords into his own normal language, then reels off the most popular, hackneyed, threadbare slogans, listening to himself and trying to notice whether they still grate on his ear, or whether he is getting used to rather than resenting them. He is constantly adding to his long list of pseudo-words, trying each one as if it were a new food or an unknown scent. One day he surprised Blouson Blanche by poring over the local papers displayed in the Silver Glen to note more examples for his collection. Much later, the recitation of those long litanies of lifeless words, named 'numb speech' by a Warsaw wit, using great variation of intonation and pitch, became for him an instrument of aggression and of self-defence against Blouson Blanche and her world. He learned some ridiculous pieces by heart for her benefit and kept on repeating them during their winter walks in the Parade Square, with the wind blowing the snowflakes along.

Sometimes the Newspeak is noticed and made fun of by one or another of the exclusive cabarets that sprang up with the Thaw, yet it continues to flourish and rule notwithstanding, just as a monarch would go on despite mockery from his court jesters. On occasion, Roman felt that Newspeak was a kind of therapy; the repetition of slogans helped him to shrug off the pressure and to retain his own non-computerized con-

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sciousness. Whenever he felt in need of reassurance he would look at his political-ideological list:

> Listen everybody, this is all you need to be able to shrug off the system, listen and read, learn it by heart if you have not done it yet. This is your daily prayer, your tune, your credo, your unalterable ritual, the rhythm of your thoughts always expressed in the same hieratic choice of special words. Listen:
>
> Stormy development. Stormy demonstration. Self-effacing work. Fatherland. Frank and cordial Party atmosphere. Renegades from the socialist cause. Full independence, freedom and sovereignty. Consolidation of unity and cooperation on all fronts. Further improvement by the Party of the methods used to direct the administrative and economic activity of the state. Dominant role of the Party. Struggle with aggression. Patriotic war of liberation. Unmasking of the true face of fascism. Banner of the fearless struggle with colonialism. Active counter-attack against ideological infiltration. Active campaigning. Consolidation of the united anti-imperialist front. Imperialist centres and revisionist forces. Outrageous provocation. Petty bourgeois opportunism. Classless liberalism. Training of ideological cadres. Political and military training. Economic activity and Party posts. Present targets of Party organization. Party cell. Ideological outpost. Commercial post. Cultural outpost. Educational outpost. Cultural front. Ideological front. Economic front. Educational front. Honoured son of the Fatherland. Reactionary junta. Raging terror. Uncompromising attitude. Courageous intervention. Heroic intervention. Freedom and social justice. Infamous provocation. To condemn categorically. Growing contradictions. Consolidation of the Party organization. Widespread Party *actif*. Basic Party organization. Improvement in the work of the basic Party organization on all levels. Key problems. Key problems in the life of the Party and the Party organization. Key difficulties. The most widespread participation possible of the Party membership and the labour force in the work on the Plan. Sources of potential reserves. Further useful work in the service of the Party and socialism. Socialist growth. Socialist People's government. Firm foundations. Eternal friendship. Vile intrigues. Barbarous crime of imperialist intervention. The worldwide socialist brotherhood. Dirty imperialist war. Common enemy of humanity—imperialism. Anti-imperialist. Key industry. Key problem. Actively engaged. Thorough participation. Indefatigable and unyielding social activist, an undaunted fearless hero of the people's struggle. Heroes of social labour. Patriotic education of the workers. Political maturity of the workers. Total commitment of the workers. To care, really to care. The shining tomorrow. The combatants' association. Ardent patriotism. Close ranks. Unmask and brand the enemy. Cynical provocation. German arrogance. Brutal violation. Infamous forgery. Impudent encroachment. Pirate raids. Vile intrigues. Dirty war. Revanchist aggressive drive. Hysterical clamourings of the revanchists. A lofty attitude worthy of the nation. Ancient lands of our fathers. Our immemorial

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heritage. Ousted from their patrimony. Marxism—Leninism—internationalism—patriotism. Public-spirited approach. Unity, sovereignty, independence. Heroic working class. Local representation of the People's Authority. Heroic proletariat. Fruitful labour. Heroic revolution. Complex coordination. Optimal solution. Further flourishing development. Improved training of cadres. Ideological training. Analysis of production potential. Redrawing of plans. Present political and economic situation of the country. Political awareness of the working class and of the working peasants. Thorough supervision of the way the decisions of the Secretariat are put into practice. Unyielding unity. Fiery zeal. Fiery, undaunted, fearless, heroic, utterly devoted. Full agreement on all issues raised, indestructible solidarity of the Party. Essential contradiction. Provoking decision. Corrupted clique. Puppets of imperialism. Hands off. . . . Dirty affair of the cartels. Brutal aggression. Perfidious attack. Brotherly friendship, unity, unanimity, full understanding. Cordial, friendly and brotherly visit. Great son of an heroic nation. Faithful son of his country. Return to the movement of the masses. Despicable crimes of American interventionists. Crimes of the Israeli soldiery. Criminal plot of international zionism. Nations struggling for peace, independence, democracy and social progress. Corrupted regime maintained by American guns. Socialism—the future of the world. Methodical work of the Party organization on all levels. The basic organizations, the executive, the departments, the ideological commissions. Class approach. Class struggle. Heroic class struggle. Fierce class struggle. Victory of the leading class. Shining future, shining future, shining future!!!

Corrections

In accordance with the Oxford University Press recording system, this issue of *Survey* is numbered vol 17 no 3. The previous issue was numbered vol 17 no 2 and the one preceding that should be recorded as vol 17 no 1 for cataloguing purposes, and *not* as vol 16 no 1 as it was designated.

Michael Scammell writes: in my article 'Soviet Intellectuals Soldier On' in the previous issue of *Survey*, the qualification 'misleading, untrustworthy and always lowbrow' referred *not* to Radio Liberty but to the other two radio stations, Deutsche Welle and Voice of America, mentioned in the same sentence.

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Czechoslovakia: Consolidation and Beyond

Robert W. Dean

COMMUNIST party congresses are assigned the conscious and weighty role of erecting historical signposts. The May 1970 congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS) served precisely this purpose; the Party promulgated an obligatory interpretation of the period since its last congress in June 1966, the greatest attention being devoted to the 'deformations' which followed the installation of the Dubcek leadership in January 1968. In addition, it ruled with approval upon its own efforts under the direction of the present Party leader, Gustav Husak, to restore life in the country and the Party to a 'normalized' state. The congress also provided a forum for the fraternal parties of the Warsaw Pact countries, with the exception of Rumania, to register their approval of and satisfaction with the course of the Party's consolidation.

The congress officially marked the end of a turbulent two-year chapter of political consolidation in the life of the Party and the country during which the Party has sought to eliminate from its own ranks, as well as from positions of leadership in the state and the economy, individuals associated with or sympathetic to the 1968 reform movement. This unprecedented 'cleansing' operation has been accompanied by a single-minded propaganda offensive designed to discredit the liberal ideas which took fast root during 1968, and by drastic recentralization of political control in the hands of the Party. Implementation of this all-absorbing task has in one way or another comprised the primary issue in Czechoslovak politics since Husak came to power in April 1969.

The congress itself was little more than an anticlimax, a recapitulation of the dominant themes of the consolidation period. It provided an authoritative forum at which Czechoslovak, Soviet, and other Warsaw Pact Party leaders accorded final, doctrinal legitimacy to the political and ideological axioms which have emerged as consolidation has progressed. Among the most important of these is the interpretation of the August 1968 invasion as 'necessary internationalist assistance' undertaken in important part in response to calls for aid by representatives of the broad strata of the Czechoslovak population and leadership—the 'sound forces' of the Party, as Soviet Party leader Brezhnev put it. The latter's speeches revealed once again the priority which the Soviets have given to winning acceptance of this view. The Soviet leader also joined in the chorus of condemnation of the reformist Prague Spring, dubbing it a 'counter-revolution' whose goal was to 'deprive the communist party of its leading role in society . . . to

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isolate Czechoslovakia from the fraternal countries, to tear it from the socialist community and hand it over to the imperialists'. Brezhnev's demonstrative approval of the reversal of these aims and of the pattern of consolidation as conducted by the Husak leadership indicates not only that the *Gleichschaltung* between Soviet and Czechoslovak policies is complete, but that the final rehabilitation of Czechoslovakia in the communist camp has been achieved.[1] While this clear show of support strengthened Husak's domestic political hand and removed many of the doubts which have surrounded his leadership, it obligates him to implement the postulates embodied in Brezhnev's tendentious praise.

The congress was to mark a turning point in the Party's life, the shifting of its attention from preoccupation with itself and the tumult of its recent past to the charting of an outward course whose primary objective will be to develop society and the economy, and in the process engage the support of the Czechoslovak people. Commenting recently on this objective, Central Committee secretary Oldrich Svestka stressed that the congress would refocus the Party's attention so that concentration on solving accumulated political, economic, and social problems would be possible. 'That is why it would be incorrect', said Svestka, 'merely to aim at an assessment of the past and to keep returning to issues which have already been closed and finalized. What is essential for the definitive defeat of revisionism and its socio-economic roots is a successful solution to the fundamental problems involved in the development of society, as well as in economic questions.'[2]

However, as a point of reference for actually shifting the Party's preoccupation away from itself and its recent past the congress provided only the most meagre of guidelines. Indeed, except on its periphery the congress was an almost total looking backward. The final resolution acknowledged that '. . . The attention of the Party as a whole [would be turned] to timely and creative solutions to the ripe problems of the present time and to the laying down of optimal means of achieving comprehensive development in the future.'[3] Beyond this exhortation, however, the congress did little to effect an end to 'consolidation' and a decisive shift of the Party's energies. The absence of anything in the congress proceedings which would indicate a decisive turn in the Party's focus of attention suggests that while consolidation in the Party may be at an end, in other aspects of the country's life it may be at a new beginning. Rather than ending the period of consolidation, the congress may mark a new and expanded phase in the struggle against 'revisionism'. Indeed, by reaffirming that 'rightist opportunism and revisionism' continued to pose the main

[1] Said Brezhnev: 'The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic today stands before the entire world as a strong link in the great alliance of the people building a new life, and no one will ever be able to sever Czechoslovakia from the socialist camp.' Radio Moscow, 20 May 1971.

[2] Radio Prague, 4 April 1971.

[3] Radio Prague, 31 May 1971.

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danger the resolution obligated the Party, as its primary task, to 'complete the struggle against the right wing'. Thus the solution of 'problems connected with the future development of society' is construed as 'reinforcing the impact of socialist ideology' and conducting political-organizational work which will 'complete the defeat of the right wing'. Under these circumstances the actual extent of the struggle and the degree to which it is pressed will remain a function of the relative strength of Party groupings and the importance each attaches to it.

CONSOLIDATION has been defined in the first instance as the wholesale expulsion from the Party and from positions of leadership of individuals associated with the reformist course. The dismissal of reformist leaders and the elevation of functionaries who would oversee the reversal of the post-January course began shortly after the dust of the invasion had settled. The extensive proportions which the purge would eventually take were of course not apparent in those post-August days. Indeed, when Gustav Husak assumed the leadership of the Party at the April 1969 Central Committee plenum he did so under the rubric of preserving the post-January course.[4] The logic of political compromise, however, transformed Husak into the superintendent of the most thorough-going purge ever undertaken in the CPCS.

The September 1969 Central Committee plenum provided the first unmistakable indications of how exhaustive the purge would be. It was at this session that the Dubcek leadership was censured for its unwillingness to take part in the July 1969 multilateral Warsaw Pact conference invoked to discuss the course of events in Czechoslovakia. The plenum repudiated the earlier condemnation of the invasion and declared illegal the Extraordinary 14th Party Congress (the so-called Vysocany Congress) which was convened in Prague prematurely but legally in an attempt to avert the political consequences of the invasion. Most importantly, perhaps, it was at this plenum that the Central Committee surrendered its statutory prerogative of deciding on major personnel changes. By this action the Central Committee gave up more than the veneer of its authority, since the step went far towards neutralizing the effect of secondary-level political influences, and fixed the directing of the forthcoming purge solely in the hands of the Party presidium. This measure accelerated and simplified the removal of compromised officials. At the same time, the necessity for such a step indicated the profound extent to which the Party had been permeated with the spirit of reform and how potent the resistance to consolidation would be.

The latter problem was to be solved by an extensive review of the Party's rank and file. The January 1970 Central Committee plenum directed the establishment of screening committees under the supervision of the Party's Central Control and Auditing Commission, which would

[4] *Rude Pravo*, 18 and 19 April 1969.

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interview each member to ascertain his attitude and behaviour with regard to such issues as the invasion, the Moscow Protocol, the March 1969 anti-Soviet 'hockey' demonstrations, and the new leadership. Suitability for continued Party membership was to be determined on the basis of newly defined official conservative standards which were in accord with the new political reality.

The Party card exchange developed into an arena of major political dispute, reflecting the varied hardline and moderate inclinations on the part of Party leaders. At issue was the rigour with which the interviews were to be conducted and the extent to which members were to be dropped from the Party rolls. Broadly speaking, the relatively moderate approach of Husak [5] was set against the more hardline attitude of those who demanded that an uncompromising judgment be passed against those who had supported the Dubcek course, that the extent of the purge should correspond to the degree to which 'right-wing opportunism' had penetrated the Party ranks.[6] The purge was concluded in the autumn of 1970, and Husak announced its results in a speech to a December Central Committee plenary session. Since 1 January 1968 the Party's numerical strength had declined by 473,731 or 28 per cent of the total. Of this decline, 326,817 (21·67 per cent) had lost their Party cards during the January–September 1970 purge; 67,147 had been expelled, and 259,670 deleted from the Party roster. The Party now comprised some 1,200,000 members, or 8 per cent of the population, and retained its mass character.

The existence of an influential, ultra-conservative opposition in the Party's constellation of forces has been one of the most salient political features of Husak's tenure. As the reaction to reformism the Party purge has by its very nature tended to enhance, if not to induce, an increase in the influence of extreme conservative elements. The past two years have witnessed the steady advance in the Party leadership of a number of politicians who, while they were previously discredited for collaborationist or disloyal behaviour, on the basis of present standards can boast of a purist or loyalist past in the reform period and during the ensuing crisis. At presidium level such individuals include Vasil Bilak, Alois Indra, Karel Hoffmann, and Antonin Kapek. On the Party's lower levels there exists a large number of individuals who share the political predilections of their counterparts in the leadership. There has also existed in the Party a strong group of leftist Stalinist elements who have been among the most radical in attempting to extend the limits of the consolidation campaign.[7] Together in spirit if not operationally, this latter 'sectarian' grouping and the ultra conservatives in

[5] 'Whoever is not against us is our potential ally', was the dictum Husak set forth at the January plenum. *Rude Pravo*, 30 January 1970.

[6] See, for example, the article by Milos Jakes, chairman of the Control and Auditing Commission, in *Tribuna*, 2 June 1970.

[7] See e.g. Jaromir Lang, 'The Example of St.K. Neumann', *Lidova Armada* No. 13, 1970.

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the leadership have comprised a competing locus of political power which has at times posed a challenge to Husak's personal leadership.

In terms of policy this division in the Party has been reflected in the dispute surrounding the extent and modalities of the purge. Depending upon their place in the political spectrum the representatives of the ultra-conservative and sectarian groups have expressed varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the purge and have pressed for more radical measures, including political trials of leading reformers. While pursuing a strictly conservative course Husak has sought to avoid the more odious coercive methods of totalitarian rule for fear of reducing the relationship of Party and society to the Pavlovian immobilism of the Stalinist era. Although some trials have taken place, Husak has evidently succeeded thus far in resisting political pressure to institute full-scale proceedings. However, in doing so, and in the interests of maintaining his own position as Party leader, it appears that he has been obliged to make political compromises to the point of relinquishing many of the relatively moderate positions with which he was associated earlier. Furthermore, while compromise has enabled an outward Party unity to be achieved it has not eliminated the more fundamental differences which have divided the Party.

Externally the consolidation period has witnessed a qualitative reordering of Czechoslovakia's relations with the Soviet Union. A bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed in Prague in May 1970 not only vindicated past Soviet behaviour toward Czechoslovakia, but stated that the contracting parties 'shall undertake necessary measures to protect the socialist achievements of the people, the security and independence of both countries',[8] thus in effect establishing the legal basis for possible Soviet intervention in the future. This is a formulation which is conspicuously absent in bilateral Soviet treaties with other East European states; it contrasts most sharply with the Rumanian-Soviet treaty which was concluded subsequent to the Czechoslovak pact.[9] The treaty pledges Czechoslovakia to cooperate in the 'socialist economic integration of the member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance',[10] and, finally, 'to strengthen permanently and consistently the unity and coherence of all countries of the socialist community based on the *identity of the socialist system* and final objectives'.[11] The latter passage effectively binds Czechoslovakia to the interpretation that there is only one correct socialist model; there can be little doubt which model the authors of the treaty had in mind. Beyond the tenets embodied in the treaty itself the Czechoslovak leadership has revived the interpretation of sovereignty which holds that the actual expression of the sovereignty of a socialist state lies in the power of the working class and the existence of the

[8] Article 5 (Ceteka, 6 May 1970).
[9] Agerpres, 8 July 1970.
[10] Article 2.
[11] Preamble, emphasis added.

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leading role of the communist party.[12] The corollary of this newly invigorated concept of socialist sovereignty is of course the Brezhnev Doctrine.

THE events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia came as a profound shock to the Soviets. In a country where communism could boast strong indigenous, historical roots, a mature mass Party, cadre and secondary organizations, a developed industrial base, and a loyal past in its role as client state, Czechoslovakia, on the measure of Soviet expectations, should have been immune to the calamities which have imperilled other communist East European regimes in the past. Yet in a country where the infrastructure of communism was among the most developed, the entire edifice showed signs of collapse from within. That the Soviets have therefore taken a keen interest and a strong hand in consolidation is certain.

In its broadest sense consolidation in Czechoslovakia has been both the cause and consequence of Soviet policy—the product of domestic reaction and Soviet objectives. It has constituted a cause because in both the psychological and political senses consolidation has derived its support, direction, and constituency largely from orthodox, conservative elements in the Czechoslovak Party. Inevitably, it has been these domestic forces of reaction which have provided the backbone for 'normalization'; and it has been the consequence of Soviet policy because to the extent that Moscow has had a directing hand in consolidation, it has perforce been concerned with creating the maximal conditions for a viable, stable system of political control. In its essential aspects the pattern of consolidation represents the confluence of these two forces.

Within Czechoslovakia consolidation has constituted a retrograde evolution of the Party. In effect the political clock has been turned back; consolidation has witnessed the reappearance of highly orthodox forces and ideas, which, at least in terms of their assertiveness, began to disappear from the Czechoslovak political scene as far back as 1962 or 1963. A new and drastically more orthodox political centre of gravity has evolved in the Party over the past two years. Consolidation itself, the ideological repudiation of the reform course, has *ipso facto* conferred renewed legitimacy upon orthodox, fundamentalist values, attitudes, concepts, and standards of behaviour. Under such conditions it is not surprising that the leading role of the Party has been redefined and defended with new, doctrinal vigour. Apart from the purge itself, the entire political-organizational activity of the Party has been directed toward eliminating autonomy and restoring the institutional and administrative means through which the Party can once again exert completely centralized control. In virtually all aspects of social, economic, and political life the dicta of the anti-reformist ethos prevail,

[12] See *Rude Pravo*, 7 and 10 April 1971.

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Ministry of Truth: Resurrection

THE past few years were marked by a lack of control over historical science. While the centre of gravity was increasingly shifting to individual efforts, control was reduced to the mere registering of these efforts. The praesidium of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, its collegium, and the directors of institutes and the heads of university departments failed to exercise adequate control. In the end, everyone at the institutes was doing what he thought was the right thing, at the universities every teacher lectured on what he regarded as desirable, interesting, etc. For many years, the output of the scientific institutes was not judged from the aspect of its theoretical approach and its ideological values. The controlling bodies were content to record the quantity. This decline in control reached its climax in 1968, when it was demanded that control, planning, and supervision of scientific work should be done away with. . . . Within the Party, the principle of so-called self-government was being propagated. This concealed the fact that, particularly after the middle of the 1960s, the leadership of the Party had abandoned control over science and culture, and over ideological work in general. Instead of control, a kind of self-governing system was to be introduced: control by common-interest associations. The then Czechoslovak Writers' Union became the model for the historians. This made itself felt in an increased interest on the part of the right-wing opportunists in gaining control of the Czechoslovak Historical Society, which had been a more or less dormant institution up to 1966. . . . Efforts were made to idealize the political system of National Front in the post-war period, 1945–48; this was presented as the only sound political system, and the role and importance of the class struggles in that period were completely neglected. Historians like M. Reiman, J. Opat, and Karel Kaplan expressed the view that this post-war, pre-February period was a time of ideal democratic socialism, of an ideal pluralistic political system which was ended, they maintained, by J. V. Stalin's ruthless intervention, while Gottwald and the leadership of the CPCS were presented as soulless puppets and instruments of Moscow. In this light, February 1948 was interpreted as a national catastrophe, as the beginning of 'political deformation', as the opening phase of 20 years of 'darkness'. The history of the workers' movement was presented, especially by the members of the CPCS Historical Institute, as a series of errors and mistakes, while the development of the CPCS after the fifth Party congress was portrayed as a continuous chain of deformation. The principles of proletarian internationalism were rejected. It was claimed that the Communist International had no right to interfere in the internal development of the CPCS. The right-wing opportunist historians paid special attention to the history of the USSR. A group of historians was formed, headed by V. Kladivova, which devoted itself to the history of Russia and the USSR, claiming that Czechoslovak historiography must present an independent picture of the history of the USSR, because Soviet historiography presents a deformed, dogmatic interpretation of its own national history. As a matter of fact, this had a clear political goal—namely, to show the history of the USSR in a negative light and to demonstrate that the Leninist principles governing the building of socialism in the USSR were only a specifically Russian deformation of Marxism, and that the so-called Soviet model of socialism was unacceptable to Czechoslovakia. The idea that Czechoslovak historians should present their own, independent picture of Soviet history, countering that of Soviet historians, was the result of a revisionist approach to the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Vaclav Kral: Reflections on Czechoslovak Historiography

(*Spolecenske Vedy Ve Skole*, No. 4, April 1971).

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The trade unions have ceased to function as the partial representatives of workers' interests and are in the process of being returned to the role of transmission belts for the Party line. In the cultural sphere only the continued recalcitrance of many intellectuals has impeded the Party's organizational efforts to subordinate the cultural community to the service of the state. In the economy the Party has acted successfully to curb an acute inflationary trend, but only through drastic recentralization of economic control. Except for the marginal political trials and an open reliance on intimidation through the manipulation of material perquisites, however, there has been no return to the wholesale terror of the 1950s. The present state of affairs has been aptly described as 'Stalinism with a human face'.

As the result of consolidation an outward stability has been imposed on the political life of the country. In a more fundamental sense, however, the consolidation of Party and society has amounted to a Pyrrhic victory. The social stability which has been achieved is based not on popular satisfaction or support, or even willing acquiescence, but —quite the reverse—on the pervasive sense of withdrawal and widespread apathy which envelop the public mind.[13] In the Party as well consolidation has been unable to generate the fundamental political consensus which is the prerequisite for the formation of basic policy decisions which would mean a departure from present orthodox norms. During the congress the Party presented a well-orchestrated united front. While this has removed many of the lingering doubts surrounding the position of the secretary general,[14] it has not altered the judgment that Husak continues to rule over a political coalition in both the Party hierarchy and its lower levels. The question is how divisive the coalition is and whether the strains which inhere in it will continue to be diffuse enough to impede agreement on basic issues of policy which await the Party's attention.

These issues are manifold, and a detailed analysis of them is beyond the scope of this article. But a brief discussion of three of the most salient—the issues of federalism, culture, and the economy—will serve to illustrate the thesis that the approach to problems which has dominated the Party's efforts during the period of consolidation is likely to continue well beyond the congress. This is to suggest that the policy of consolidation has actually been institutionalized in a far broader sense than that implicit in the simple restoration of order in the Party, and is likely to exert a decisive influence as the Party turns its attention to problems which have so far been tackled in only patchwork fashion. The non-policy holds sway that the established groundrules of consolidation must be adhered to and extended in order to prevent the Party's

[13] A state of affairs recently characterized by a leading Party functionary as 'internal emigration'. (Jan Risko, director of the Czechoslovak Broadcasting System, speaking over Radio Prague, 3 April 1971.)

[14] The congress elected to change the designation of the Party leader from Party First Secretary to Secretary General.

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and society's political and ideological permeability to 'revisionism'. This amounts to an inherent tendency to check any movement away from a strictly neo-Stalinist pattern of centralization and control in virtually all aspects of the country's life. In the Party itself this syndrome of consolidation is reflected in the call for increased struggle against the Right, and the provision in the revised Party statutes which permits an ongoing review of each individual's suitability for membership. In other domestic problem areas the Party's policy appears to be moving in a direction which is, to a greater or a less degree, opposite to what even it acknowledges as necessary solutions. This is perhaps most clearly the case with regard to federalization.

THE federal structure which was promulgated by law on 1 January 1969 was an historic step in solving one of the most pressing issues of political and social conflict in Czechoslovakia. In the official rhetoric federalization remains a sacrosanct principle of Party policy, and Husak, long its greatest Slovak champion, its continued advocate. 'We shall continue', he said at the May congress, 'to promote this Leninist form of relations between our nations, and shall strive to achieve optimum development of both republics and, at the same time, to strengthen the unity, power, and prosperity of the whole state.'[15] In the political milieu of consolidation, however, the Party has not only failed to strengthen the still-incipient federal structure, but has in fact taken several major steps in the direction of recentralization. A December 1970 amendment to the 1968 law on federation restored the control of planning and economic management to the federal government, reintroduced a single Czechoslovak citizenship, and transferred the entire administration of state security to the Federal Ministry of the Interior.[16] The Czech Party Bureau, initially intended to serve as the counterpart of the Slovak Communist Party in a symmetrically federalized party, has been allowed to atrophy, and with it the once-accepted concept of a separate Czech Communist Party.[17] These and other steps which deprive Slovakia of the political and economic autonomy granted it by federalization are difficult to reconcile with the Party's professed claims of support for the federal concept. While a convincing case can be made, on the grounds of economic rationality and efficiency, for the economic integration which is the object of some of these measures, the Party's general thrust against the federative concept shows how its view of consolidation—its overriding aim of reasserting its control through recentralization—works to the detriment of the solution of this key social and political question. This demonstrated incapacity to

[15] Ceteka, 25 May 1971.
[16] *Collection of Laws*, 22 December 1970.
[17] For some time the only sign that the Czech Party Bureau still existed was the publication of its weekly *Tribuna*. On 26th May 1971, *Tribuna* appeared under the new masthead of the *Czechoslovak* Communist Party Central Committee, thus confirming the long-expected abolition of the Bureau.

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depart from the accepted conservative norm for fear of exposing itself and the country to the dangers of 'revisionism' means that the Party has turned its back on a solution which even it acknowledges to be necessary. Opting for a 'paper federalization' may postpone the Party's eventual reckoning with this problem, but in the meantime it may open or exacerbate the Slovak question.

THE reforms of the Dubcek period had the overwhelming support of the country's artistic and cultural community. It is this social group which has proved most resistant to consolidation, a fact which the Party leadership has publicly acknowledged.[18] By their aloofness and their reluctance to cooperate with the Party's efforts to enlist their support they represent one of the most important vestiges of the Prague Spring still extant in Czechoslovak society. Thus far the Party's consolidation attempts in the cultural sphere have included the disbanding of cultural organizations and publications associated with the reform movement, the castigation of Western and 'bourgeois' cultural influences, the restriction of public display of art interpreted as contrary to the Party's stiff ideological line, and the formation of new artistic unions which are to channel and control the creative energies of the country's artists in ways defined by the Party. The effect of these efforts has been to drive the creative intelligentsia into an even deeper state of isolation, and, or so it appears, to stiffen their resistance. Stymied in its attempts to enlist their support the Party has betrayed an increasing frustration and a growing impatience with their recalcitrance.[19] Thus far the Party has shown itself incapable of dealing with the problem in any way other than on the basis of 'enhancing the authority of the Party and state over the entire cultural sphere'. In this area as well the syndrome of consolidation tends to force the Party in a direction which is counter-productive. The Party recognizes that society cannot dispense with the services of the cultural intelligentsia, that to do so would be to induce a state of cultural bankruptcy and immobilism. But in its efforts to bring this important social group to heel, to ensure an artistic production which serves the Party's narrow and essentially political interests, Party policy has succeeded not in eliciting support but only in stifling creativity.

ANOTHER area which awaits the Party's constructive attention is the economy. Administrative measures during the past two years have attenuated an acute inflationary trend and restored stability to the market. They have, however, comprised a stop-gap solution which has necessitated the drastic recentralization of economic controls. The long-term prospects of the Czechoslovak economy will depend in important part on the extent to which economic reform is carried out. That

[18] See Husak's speech at the Prague City Party conference, Radio Bratislava, 19 April 1971.

[19] See e.g. Husak's speech to the Prague City Party conference (cited above), and his speech to the Slovak Party Congress, Radio Bratislava, 14 May 1971.

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no reforms have yet been undertaken reflects not only preoccupation with the most immediate problems of economic stabilization, but the absence of a political consensus on any specific reform design. In the uncertain political atmosphere of the past two years the issue of economic reform and its automatic association with the repudiated policies and personalities of the liberalization period have been something with which experts and politicians alike have been reluctant to concern themselves. Nevertheless, the economy is the one area where the Party has shown a willingness to adopt a modicum of flexibility. There are signs that a discussion of economic reform may be in an incipient state.[20] Indeed, Premier Strougal's approving reference at the Party congress to the 'principles forming the basis of the improved system of planned management approved in 1965'[21] indicate that it is the postulates of the 1965 reform which will serve as the basis for economic reform. But here as well the psychology of consolidation, the return to a strictly centralized system of planning and management, are bound to impede an open-minded approach in the foreseeable future. While the danger of reinstitutionalizing overcentralized control seems to have been recognized, the obligatory repudiation of the Sik model which has been one of the main tenets of consolidation will continue to exert an important influence in impeding serious consideration of such issues as enterprise autonomy and the general devolution of economic control, or departure from the system of material balances. One cannot rule out the Party's capacity to undertake significant economic reform in the future, but it should be pointed out that the legacy of the past two years' experience in the economy will make any major shifting of gears necessarily gradual.

FROM the Soviet point of view the August invasion was the exigent response to a perceived political challenge of major dimension; the task of consolidation has given the Soviet Union a relatively free hand in defining and implementing an optimum solution to the arresting of possible future political challenges, and providing a viable, stable system of political control. If the ultima ratio of this system has been established as the threat of Soviet armed intervention, the system can be adjudged successful only if it avoids the necessity to resort to force. This is to say that, ideally, from the Soviet point of view, stability and control must inhere in the system itself, rather than in the exogenous threat of intervention. Has consolidation as it has been carried out in Czechoslovakia achieved this objective? The question can be answered in two ways. In the short run it would seem that the reconstructed Czechoslovak model provides the Soviets with a certain measure of

[20] See e.g. Andrej Lantay, 'To Proceed Deliberately and Soberly with the Economic Reform', *Pravda* (Bratislava), 19, 21, 22, 23 October 1970. Lantay is director of the Economic Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava. See also the article by Igor Zvach in *Hospodarske Noviny*, 18 December 1970.

[21] Radio Prague, 26 May 1970.

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stability and control—a loyal collaborationist regime which has successfully anaesthetized or eliminated the sources of internal dissent and which looks to Moscow in the first instance for its own political viability. This is essentially a re-creation of the pattern of Soviet control in the 1950s. Moreover, the virtual inattention of the Czechoslovak regime to creating a genuinely popular political constituency as a basis for support places it between two political points of reference, Moscow and the Party apparat, and enhances the role of Moscow as the final political arbiter —and hence the dependence of the Czechoslovak regime.

In the long run, however, the fundamental flaw in this system—one which Soviet policy has apparently failed to grasp—is that ultimately, as the recent events in Poland demonstrated with inescapable clarity, genuine stability rests upon the support, or at least the willing acquiescence, of the Czechoslovak population, and, further, on the successful development of society and the economy. This means that in the Soviet orbit a certain latitude must be accorded national communist leaderships in defining and implementing a political equilibrium based upon the demands of various national experiences and circumstances. This is by no means a novel observation, but the pattern of consolidation in Czechoslovakia puts it into a somewhat new light. The Czechoslovak leadership has given legal form to the Soviet dictum that there can be no model of socialism except the Soviet model, and it is to the Soviet paradigm that, by their own admission, the Prague leaders now look with undivided attention. The dilemma for the regime (and this will be more important as time passes) is that it must operate between the demands of the development of society (ultimately the basis of their own political stability) and the fear that by innovation or experimentation (read: by deviation from the prescribed Soviet model) they will compromise or even forfeit their Soviet mandate to rule.

The question in Czechslovakia is whether the Party can retain and extend its stultified and doctrinaire concept of the pervasive leading role of the Party and at the same time provide for the development and the solution of pressing problems which ultimately will determine the viability and stability of the system. An instructive example in this regard is the existing problem of poor labour discipline. From the regime's point of view popular support is not only a crucial political factor but an economic factor of great importance as well. The lassitude which has pervaded the public psyche since the invasion and the anticlimax of Husak's accession to power has been manifest to a great extent in insufficient labour discipline—absenteeism, failure to work to capacity, and shirking during working hours. This is something which the Czechoslovak economy—already plagued by a severe shortage of labour —can ill afford. Future increases in production have been keyed to an increase in labour productivity. The target of the 1971–1975 plan approximately is to raise the national income by 28 per cent, at least 95 per cent of which is to be achieved by increasing labour productivity.

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This goal, the existing shortage of manpower, and the especially low level of labour discipline combine to render this one of the most pressing and complex problems the Party leadership faces. This and other dilemmas which a withdrawn and alienated population present to the Czechoslovak regime must eventually be reckoned with in Prague as well as in Moscow.

Does this have some bearing on the future course of consolidation? The apparent Soviet satisfaction with the pattern of consolidation and with the measure of control they have undoubtedly achieved was an important feature of the congress. Would the Soviets not now be inclined to lend their support to those forces in the Czechoslovak Party which are inclined to abandon the present emphasis on consolidation and set a new, more genuinely productive course? At the least, would it not appear to be in Soviet interests to avoid the development of an even more oppressive regime which, in its insistence on carrying consolidation further, would stifle all tendencies toward initiative and reform? The question has to do as well with the margin of autonomy which indigenous forces have in carrying consolidation further. In this connexion the remarkable strength of the Stalinist reaction in Czechoslovakia may yet prove to be the decisive factor.

WHAT relevance do the reconstructed Czechoslovak model, and the reordering of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, have for the rest of Eastern Europe? Broadly speaking, intervention and consolidation have set the negative limits of Soviet toleration and have placed a new premium on the judicious exercise and/or the cautious expansion of national prerogatives. In addition, they have magnified the contrasts between different models of socialism in Eastern Europe. Beyond this, however, it would be wrong to place undue emphasis on this international aspect of consolidation. Little observable effect has been registered, for example, on the ongoing process of reform in Hungary or on the relatively independent foreign policy pursued by the Rumanian regime. Indeed, as a reaffirmation of their disapproval of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia the Rumanians sent a second-level delegation to the Czechoslovak Congress which took advantage of this forum to reassert the well-known Rumanian principles of sovereignty, independence, and non-interference in internal affairs. Nevertheless, because the obligatory contribution to socialist economic integration has been raised to a juridical maxim in the Czechoslovak-Soviet bilateral treaty, the reticent Rumanian position as the Warsaw Treaty odd-man-out has been further emphasized and that nation's task of maintaining aloofness on this issue may have become more complicated. Finally, with regard to Czechoslovak foreign policy, in so far as consolidation has brought a new element of confidence to Soviet hegemony in Czechoslovakia, it has probably contributed to Prague's announced readiness to set its relations with West Germany on a new footing.

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Any predictions concerning the long-term course of the Czechoslovak regime would be premature. The Hungarian experience is often cited as an example which will eventually be followed by its northern neighbour. Despite the political trauma of an even more drastic period of consolidation following the Hungarian crisis of 1956, the Kadar leadership adopted after a period of some five years a policy of forward movement and eventually of reform. While the historical parallel is tempting, there is little in the present Czechoslovak situation to indicate that 'Kadarization' will occur. It is true that the Hungarian case demonstrates that a reformist oriented regime can emerge, however gradually, from a highly conservative period of consolidation in response to pressures for modernization and a constructive policy. Yet at this point in Czechoslovakia the only similarity with past Hungarian experience is the existence of similar pressures. In the foreseeable future it is a virtual certainty that the orthodox ethos which has guided the Party's efforts thus far will continue to prevail.

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Urban Guerrilla In Latin America

Alexander Craig

INSURGENCY in Latin America today is largely urban. Rural guerrilla still goes on in a number of countries (notably Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala), but it has in great measure been superseded by urban guerrilla in its various forms. All countries experience this; what appears to be the only exception is a glaring one: the revolution going on in Peru can still call on the support of much of the left, with the result that there their attitude is one of expectation, not provocation or frustration.

Urban guerrilla is most advanced and widespread in Brazil, Uruguay and Guatemala, with Argentina and Chile some way behind. It is essential to note that, although much of their declared nationalism is 'Latin American nationalism', the strength and strategies of urban 'insurgent groups vary greatly according to the peculiar national conditions. Thus in Argentina and Chile there seems to be not nearly as much call for urban guerrilla as in Brazil, Uruguay and Guatemala, and consequently it is considerably smaller and enjoys considerably less support. In Argentina, internal affairs are so complex and contentious that it is often difficult to tell whether the terrorism comes from the right or the left: in Chile a proud democratic tradition is still maintained, meaning that there are institutional and respected channels for protest, and the new Popular Front government has made clear its distaste for the local urban guerrilla, the MIR.

Another problem to note when considering urban unrest in Latin America is the different levels of it: what is traditional, what responds to other causes, and what can properly be called urban guerrilla? One leading political scientist (Martin Needler) has characterized violence in Latin America as being of three types: anomic, representational, and revolutionary. Anomic violence lacks coherent political purpose. It exhibits a high degree of spontaneity, is marked by riots as distinct from anything more planned and organized; a typical example might be that of the 'bogotazo', the riot which erupted in Bogota in 1948, causing 5,000 deaths. The urban guerrilla is very opposed to such costly and unproductive riots, wanting instead to organize and plan anomic violence towards a situation of internal war.

Representational violence comes about when the internal organs are weak and the powerful classes show little interest in the needs or wishes of the masses. There is a need to take direct action for even the most patently legitimate demands; teachers for instance, are often not paid for months on end, so they go on strike. Latin America has

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quite a tradition of urban riots in demonstration against arrest of political or labour leaders, or against increases in bus fares; university students are particularly active here. There has been some talk of a 'new guerrilla' with limited objectives, but many protesters have quickly realized that more than representational violence is required—in, e.g. Brazil, conspiracy has become the only way to change the regime. As once the foremost exponent of urban guerrilla in Brazil, Carlos Marighela (killed by police in November 1969) had declared 'demonstrating in the streets means being killed without having the power to strike back, so there is a need for armed struggle'.

This armed struggle in order to overthrow the regime is 'revolutionary violence'. Those carrying it out want a complete change of both government and system. Urban guerrilla falls into this category. As Marighela said, 'The urban guerrilla is an implacable enemy of the government and systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and on the men who dominate the country and exercise power. The principal task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear out, to demoralize the militarists, the military dictatorship and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the North Americans, the foreign managers, and the Brazilian upper class. The urban guerrilla is not afraid of dismantling and destroying the present Brazilian economic, political, and social system, for his aim is to help the rural guerrilla and to collaborate in the creation of a totally new and revolutionary social and political structure, with the armed people in power'.

What form does urban guerrilla take? Marighela, in his widely-circulated *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, has listed possible operations or 'action models' as follows: (a) assaults; (b) raids and penetrations; (c) occupations; (d) ambush; (e) street tactics; (f) strikes and work interruptions; (g) desertions, diversions, seizures, expropriation of arms, ammunition, explosives; (h) liberation of prisoners; (i) executions; (j) kidnappings; (k) sabotage; (l) terrorism; (m) armed propaganda; (n) 'war of nerves'. In practice what this means is carefully-planned, well-executed assaults (or 'expropriations') on banks and arsenals to finance and arm the groups and raids on prisons to free jailed urban guerrilla personnel; these operations also provide valuable training for other revolutionary warfare exploits. Foreign, especially United States, factories, shops, cultural centres are bombed, to show the population who the urban guerrilla think the 'real enemy' is, and to attract international publicity. The latter has been plentiful for the most sensationalist of the urban guerrilla's activities, hi-jacking and kidnapping.

Hi-jacking of planes, once such a popular sport, seems to be dropping off somewhat. It still goes on quite a bit, of course, but a combination of effective counter-measures plus growing willingness of countries, especially Cuba, to hand back hi-jackers, has made it seem a less profitable operation. Possible international agreements on counter-guerrilla activities, on the other hand, are more difficult to achieve. For one

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thing, Latin America's tradition of non-intervention is deeply rooted, and so agreement on international cooperation in this respect is very difficult to achieve. For another, some of the guerrillas, notably (but by no means exclusively) in Uruguay seem to welcome the possibility of foreign interventions; this, they feel, would really swing the people behind them, against the government and the occupying forces. Furthermore, many of them do seem to feel that 'our strategy is part of the continental strategy of "creating many Vietnams", and the interventionists will have a great deal of work in many and dispersed fronts'.

Kidnapping is a much older Latin American tradition, going back at least to the days when the first Europeans, led by Cortes and Pizarro, landed on its shores. Ransom only started in a big way, however, somewhat later, when Castro refused to release the Bay of Pigs prisoners before the United States handed over $50m. to Cuba. Guerrilla kidnapping seems to have been begun in Venezuela, when di Stefano, Fangio, paintings on loan from the Louvre, etc., were variously lifted for a few days, with much attendant publicity.

Today kidnapping is a much more serious business—and a lot more goes on than is reported (often this is of important politicians, businessmen, etc., for ransom, to provide funds for urban guerrilla activities.) The Brazilian case shows clearly how it is not carried out simply for the release of prisoners (although this is very important—able and experienced talent is highly prized) but also in the words of the London *Times*, 17 September 1969 'the Rio kidnapping did great damage to the prestige of the Brazilian armed forces—years of effort penetrated by a bunch of raw urban guerrillas'. The Brazilian military had been unable to guard the 'representative of the metropolis' (the US ambassador) and the ensuing bitter division within the military over this problem further helped the urban guerrilla's aims.

One of the major aims of the urban guerrilla is to provoke the government into harsh, unselective repression, so that this will force people on to their side. As the United States magazine, *Military Review*, has said in an article on urban guerrilla: 'The rules, concepts and weapons associated with normal hostilities can be rendered ineffective when an attempt is made to determine how to rid a city of a guerrilla band without destroying that urban complex in the process.' The Cuban magazine *Tricontinental* has spoken of 'the police repression that attacks students with fragmentation bombs, disperses demonstrations with gases, clubs, and bullets, jails trade union leaders, and persecutes any expression of independent opinion, . . . the population has fewer and fewer difficulties in choosing in favour of the Tupamaros'.

Another possibility is getting harsh, 'law and order' candidates elected, as happened in Guatemala in 1970 when a soldier who had ruthlessly crushed the rural guerrilla, and was prepared to do the same with the urban guerrilla, was elected president. In Guatemala guerrilla activity has provoked equally serious terrorism from the right. Para-

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military groups have sprung up in other countries; not only governments are determined to be repressive. So the urban guerrillas see one of their main tasks as creating a situation in which, as Marighela says in his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*,

> 'The government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police networks, house searches, arrests of innocent people and of suspects, closing off streets, make life in the city unbearable. The military dictatorship embarks on massive political persecution. Political assasinations and police terror become routine.
>
> In spite of all this the police systematically fail. The armed forces, the navy and the air force are mobilized and undertake routine police functions. Even so they find no way to halt guerrilla operations, nor to wipe out the revolutionary organization with its fragmented groups that move around and operate throughout the nation's territory persistently and contagiously.
>
> The people refuse to collaborate with the authorities, and the general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents.
>
> The political situation in the country is transformed into a military situation in which the 'gorillas'[1] appear more and more to be the ones responsible for errors and violence, while the problems in the lives of the people become truly catastrophic.'

And, after all, as a United States political scientist has observed, 'the willingness of the population to support the guerrillas depends upon the intensity of its hostility to the guerrillas' enemies; it is not necessarily related to the ultimate goals of the guerrilla leadership—e.g. to the establishment of a communist or other nation state or to the carrying out of a broad-based social revolution'.

Why do the urban guerrillas choose these methods to achieve their aims? They feel that the institutional channels, where they exist, are quite inadequate for them to bring about the far-reaching changes they feel are absolutely necessary. In Brazil and Argentina and elsewhere, these institutional channels are practically non-existent; in Guatemala and Uruguay the amount of external constraint on the government is felt to be so much that the institutional channels are in fact useless and meaningless. They are rebelling against what they feel are very illegitimate and unrepresentative governments. 'Today when dictatorship is a fact in Uruguay, however many appearances of "legality" it tries to ostentate . . .', etc. 'Many social scientists argue that strife is minimized to the extent that organizations like labour unions, political parties, and the government itself are broad in scope, command large resources, and are stable and persisting.' This ideal is too often too much away from the reality in Latin America.

The need for armed struggle has been underlined by Marighela's remark about the futility of demonstrating in the streets. The import-

[1] Abusive left-wing term for a right-wing repressive ruler.

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ance of force is also accentuated by the fact that few if any regimes have ever been overthrown if they maintained control of the army. They are out to disprove Trotsky's assertion that 'a coup can succeed without the army, but it cannot succeed against it'. Most of the urban guerrilla groups are convinced like the Tupamaros of 'the inevitability of armed confrontations and the need to prepare for them'. 'No one today in Latin America does not realize that the struggle against imperialism is decisive . . . everything else is secondary.'

Another major reason for the urban guerrillas' choice of force stems from their divorce from the more traditional left-wing groups. The organized left has always been weak in Latin America: Che Guevara found Latin American communists absurdly dull and unadventurous. The traditional left, both social democrat and Muscovite-Marxist, is European-oriented, outward-dependent, gradualist, reformist: much is said, but little is achieved. They insist on waiting until conditions are ripe/right for revolution.

The urban guerrillas can be accused, and are by, among others, various leftist sectors, of elitism, voluntarism, adventurism, anarchism, and so on. They obviously prefer to follow Castro's advice when he told the founding conference of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) in Havana in 1967, that Cuba's position on guerrillas in Latin America was that: 'We prefer them to make mistakes trying to make revolution without the right conditions than to have them make the mistake of never making revolution.'

So, as Che Guevara and Debray emphasized, pre-conditions for revolution are to be created, not awaited. 'Armed struggle accelerates and participates the mass movement', the urban guerrillas believe, taking Cuba and China as examples. They repudiate 'the rigid formula of some theorists' which says 'first create the Party, then prepare to launch the Revolution'. They appeal to history to show that 'now no-one can disagree that an armed group, however small it is, has greater possibilities of success to convert itself into a great popular organization, than a group which limits itself to announcing "revolutionary positions"'.

Action is prized way above mere words, thoughts and attitudes (the discrepancy between stated ideal and actual practice has always been very great in Latin America, and this possibly is only the latest and one of the gravest manifestations of it). One of the OLAS declarations was that: 'It is not enough that a political force calls itself vanguard for it to be one. The condition of vanguard is the result of the decision of struggle and of the fact itself of leading and taking to its ultimate consequences the revolutionary act . . . Revolution is a dynamic, complex and violent phenomenon, and definitively it will be the combat itself which will select the most capable men and put them at the front.'

In this they very much follow the line of Debray—'Revolutionary situations are precipitated by revolutionary actions'. One Tupamaro has talked of how Cuba was an example: 'In place of a long process

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of formation of a Party of the masses, a guerrilla foco was set up with a dozen men and this deed generated revolutionary awareness, organization and conditions which culminated in a real Socialist Revolution.' Unity of the left, they aspire, will come this way, through revolutionary action rather than after patient negotiation and manoeuvring before action.

A Tupamaro document has talked of 'indiscriminate terrorism', which in other parts of the continent has 'become one of the most negative experiences of revolutionary movements.' The Tupamaros themselves were previously known for what the Montevideo chief of police called their 'perfect organization, good education . . . and the human touch', but in Uruguay, too, urban guerrillas quickly became violent, if not quite indiscriminate. Nevertheless, the Tupamaros remain fully aware of the dangers of being unselective: 'a revolutionary principle and a practical requirement' remain that their 'actions attack the system and the interests it represents, but avoid provoking innocent victims which would earn them the antipathy of the population'. 'Urban struggle requires of the revolutionary militant, perhaps even more than does rural fighting, that he moves about among the population "like the fish in water".'

The more enlightened urban guerrillas recognize that 'it is a fundamental fact that the majority of the people are not going to throw themselves into insurrection—but neither are they going to let themselves be killed by a regime which attacks them'. The urban guerrillas, therefore, see their role as being highly organized and trained in order to create revolutionary conditions: in the words of Raul Castro, 'the small motor which sets off the great motor of the revolution'. They want to make the people aware 'through actions by armed groups or other means, that without revolution there will be no change'.

To this end propaganda and publicity, both international and domestic, is essential. Urban guerrilla raids and other activities must be explained to the people. Usually the government maintains strict control of the media (the word 'Tupamaro', for example, is now publicly prohibited in Uruguay) and so unconventional means, such as capturing radio stations, playing pre-recorded tapes, or taking over cinemas, have to be resorted to. They were so successful in this in Uruguay that an opinion poll last year found that at least 50 per cent of the Uruguayan population did not wholly disapprove of their actions.

It is imperative that the urban guerrillas get their message over to the people. As Che Guevara said, 'the end is the conquest of political power . . . to try to carry out this kind of war without the support of the people is heading for inevitable disaster'. In *Guerrilla Warfare*, he wrote that 'The individual guerrilla is a social reformer'. Guerrilla warfare, he underlined, is a 'war of the people, a struggle of the masses'. (He also said, however, 'It is not necessary to wait until all the conditions for revolution exist; the insurrectional focos can create them'.) As Fidel Castro told the OLAS conference, 'Whoever

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stops to wait for ideas to triumph among the majority of the masses before initiating revolutionary action will never be a revolutionary. For what is the difference between such a revolutionary and a latifundium-owner, a wealthy bourgeois? Nothing? '

Yet one of Mao's cardinal principles of guerrilla warfare is that ' Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation '. What very much needs to be discovered in Latin America, therefore, is just how much popular sympathy and cooperation the different urban guerrilla movements dispose of. For one thing this will serve to show how different the urban guerrilla movements can be from one country to another; for another, it helps to delineate between causal factors ranging from serious societal dysfunction to sheer adventurism.

Certain tactics followed—free distribution of lorry-loads of stolen food, encouraging and helping squatters to take over unused land, taking over cinemas by force and surprise to show propaganda films—are evidence of the concern the urban guerrillas feel about this, and their desire to win popular support. One of their aims (expressed here with characteristic irreducible optimism as an achievement) is that ' they have proved that an urban guerrilla vanguard can organically link its action to the concrete demands and aspirations of the masses '. But these actions are essentially small-scale operations, difficult to carry out on a scale large enough to win sizable support (although considerable political problems seem to have been created by the different groups, urban guerrilla and otherwise, encouraging seizure of land and buildings by squatters in Chile). All in all, however, the situation is at best as one Brazilian urban guerrilla describes it, ' We may need 25 years or more to liberate the country. Right now we are little understood by the population: only about 20 per cent approve of what we are doing. But we must go on. Everything we see in our country is rotten. It is not just the exploitation that revolts us, it is the mentality. Illiteracy is encouraged; medieval customs are still maintained in certain regions.' Another of his urban guerrilla compatriots has said that ' We are proceeding prudently, slowly. We know it will take years, maybe dozens of years, to successfully mobilize the Brazilian masses. But to teach people to fight you have to begin fighting yourself. There is no other way.' (While there may be some truth and tactical sense in Marighela's assertion that ' It is enough to win the support of a part of the people and this can be done by popularizing the following slogan: " Let he who does not wish to do anything for the revolutionaries, do nothing against them." ')

INSURGENCY, Robert Kennedy said, aims not at the conquest of territory, but at the allegiance of men. But this would seem very difficult to obtain in Latin America. The newly urbanized masses, the very poor living in the squalid poverty of the shanty-towns surrounding

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all Latin American cities, seem to be much more concerned with their own affairs, with trying to get ahead peacefully and gradually. Almost all observers of Latin American society seem to feel that newly urbanized peasants are significantly less revolutionary-inclined than they would be if they had remained in rural areas. In the near-insurrection in Cordoba in 1969, for example, an experienced Cordoban sociologist has shown categorically that 'at no time were the participants in Cordoba from the marginal classes . . . the working class, yes, but not the lumpen-proletariat'.

Some hope for the urban guerrilla's cause might come from opposition to the indiscriminate repression by frightened governments: there is evidence of the possibility of some change in Uruguayan politics this way—a new third party, left-wing and with prospects of jolting the two unimaginative and now stagnating parties which have ruled Uruguay for 100 years, is being mooted (the Tupamaros have of course attacked this, together with decrying the Allende government in Chile: the consequences may be unintended, but they have contributed to them). On the whole, nonetheless, it seems as if the great mass of the people, especially the middle class, are not too concerned about governmental repression as long as the economy progresses satisfactorily for them: evidence seems to indicate that this is very much the case in Brazil.

The urban guerrillas doubtless agree with Mao when he says that 'In war we have no stupid scruples about righteousness, benevolence and morality'. But they differ radically from his emphatic declaration that 'a communist revolution cannot succeed on the back of a conspiracy, but only behind the natural upsurge of the people'. 'Guerrilla warfare must fail', Mao has written, 'if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained'.

Appeals to different sectors of the population are attempted, but half-heartedly and without much success. The Tupamaros, for instance, talk of the need 'to create awareness in the population, through actions of the armed group and by other means, that without revolution there will be no change. The unions must be strengthened and their struggles made more radical, and connected with the revolutionary movement.' In fact, however, organized labour in much of Latin America is relatively well-off and wants to conserve its gains; it is reformist rather than revolutionary (one major exception perhaps is Bolivia where the tin-miners are not well-off and have a vigorous revolutionary tradition: the student-worker alliance showed its strength here when the nationalist military took over in October this year). The student-worker alliance in the uprising in Cordoba in May–June 1969 was in great part due to local, provincial labour conditions, and the alliance does not seem to have lasted. Labour leaders of course may find themselves forced to take a more radical position if the economy worsens; the Tupamaros talk longingly of the crippling effects a general strike would have on Uruguay with its very large public sector, and this cannot be ruled out.

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The urban guerrilla cannot appeal directly to the peasantry, and the newly urbanized masses, as indicated, are not revolutionary material. Other sectors to which they appeal include women and priests. Marighela talks of the Brazilian woman's 'unmatched fighting spirit and tenacity in urban guerrilla warfare', but he is of course talking about a fistful of female firebrands: Latin American women, in general, tend to be even more conservative than women in the northern hemisphere have been clearly shown to be. There are some very committed, almost one might say fanatical, priests too, but the great bulk of the clergy, when not conservative, is not prepared to resort to violence.

One of the most important sectors of the public as far as the urban guerrilla is concerned, the police and the largely-conscript military forces, seems to have been little touched or infiltrated. Mao said, 'Besides annihilating troops in war, it is important to work for their disintegration'. A small number of highly-trained officers, in Brazil and Guatemala in particular, have been persuaded to desert, and they have become important leaders, but other than that little seems to have been achieved in this respect.

Another of the essential prerequisites in Mao's doctrine of guerrilla warfare is rigid discipline. Urban guerrilla groups in Latin America realize they need men who are not only determined, but highly trained and prepared: Marighela's *Minimanual*, for instance, is nothing if it is not an extensive catalogue of all the measures necessary for all-round training—but he emphasizes that 'The secret for the success of any operation, simple or complicated, easy or difficult, is to rely on determined men. Strictly speaking, there are no easy operations.' Whether there is so much real consensus on discipline is another question.

Personalismo is a deeply-rooted Latin American problem in much of the continent's politics, and guerrilla warfare is no exception. What has been unkindly said about the rural guerrillas—'they remain little disconsolate bands of middle-class intellectuals harried by mosquitoes. There are too many chiefs and not enough Indians', has more than a grain of truth in it. Some of the urban guerrillas recognize this problem, 'the overproduction of leaders in relation to the bases' but of course this is very different from doing something about it, or being able to change it. And this is politically, not just operationally, significant: a lot of the opposition to Debray's ideas, within and without the continent, stem from what his critics regard as the dangerous elitism his ideas entail.

Being relatively undisciplined seems to be a necessary corollary of 'action not words', of the thesis that unity of the left will come through fighting. The Tupamaros are a fine example of this ideological non-dogmatism—'*rebelles à toute ideologie et à toute doctrine rigide*' (*Le Monde*, 17 July 1970). Their 'lack of dogmatism in everything except their ultimate goal, socialism' could just prove to be a tactical advantage, but a strategic weakness.

And the Brazilian urban guerrilla is, after all, made up of more than

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half a dozen separate groups—Trotskyist, Fidelist, Maoist, anarchist, etc. (the prisoners released in exchange for the United States ambassador last year were from various different sectors, in an effort to show the unity of the revolutionary left). It is too early to say how much this strengthens or weakens them. In other countries, too, particularly Argentina, urban guerrilla is carried on by quite unrelated groups.

There do seem to be some tactical advantages—perhaps peculiarly related to the nature of the urban 'battlefield'. Marighela said

> 'There is no such thing as a firing group without its own initiative. For this reason it is essential to avoid any rigidity in the organization in order to permit the greatest possible initiative on the part of the firing group. The old-type hierarchy, the style of the traditional left doesn't exist in our organization.
>
> This means that, except for the priority of objectives set by the strategic command, any firing group can decide to assault a bank, to kidnap or to execute an agent of the dictatorship, a figure identified with the reaction, or a North American spy and can carry out any kind of propaganda or war of nerves against the enemy without the need to consult the general command.
>
> No firing group can remain inactive waiting for orders from above. Its obligation is to act. Any single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a firing group and begin action can do so and thus become a part of the organization.
>
> This method of action eliminates the need for knowing who is carrying out which actions, since there is free initiative and the only important point is to increase substantially the volume of urban guerrilla activity in order to wear out the government and force it on to the defensive.'

This might at first glance seem anarchic, or at least in danger of falling into anomie, but it must be remembered that these men do have a certain vague anti-imperialist ideology, and they are all bound together by a fierce determination. In addition, the potential strength of such tactics is pointed out by Marighela himself when he declares that one of the main objectives of the urban guerrilla is 'to attack on every side with many different armed groups, few in number, each self-contained and operating separately, to disperse the government forces in their pursuit of a thoroughly fragmented organization instead of offering the dictatorship the opportunity to concentrate its forces of repression on the destruction of one tightly organized system operating throughout the country . . .'. Elsewhere, he says 'Any citizen who wants to become a guerrilla can go into action on his own and thus become a part of our organization. This decentralization makes it more difficult to locate the sources of actions.'

How much assistance do the urban guerrillas get from outside? Previously a great deal from Cuba, the high point being the OLAS conference in 1967. Cuba's position now seems to have changed—as evidenced by the accusations and estrangement of some of the guerrilla leaders themselves—but there is no doubt it still supports the guerrillas

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in some ways. Supposedly it has followed the Soviet line of wanting the peaceful road to revolution in Latin America, but unconfirmed reports, for instance, suggest that funds are being transferred from Cuban to Brazilian urban guerrilla accounts, in Swiss banks. Some of the 'bombers' in Argentina, it has been asserted, are Peking-trained. Such charges have, however, to be taken with a large pinch of salt. Anti-communism runs deep in Latin America, and showing a movement is foreign-dominated is one of the best justifications for crushing it. Urban guerrilla groups are nationalist. Fidel Castro had insisted on only nationals in his original invasion of Cuba. The only man for whom he bent the rules, Che Guevara, came to his early end in part because he himself greatly ignored this essential provision when he set up operations in Bolivia. General Ovando, who had been in charge of the Bolivian army when Che was killed, said 'Che chose the wrong country, the wrong terrain, and the wrong friends. He was a brave man, but God was not with him.'

One important qualification must be made. 'For us the motherland is America' is a frequent declaration among urban guerrillas. While they are nationalist, part of their strength is that they are also 'Latin American nationalists'. This helps them greatly, for one thing, in underground talks, between the Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR, for example: international communications and publicity are valuable to both sides. 'To connect with other revolutionary movements in Latin America, for continental action' is part of the general strategy of some groups. These connections are bound to grow, and this is one thing counter-insurgency forces will find difficult to crush. (This also applies to connections between Latin American groups and similar organizations in North America, where books such as Marighela's appear popular with Black Panthers, Weathermen, etc.)

WHAT kind of people take part in urban guerrilla? How many? Estimates of numbers vary. Back in 1967 the *New York Times* reliably estimated a total of 750 men throughout the continent. But since then the more accessible urban guerrilla has replaced the more remote urban guerrilla. The Tupamaros, for instance, have been estimated at 1,000, but with only around 100 hard-core members participating in commando operations. They are divided into completely independent cells of six or seven men, coordinated through the leaders, and each Tupamaro is unaware of the real identity of his fellow members. Decisions for commando operations are put to a vote, individually or by cells.

One potential problem arises from the increase in numbers and the greater facility with which one can opt in and opt out of urban guerrilla-type activities. 'The irreducible characteristic of successful guerrilla warfare is the close cooperation between full-time guerrillas, and a population almost wholly in sympathy with the guerrilla's goals.' How much does this apply to urban guerrilla? One of the supposed

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advantages—both in terms of recruitment and of disguise—of urban guerrilla is that it can be carried on by part-time guerrillas, but do we have here a case of tactical convenience masking a strategic fallacy?

What kind of people take part in urban guerrilla? In his idealized declaration of tactics, Marighela talked of 'the armed alliance of workers and peasants, with students, intellectuals, priests'. He then paid tribute to the respective merits of each of these groups (plus 'the Brazilian woman'). Students, for example, as he said 'are noted for being politically crude and coarse and thus they break all the taboos . . . they show a special talent for revolutionary violence and soon acquire a high level of political, technical and military skill . . . they have plenty of free time on their hands . . .'

But, as in Uruguay, it would seem those who make up the urban guerrilla are largely students and intellectuals, with the aid of a handful of priests. A small number of workers and peasants, yes, but almost as important at times have been a few army deserters, particularly junior officers, who bring considerable technical skill and experience. (It may, however, be significant that the urban guerrillas have made little headway in infiltrating or otherwise influencing the largely conscript 'other ranks'.)

In Chile, where the need or demand for urban guerrillas seems much less, the MIR movement does indeed appear to be made up of what the leading Marxist ideologist, there, Volodia Teitelboim, calls 'the spoiled darlings of the upper middle class'. Pablo Neruda, the great Chilean poet, when he was still considering standing as a Marxist presidential candidate, said that the urban guerrilla would not continue under his government. The communists, he said, are opposed to adventurism, and he did not see who benefited by the actions of the guerrillas. The various extreme left organizations proposing armed struggle were excluded from the Popular Unity coalition which Allende led to victory.

They are 'totally without contact with the working class', Teitelboim said. Showing how committed they are, however, many of the MIR have not limited themselves solely to military actions. They have helped and encouraged squatters to seize public and private land, creating considerable embarrassment to both the previous Christian Democrat government and the present Popular Front one. A kind of temporary cease-fire between the very left-wing government and the Maoist left seems to have been agreed upon, but violent incidents continue at local levels; in December for instance, one Mirista student was killed in a fight with communist students at Concepcion. But this truce would only seem to be a hiatus—when trouble begins again, the estimated 3,000 or 4,000 Miristas will be near the head of it. They have, for one thing, the energy of youth. For urban guerrilla is in quite some part a rebellion of the young, a generation rebelling against its often comfortable middle-class origins, against an older generation which resists social change. Many of the urban guerrillas in Argentina, Chile,

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Brazil and elsewhere appear to be under 25. Especially in small countries such as Uruguay, Puerto Rico, Trinidad, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama, etc. there is a serious shortage of opportunities for educated young people, and their resentment is compounded by their belief that so many decisions vital to their country's future are made far outside, abroad.

IN what kind of milieu does this go on? Fundamentally the great increase in urban guerrilla activities with a parallel decline in rural guerrilla, is due to the fact that Latin America is a very urbanized continent. Latin America today has not only the highest rate of population growth in the world but also the fastest urbanization. Sao Paulo, with a population of around seven and a half million, is the fastest growing city in the world: an official forecast has said that Rio de Janeiro, whose population grows by 5,000 each week at present, will increase from four million in 1968 to 12 million in 1980: Mexico City's present population of seven and a half million will, it is reckoned, double within 10 years; Greater Buenos Aires, holding 44·5 per cent of Argentina's population, has by far the most disproportionate city-country ratio in any country over 20 million population (London is the next highest). Such statistics, like the inflow of poor, unskilled, jobless peasants into Latin America's towns and cities, are apparently endless. Latin America is becoming more and more an urban continent—but it has nothing like sufficient resources to meet the needs of its population. The Rockefeller Report advised the increase of urban security forces, foreseeing Latin American countries were in for a 'rough weather' period as the youthful population concentrated in Latin America's exploding cities gave 'intermittent vent to their jobless frustrations'.

Argentina's 'macrocephaly' is rivalled only by the much smaller Uruguay: 46·5 per cent of the Uruguayan population live in the metropolitan area of Montevideo. Uruguay, like the area around Buenos Aires or Santiago, is none too propitious for rural guerrilla, so insurgent activity has to be pretty largely urban. In a very interesting interview in the Cuban newspaper *Granma* of 18 October 1970 a Tupamaro leader admitted, 'It is true that we are operating right in the mouth of the enemy, but it is also true that the enemy has got us stuck in its throat'.

What are the advantages/disadvantages of urban guerrilla? Guerrilla bases need supplies, and this demand is primarily met, especially in the early stages, by capture from the enemy. The urban area would seem to be well-suited for this. Mobility and surprise are the key elements in insurgent strategy: the urban guerrilla, Marighela says, should never accept open fighting: 'the urban guerrilla has no mission other than to attack and retreat'.

Counter-guerrilla forces are more heavily concentrated, more vulnerable and less able to retaliate in areas of population density than in the countryside. Detection is so much more difficult. The guerrillas have

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moved into the cities since 1967 because 'protection, shelter and support are easier to come by than in the wilderness'. In gigantic cities like Sao Paulo or Buenos Aires, where there are tens of thousands of unemployed, the security forces' tasks of detection are infinitely more involved than in a deserted or more lightly populated rural region. The urban guerrillas also know the area so much better: 'The Tupamaros by contrast with Che in Bolivia seem to know every inch of this small country and every important person who lives in it.'

In 1885 Engels pointed out that street-fighting had become obsolete as early as 1849. It needed to be compensated by other factors, he went on, otherwise it plays into the hands of the ruling class, giving its military agents an opportunity to wipe out revolutionary forces. Che Guevara and Debray fully agreed. Like Mao, they felt the use of industrial workers and urban bases was impracticable. But they went too far in their anti-urban bias. They unintentionally helped to prove the truth of the dictum that Latin American revolutionary movements almost always develop in the great cities, especially in the national capital, the seat of government and power. Che had been too influenced by Castro's success and his theme of 'everything for the Sierra'.

But many realize they cannot afford to neglect urban insurgency. As one Spanish Republican general has said, protracted guerrilla struggle is impossible without armed insurrections in the towns and cities. In Cuba, for example, insurgent terrorism in the cities was very important (if not as romantic or publicized) especially in the latter, decisive stages, when it tied up great numbers of security forces: Castro's government later claimed that 1,000 lives had been lost in the mountains, and 19,000 in the urban underground.

Guevara wrote of the unjust neglect of urban operations. They can, he said, almost completely paralyze the commercial and industrial life of the area and cause disturbance and distress to the entire population. This, he thought, would make the people anxious for violent developments to bring an end to their troubles. In practice, of course, he himself neglected links with the urban underground and the revolutionary miners in Bolivia—a fatal mistake. One of the main reasons for his failure, apart from unfamiliarity with the area, was his inability to mobilize sustained support and to prepare an adequate urban apparatus.

To some considerable extent, the argument over rural or urban guerrilla centres on direction and control of the movement rather than on tactics. For instance, Castro told the OLAS conference in his summing-up speech in 1967, that 'guerrilla experiences in this continent have taught us many things—among them the terrible mistake, the absurd concept that the guerrilla movement could be directed from the cities'.

Reflecting the confusion over this point is the debate on which has primacy—rural or urban. The Tupamaros, understandably enough, feel that urban guerrilla must have top priority in their country. In Brazil,

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equally understandably, there is no such unanimity. Marighela, for instance, talks of the function of urban guerrilla as being 'to wear out, demoralize, and distract the enemy forces, permitting the emergence and survival of rural guerilla warfare which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war'. In Brazil as in Guatemala, the military have so far successfully crushed rural guerrilla, driving insurgent activity into urban areas, but a resurgence of rural guerrilla is by no means out of the question.

URBAN guerrilla in Latin America is still at such an uncertain, confused stage that it is difficult fully to assess its tactical advantages and disadvantages. 'The Chinese communists regard the principle of concentration, with its attendant requisites of superior mobility and intelligence, as the key to insurrectionary warfare.' In Latin America the urban guerrillas have the possible advantage of superior mobility and intelligence, but they cannot concentrate—except in a riot which may well be uncontrollable. Similarly, 'organization is the complement of mobility in the strategy of guerrilla revolution . . . the final stage of organization being the establishment of revolutionary bases'. Again in urban guerrilla this is not possible—this may be a tactical strength but a strategic weakness. Of course, premises based upon the Chinese experience may just be irrelevant to Latin American conditions and circumstances. But what is the final stage of urban guerrilla? To overthrow and replace the government, one would think. How is this to be done? The Tupamaros, apart from rhetoric about 'the creation of a popular army', etc. evade this question, in their 'low-profile', non-doctrinaire way. They have no precise strategy for taking over Uruguay: they will deal with that pragmatically, as the possibility draws nearer.

The end-result of urban guerrilla may not be what its proponents want, but rather be much more indirect. It may affect the various sectors of public opinion and push them toward a more nationalist and reformist line, as has happened in Peru and Bolivia. The Cuban insurgency, it has been said, was a greater success as a propaganda campaign than as a military one; the critical factors during the six-year struggle were popular opinion and attitudes. Marighela's group chose to begin by 'urban and psychological guerrilla'. The revolutionary message, despite all the obstacles, is widely diffused among students, intellectuals and others all over Latin America, in print, in music, on film, etc. The poor may at present appear to be conservative and little interested in urban guerrilla, but their dreadful living conditions will continue for a long time yet, so their revolutionary potential will continue to be coveted by the urban guerrilla. As Oscar Lewis said in his foreword to *The Children of Sanchez*, 'A critical attitude toward some of the values and institutions of the dominant classes, hatred of the police, mistrust of government and those in high position . . . gives

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the culture of poverty a counter quality and a potential for being used in political movements aimed against the existing social order'.

There is a good deal of rhetoric, even more of theory, and optimism, *in nearly all urban guerrilla literature.* '*Insurrectional activity is today* the number one political activity', trumpeted Debray, but erroneously. It gets lots of headlines (outside the country in question, usually) but, in the final analysis, it seems unlikely that it can directly overthrow governments. It can be exceptionally bothersome, especially in terms of international relations; it may also contribute to a general increase of non-political acts of hooliganism and gangsterism (cf. this in Northern Ireland?). Student and other traditional violence will also not be discouraged.

Counter-guerrilla forces are strong and the US has made clear that it will give every assistance to strengthen them further (and the general in charge of US Southern Command, which covers all of Latin America, was previously Director for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations at the Department of the Army in Washington). The farcical Rockefeller Mission, which provoked serious riots in every country except Haiti which allowed its entry, led to a report which urged greater US military aid to urban security forces. In addition, it must be remembered that a good deal of urban guerrilla is amateurish, and, just like unsuccessful military coups, hardly gets reported; one Rio newspaper wryly commented, 'in Brazil even subversion seems to be underdeveloped'.

Governments take a firm, very tough line. Military commanders in Brazil and elsewhere have recognized that they are fighting 'an actual revolutionary war'. The death penalty has been introduced in Argentina and Brazil, where it is respectively unconstitutional and only constitutional in wartime. The armed forces are only too well aware of the threats of Guevara, Debray, et al., that 'we must patiently destroy regular armies'. The revolution (of the left) has indeed revolutionarized the counter-revolution (of the right).

Yet with governments which are not open to pressure, which do not allow consultation, it would seem likely that confrontation or at least protest will grow. Moreover, when the power structure is divided, actually or potentially, serious problems may be created without too much difficulty. And many of the military understandably dislike repression of their fellow citizens. So urban guerrilla might have the indirect effect of fortifying the nationalist sector among the military. This has led to their take-over in Bolivia and, especially, Peru. In the latter country the military government has changed from fighting (rural) guerrillas to putting a programme very similar to theirs into effect; problems of political participation, consultation, and so on, still have to be worked out, but an undoubted revolution is in progress.

In many ways, it has been said, guerrilla warfare is not a national problem, but a challenge to the international system; urban guerrilla substantiates this statement at least as much as did rural guerrilla. The

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authorities and counter-guerrilla forces seem to be growing aware of this, even if agreement on coordinated measures is still a long way away. Reaction will, however, have to be a lot more than mere counter-insurgency. Serious urban unrest, and the problems which provoke it, look likely to go on for quite some time yet. Robert McNamara announced in 1969 that the World Bank was beginning to move on 'three urgent interrelated development problems—unemployment, urbanization and industrialization'. Latin America's social and economic problems are grave.

Per capita food production in Latin America is today lower than it was 10 years ago. In some countries, notably the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Uruguay, per capita g.n.p. has actually fallen over the decade. It is no coincidence that these countries are high among the most despairing crisis spots in the hemisphere. It has been estimated that average per capita income in Latin America is only one-seventh that of the United States (and of course it is much, much more unevenly distributed in Latin America—a problem both economic and social, with grave political implications). But Raul Prebisch, the distinguished Argentine economist who headed UNCTAD, has warned that the US average per capita income will be 15 times that of Latin America by the end of the century—i.e. in less than 30 years. In a special report to the Inter-American Development Bank in April of last year (1970) Prebisch stated categorically that if Latin America does not reach a rate of growth of 8 per cent p.a. during the next 10 years, the consequences are unforeseeable. This is a totally unprecedented rate of growth. Prebisch's simple statement calls for careful reflection.

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SOMMAIRE

No. 3—1971

Maurice COUVE de MURVILLE	Un voyage en Chine
Normand LESTER	Les conditionnements de la decision politique au Canada
PROBLEMES JURIDIQUES ET POLITIQUES DES UTILISATIONS MILITAIRES DE L'ESPACE:	
Simone COURTEIX	Le traité de 1967 et son application en matière d'utilisation militaire de l'espace
Jean KLEIN	Le traité sur l'espace et la règlementation des armements
Rapport de synthèse	
Violette GRAFF	Les élections en Inde
Henryk BIRECKI	Le monde triangulaire et les relations Est-Ouest en Europe

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Soviet Foreign Policy and the Military

John R. Thomas

THE recent Soviet success in drastically closing the strategic gap between the US and the Soviet Union, revealed in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the confident air exuded at this spring's 24th Party Congress have tended to overshadow the wide range of strategic and political problems facing the Soviet leadership as constraints on Soviet foreign policy. Some of these major foreign policy problems should therefore be pointed up in order to put the results of the Soviet military build-up and the policy achievements touted at the 24th Party Congress into proper perspective. Moreover, equal attention should be given to the impact of these foreign policy issues on internal Soviet political-military relations.

The sizable Soviet military build-up in recent years has raised the question of the traditional political control over the military in the Soviet Union. Because of the build-up it has been assumed either that the military have become decisively influential in Soviet policy-making or, conversely, that if not shaping policy, they unreservedly support the political leadership in its policy on such external issues as the 1968 Czech invasion and the current Soviet involvement in the Middle East and the Sino-Soviet dispute. (The full backing of the Soviet military on these issues is assumed because they relate to expansion of Soviet influence abroad or to addressing threats to Soviet national security.)

This article questions whether either of these appraisals is correct. Instead, it proceeds in the belief that while the Soviet military have of necessity been drawn into policy-making, because of the strategic and national security implications of the current major foreign policy problems confronting the Soviet Union, they not only do not have the decisive voice in formulating policy but in many instances have basic reservations about the external policies fashioned and executed by the current political leadership. The alternative view of this paper will be illustrated by reference to the reaction of the Soviet military to selective but major problems of Soviet policy in Europe (Czechoslovakia and *Ostpolitik*), in Asia (the Sino-Soviet dispute and Japan), and in the Middle East.

One of the basic assumptions of this paper is that domestic considerations are overriding in Soviet policy-making. Foreign policy problems may be issues in the continuing rivalries within the Soviet leadership, but these issues are secondary to those relating to the domestic scene. Short of Soviet involvement in a war, the home front and, consequently, the personal position of the Soviet leaders, has been affected more by the exacerbation of the traditional domestic problems.

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The Soviet Union's economic performance not meeting the needs of the country has often, as at present, been the focal point of domestic concern and a potential catalyst for leadership and policy changes.

Nevertheless, foreign policy issues have intruded and do intrude heavily into Soviet policy-making, particularly since the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and his successors broke with Stalin's traditionally conservative foreign policy of not involving its capabilities in areas beyond the Soviet periphery. Beginning in the mid-1950s to pursue an activist policy, the Soviet Union became involved for the first time in areas beyond the immediate Soviet periphery such as the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, areas in which the Soviets did not play an active or significant role between the two world wars. Moreover, because of their latter-day heavier intrusion into Soviet policy-making, the foreign policy issues also affect the views of those both within and external to the political leadership, in particular those who may be heavily involved in implementing foreign policy, such as the Soviet military.

This article further assumes that the differences within Soviet policy-making circles do not simplistically range all the military leaders on one side against all the political leaders on the other side. Rather, the picture is more complex: some of the political and military leaders find themselves in opposition to other political and military leaders. Moreover, specific foreign policy and domestic issues may bring shifting alignments of political and military leaders at any given time, depending on the issue under discussion in Moscow. For example, the Soviet Party Secretary responsible for liaison with and policy toward foreign communist parties may share the attitude of a functional counterpart in the military, such as the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, in opposing the use of force against an East European ally because of the disruptions this would cause within the communist world and within the Warsaw Pact, as was possibly the case in Czechoslovakia (to be indicated later); at the same time, these leaders may be opposed by others with different interests or functions, e.g. the Party Secretary of a bordering republic, such as Ukraine, may be concerned by the spillover of political unrest in East Europe into his republic and find as an ally the Commander of the Strategic Air Force or of the Navy, who may because of his professional absorption and functional concern be less concerned about the consequences of an invasion of an East European ally than with the far graver consequences of a situation such as a strategic war between the US and the Soviet Union or between the Soviet Union and China.

THE one unifying factor that may pit all of the Soviet military in opposition to the Party, may be the resentment of the latter's interference in professional military affairs, on the one hand, and the imperative for such interference by the Party in order to preserve its supremacy within the Soviet Union, on the other hand. This situation

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has traditionally produced tensions between the Soviet political and military leaders.

This internal political-military tension contributes to the factor that dominates the Soviet system today and that must be kept in mind in appraising Soviet policy: the insecurity that extends from the top leadership down and relates both to the personal power positions of the Soviet leaders and to the broader national security. At the personal level, even the top Soviet leader has no constitutionally guaranteed tenure. He is dependent on keeping the potential opposition divided and preventing diverse rivals from banding together to overthrow him. The personal insecurity of Soviet leaders exists against the background of the Soviet Union's national insecurity. The latter stems from a long history of incursion by hostile forces.

The Soviet Union's national insecurity exists despite its tremendous achievements in selective fields, most particularly in military technology. In part, the insecurity exists precisely because the unbalanced Soviet development has been achieved at the expense of the general welfare of the Soviet people and reinforced by their alienation because of harsh political repression used to override their wishes. Soviet insecurity dates back to the Stalinist era and was most dramatically demonstrated by the disaffection revealed during the second world war, e.g. the massive defections in the early months of the war and the unwillingness of many Soviet soldiers, officers and civilians to be repatriated at the end of the war. Most recently, Soviet insecurity was reflected in the invasion of Czechoslovakia when Soviet tanks were moved in to strangle the developing political alternative to Soviet-style rule and to shut off the varied, non-Party sources of views and information which sprang up in Dubcek's days.

The current Soviet leadership in particular is insecure, having witnessed the evidence of Soviet and East European people's disaffection both in the second world war and in the post-war era. (We should recall that Brezhnev, among others, was present in the Ukraine, the scene of the massive defeat of the Soviet forces by the Germans, and many of the leaders participated in the decisions to put down the post-war uprisings in East Europe. This, combined with their experience of the Stalinist purge in which they were lucky to have survived physically, has all fed both the personal and the collective insecurity of the present leaders. Perhaps future leaders may acquire a sense of security but the current leaders—with whom this article deals—do not have it.[1])

[1] From personal experience, the author—as well as many others—can vouch about the insecurity that pervades the Soviet system as reflected in meetings with Soviet counterparts in which the latter were unwilling or unable to place the basic assumptions of the Soviet system under scrutiny even intellectually for sake of discussion. Then, too, the many physical or other obstacles often placed in the way of free contact with Soviet citizens at all levels during the author's experience and those of others in the Soviet Union also testify to the regime's apprehension over permitting wide, open-ended and uncontrolled access by informed Westerners to the Soviet people.

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ADDING to the current political insecurity of the regime and the Party leaders is the combination of massive old and new strategic problems which the US does not confront and which must be noted because they form the vital background against which the issues to be discussed shortly have to be viewed. First, the Soviets face a two-front challenge on the Eurasian Continent. In the West, they confront a traditional continental rival—West Germany—whose strength (in their view) is likely to be increased in the future by possession of nuclear weapons and missiles. Even if there is no objective basis for assuming that West Germany will in the near future acquire its own nuclear-missile capability, the Soviets assume this may occur—particularly if a shaky German government dominated by the socialists were replaced by a harder-line government—and undoubtedly are already using it as the basis for long range contingency planning. The Soviets also assume that West Germany, by the sheer weight of its size and strategic location, will dominate any future alliance arrangements in West Europe, particularly if the US reduces its military presence in the area. But even in the worst case of national acquisition of nuclear-missile armaments, West Germany would offer relatively little concern to the Soviets if, alone and unaided, it posed the only threat; they could handle such a threat by their superior ground forces, nuclear-missile capabilities, and the greater resources available to them in the post-second world war period.

But the potential threat posed by Red China has added another dimension to Soviet strategic problems on the Eurasian continent. With the defeat of Japan in 1945 and the communist victory in China in 1949, the Soviets assumed that they had permanently solved the two-front threat posed before the second world war by Germany and Japan. Now in their contingency planning for the future they must assume a hostile Red China, either acting alone or in implicit collusion with West Germany. Indeed the Soviets already view the two as possible anti-Soviet allies in so far as both have designs on Soviet-held territory.

Beyond China, Japan can potentially resurrect its challenge to the Soviets in Asia. It has greater economic potential than China today to develop large nuclear-missile capabilities; politically, Japan has reasons to challenge the Soviets because of her territorial loss to the Soviets in the second world war; the challenge is already posed in the budding Japanese demands for the return of the Soviet-held northern islands.

In addition to the traditional Eurasian threat, the US has added an entirely new dimension to postwar Soviet strategic problems. In Soviet eyes the US challenge differs from any Eurasian threat on three counts: (a) the US is a non-Eurasian power and hence beyond the reach of Soviet ground forces, unless the Soviets succeed in establishing a presence on the North American continent similar to that of the US in Europe; (b) the US still has the overall edge in the nuclear-missile arsenal particularly if the present US lead in multiple, independently targetable warheads is considered; and (c) most important, the US has the resources to enlarge its military capabilities that the Soviets cannot hope to match in the

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foreseeable future unless the US deliberately permits them to do so.[2] Consequently a possible US-USSR confrontation in a general war poses almost insoluble problems for the Soviets. A German attack on the Soviet Union could at least be blunted by the traditional Russian strategy of trading space for time, but a US missile attack that would eliminate the need to invade Soviet territory in order to threaten Soviet political centres cannot be met by the space-for-time solution. The impact of such a possibility must be viewed against the background of the 1941 Nazi attack. Even without the capture of such key centres as Moscow and Leningrad, the German invasion revealed the depth of the people's disloyalty to the Soviet system and almost led to its collapse. With this in mind, the Soviet leadership will not lightly subject the Soviet system to the far graver test of nuclear war. Its apprehension is reflected in Soviet discussion of the political and military consequences of nuclear war: concern over panic and political immaturity that could affect Soviet capabilities to fight and survive a nuclear war has been voiced. To avoid such consequences and to meet a US missile threat the Soviets have devoted great effort to developing missile defence, an entirely new weapons system with strategic implications for a US-Soviet confrontation.[3] For the Soviets to *deploy* missile defence on a massive area-defence basis, however, will require sizable resources; this may be beyond the capability of the currently lagging Soviet economy in the near future unless the Soviets abandon other priorities.

The requirements of support for 'wars of national liberation' or, in great power terms, to show the flag around the globe confront the Soviet Union with another postwar strategic problem: how to project its military power beyond its periphery. As in the case of missile defence to meet the US threat, a different capability than that represented by traditional ground forces is required. The Soviets are trying to solve the problem by developing airlift and sealift capabilities as well as trained amphibious and airborne forces. But this task, like missile defence, adds another burden to the already overburdened Soviet economy.

In sum, the Soviets are confronted by the gigantic problem of developing separate and relatively non-interchangeable capabilities to counter a missile attack from the US, to meet a ground attack on the Eurasian continent from either or both the East and West, and to support or fight in non-peripheral national liberation wars. Given the limitation on their resources and the rising demands of domestic needs, the Soviets cannot hope to acquire *simultaneously* in the *near* future the massive capabilities

[2] While the US has been holding its strategic forces constant since 1967, the Soviets cannot count on this to continue indefinitely. Secretary of Defence Laird indicated this Spring that the US may have to build additional strategic missiles if the Soviets continue their current build-up.

[3] For a discussion of Soviet rationale and requirements for missile defence see John R. Thomas, 'The Role of Missile Defense in Soviet Strategy and Foreign Policy', RAC-P-1, Research Analysis Corporation, Mar. 1965, and a chapter in John Erickson (ed.), *The Military-Technical Revolution: Its Impact on Strategy and Foreign Policy* (Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1966).

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for meeting all the strategic threats and requirements. Should they opt for such a solution, it could only be realized—if at all—at the expense of other important priorities such as long-term economic growth.

To reinforce further the disparity in the strategic problems facing the Soviet leadership as opposed to the US, it should be noted that the US does not have on the American continent the equivalent of a two-front challenge faced by the Soviets in Eurasia, i.e., an equivalent of Germany and China/Japan. Neither Canada nor Mexico equals either Germany or China/Japan in actual or potential power; then, too, the US does not have the second world war experience of the massive devastation inflicted by either of her neighbours, comparable to what the Soviets suffered at the hands of the Germans. (Indeed, the US has not suffered an enemy incursion on its soil since 1812.)

The post-war Soviet strategic problems noted above have of necessity forced the Soviet political leaders to bring the military into policy-making since these problems relate to Soviet national security. This development has surfaced the traditional tensions in Soviet political-military relations. As already noted, the Party's distrust of the people in general and of the military in particular dates back at least to the disaffection evidenced in the second world war. In the post-war period, the tensions have been epitomized by Marshal Zhukov's dismissal in 1957 (for his battle to lessen Party interference in professional military affairs and not because of Bonapartist ambitions charged by Khrushchev), by Marshal Zakharov's dismissal as Chief of Staff in 1963 for opposing Khrushchev's 'adventurism' in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and by the political leadership's criticism of the one-time Chief of Staff Marshal Sokolovsky, after the appearance of a book on Soviet strategy edited by him, for infringing on the prerogative of the political leadership in formulating Soviet strategy. Even though the Party has retained its dominance to date, these tensions exist and continue to affect Soviet policy-making.

This internal political-military strain has been exacerbated by at least five current foreign policy issues—Czechoslovakia, *Ostpolitik*, China, Japan, and the Middle East—because they stem from the Soviet Union's post-war strategic problems, relate to Soviet national security and, consequently, must once more involve the Soviet military.

THE fact that the Czech armed forces have been used in Warsaw Treaty Organization manoeuvres since the Soviet invasion of 1968 has not solved the problems of their reliability and effectiveness which have confronted the Soviets since the invasion. These problems require a look at the impact of the invasion on Soviet-Czech relations in general and on political-military affairs in particular.

Until the invasion, the Soviet Union's best 'natural ties' in East Europe were with the Czechs. For, with the possible exception of the Bulgarians, all other Warsaw Treaty allies were suspect in Soviet eyes for one or another reason: the Poles, for example, because of their long history of opposition to both Tsarist and Soviet regimes. Soviet wariness

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regarding its East European allies was reinforced by the post-war experience of disaffection in the case of the East Germans in 1953 and the Hungarians and the Poles in 1956. And the Rumanians have resisted Soviet policy 'suggestions' since the early 1960s. By contrast, until the 1968 invasion the Czechs came closest of all in East Europe to being voluntarily pro-Soviet, in part because of the disillusionment with the West in the 1930s over what many Czechs considered the Munich betrayal and in part because of genuine gratitude for Soviet liberation from the Germans at the end of the second world war.

These close ties between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia—and in particular between the military of the two nations—were destroyed by the invasion of August 1968. Because they anticipated this result and recognized the new problems that would follow in the wake of an invasion, some of the Soviet military opposed the Czech invasion. More than ever, the Soviet military will now have to take into account in their contingency planning the possible unreliability of the Czechoslovak armed forces in the event of a European conflict. Translated into operational terms, this could mean an additional strain on the Soviet leadership in terms of requiring more Soviet troops behind the front lines to ensure internal security in Czechoslovakia as well as additional Soviet units at the front to ensure the loyalty of any Czech divisions that might be used in combat. That such problems now confront Soviet military planners may be inferred from recent meetings which the Soviet military have had to hold with their Czechoslovak counterparts in order to discuss 'topical questions involved in the further development of *friendship* between the Soviet armed forces and the Czechoslovak army'.[4]

In relating the invasion to Soviet political-military relations, it should be made clear that the opposition to the invasion by the Soviet military was not based on political approval of the Czech liberalization but on anticipation, from a *professional* military viewpoint, that the invasion would weaken the effectiveness of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and create the contingency problems suggested above. The opposition of the Soviet military on this score may be comparable to that of some Soviet *political* leaders, again not because the latter approved the Dubcek reforms but because the invasion would undermine the *functional* responsibilities of the opposing leaders and pose additional operational problems, e.g. Suslov, the Soviet Politburo secretary responsible for overseeing the international communist movement, opposed the Czech invasion because he was at the time in the midst of efforts to convene a world conference of the communist parties and recognized that the Czech invasion would undermine this effort.

Moreover, while there may have been overriding strategic and political reasons for the invasion and both played a role in the Soviet occupation, the strategic reasons were long-term and did not call for immediate Soviet

[4] Meetings on this topic were noted by TASS, the Soviet News Agency, in reporting the visit of Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, to Prague. See TASS International Service in English, 5 Feb. 1970. (Emphasis added.)

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action.[5] Thus, the dire West German threat to Czechoslovakia (voiced by Soviet propaganda) was probably not taken seriously, even by the Soviets.[6] Indeed, the Soviet leaders most concerned with the strategic aspects—the Soviet military—apparently were not concerned enough during the months preceding the invasion by the changes in Czechoslovakia to press for the immediate use of Soviet forces. Thus, on a visit to Prague in May, Marshal Koniev undoubtedly reassured himself that the Czech President, General Svoboda, an old wartime comrade who led the Czech troops as part of Koniev's command that liberated Prague, both had things under control and was aware of Soviet sensitivity on strategic aspects. For his part, General Svoboda must have persuaded Koniev that as long as he (Svoboda) was president, the Soviet military did not have to worry about any Czech developments that would undermine Soviet national security interests since he was fully aware of the Soviet strategic requirements and would not allow any Czech action, such as leaving the Warsaw Treaty Organization, to undermine the effectiveness of the Czech military in that treaty organization or to jeopardize the Soviet objective of maintaining Czechoslovakia as a buffer in the West against a potential German threat. It can be assumed that since the Soviet use of force did not follow immediately in the wake of Koniev's visit, Koniev and the Soviet military whom he represented were satisfied that no immediate danger was posed to Soviet strategic interests.

Moreover, the Soviet leadership—including the military—must have been subsequently reassured about the favourable course of events in Czechoslovakia: the Soviets withdrew their troops from the country in July after having earlier pressured the Czechs to allow these forces into Czechoslovakia for extensive manoeuvres as a way of testing out 'the combat-readiness' of the Warsaw Pact troops. The belated Soviet withdrawal of these troops—after having been committed to do so earlier in June—suggests that the Soviets delayed the withdrawal until they were satisfied that it was politically and militarily safe to do so. Thus they must have been satisfied that the trend and magnitude of Czech internal political developments no longer called for Soviet military presence in the country and that the combat-readiness was high enough to permit the withdrawal.[7] This satisfaction seemed to have been capped by the agreements at Cierna and Bratislava in late July. These agreements suggested that the Soviet *political* leadership now shared the earlier evaluation by the Soviet *military*, represented by Koniev, that there was no immediate danger to Soviet interests.

[5] For a discussion of the strategic context in which the Soviet decision to occupy Czechoslovakia was probably made, see the present author's 'US-East European Relations: Strategic Aspects', RAC-P-37, Apr. 1968.

[6] Prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the West Germans, in trying to avoid offering provocation to the Soviets, moved the manoeuvres site for the Bundeswehr from the Czech border to a clearly internal area.

[7] The Czechs did not have the ability to eject the Soviet forces from their country; it must be assumed, therefore, that the Soviets of their own volition exercised the option of returning their forces to the Soviet Union.

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This situation was drastically altered in the subsequent few weeks by the invasion, a move that could have been triggered by Ulbricht's visit to Prague in mid-August. On his return, he undoubtedly posed the question to the Soviet leadership of a choice between restoring tight control over Czechoslovakia or 'losing' East Germany. If the issue was indeed posed that way, and given the visceral reaction that the German question evokes in Soviet circles, the issue garnered enough support for an invasion decision by the political leadership.

But whatever the specifics of the decision, reservations among the Soviet military about the proposed use of force against the Czechs may be inferred from the replacement of General M. I. Kazakov. As a former commander of the Southern Group of Forces in the 1950s involved in the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, Kazakov could in 1968 foresee the disruption that the use of force against an East European ally would cause. Then, too, having worked with the Czechs up to the time of his removal just prior to the invasion, Kazakov undoubtedly had qualms about military action against the only 'natural' ally of the Soviet Union in East Europe, particularly since the Poles and Hungarians, as already noted, were not to be trusted because of their rebellious behaviour in 1956 and their long history of fighting against the Russians. It is against this background that General Shtemenko, an old Stalinist, took over from Kazakov as the Warsaw Treaty Chief of Staff in order to plan the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.[8]

An indication of the strained Czech-Soviet military relations in the wake of the invasion may be inferred from the closing down of the Czech Political-Military Academy in Prague in the wake of the Soviet invasion in 1968. This academy, modelled after the Soviet Union's Lenin Political-Military Academy in Moscow, had been designed to serve as the instrument for ideological indoctrination of the Czech military, including maintenance of loyalty to the Soviet cause. As in the Soviet case, only the most reliable professional military and Party workers in the Czech army were sent to this academy. That the Prague academy was closed down despite the handpicking of its staff and students indicates how far the political views of the Czech military were shattered by the invasion. It can be assumed that the Soviets became directly aware of the retrogression in the Czech military reliability since they must have approved, if not initiated, the closing down of the academy in Prague. It should be recalled that even before the invasion the Soviets pressured the Dubcek regime to remove General Prchlik when he surfaced a demand

[8] Kazakov was replaced by Shtemenko ostensibly because of 'illness' but later he attended Western Embassy receptions in Moscow and appeared in good health. Professor John Erickson of Edinburgh University, a foremost British specialist on Soviet military affairs, also suggests possible opposition to the Czech invasion by Marshal Krylov, Soviet ICBM Commander, based on Krylov's apparent association with Tvardovsky and the latter's tribute to Krylov's war memoirs, in the liberal Soviet journal, *Novy Mir*, No. 9, 1968, i.e. *after* the Czech invasion. (See the Erickson article on the Soviet military in *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, Sept. 1969.) It should be noted that Tvardovsky was forced to resign as editor of *Novy Mir* in Feb. 1970.

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(made earlier by Rumania) that the top command of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization be rotated among the East European allies instead of being confined solely to the Soviets.

In the wake of the invasion, Czech and Soviet press commentary indicated the nature of the strained relations between the Soviet and Czech military. For example, a Czech general declared that the Czech army was affected by 'liberal tendencies' and 'pacifist attitudes' which developed during Dubcek's period and that there were elements in the military that needed re-education or removal because of their anti-Soviet hostility.[9] The conviction to prison of General Prchlik this spring for allegedly wanting to take Czechoslovakia out of the Warsaw Pact Organization only served to reopen old wounds in the face of recent Soviet military efforts to integrate the Warsaw Pact more closely. It might be noted parenthetically that from a Soviet military viewpoint the damage to the Pact inflicted by the Czech invasion in 1968 was almost repeated in the disturbances in Poland involving the replacement of Gomulka by Gierek in December 1970. Here the possibility of using Soviet forces to put down Polish unrest might again have confronted the Soviet military with the impact of such an action on the Soviet efforts to integrate the Polish Army—the largest in East Europe—into the Soviet contingency planning.

AS a heritage of the second world war, most Russians have a generally hostile attitude towards West Germany. Consequently, any post-war West German initiative toward the Soviet bloc, short of clearly one-sided concessions by the Germans, would have evoked a negative Soviet reaction.

However, the Soviet political leadership has chosen currently to respond favourably to the conciliatory overtures by West Germany, represented by the new *Ostpolitik*. In this context, the signing of the August 1970 treaty has been hailed by some Soviet political leaders as providing the basis for a radical change in West German-Soviet relations. Undoubtedly the treaty can, in their eyes, permit the Soviets to exploit developing signs of German independence from the US, aided by US consideration of reducing its presence in Europe, in order to drive a wedge between Germany and the West. At the same time, the Soviet effort could serve other purposes: a *détente* on the western front would allow the Soviets to concentrate greater attention in the East on communist China and to exploit other opportunities against the West, e.g. in the Middle East.

Brezhnev played a prominent part in this reversal of the earlier policy toward West German 'revanchists'. In the ceremony in Moscow initialling the August treaty, he monopolized the spotlight even though this was a state function which properly should have been left to Kosygin as the Prime Minister. (Brezhnev's behaviour might be compared to

[9] Lt.-Gen. Alexander Mucha, Deputy Chief of Czech People's Army in the Soviet military journal *Voenny Vestnik*, No. 9, 1969.

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Khrushchev, who, as Party secretary, often elbowed aside Bulganin in the 1950s at the time when the latter was the Soviet Prime Minister.)

By such heavy involvement, Brezhnev and his supporters have gambled that the 'significant turn' in Soviet-German relations, represented by the treaty, will materialize. But if West Germany fails to ratify the treaty, the vulnerability of the Brezhnev leadership will increase to those within the Soviet ruling circles who have argued that West Germany has not changed its nature and cannot be trusted despite the 1969 change in the Bonn government.

Even now, Brezhnev has had to take public note of the internal opposition to the current German policy. For example, in a speech at Baku last autumn, he had to defend the treaty by maintaining that 'arguments one encounters here and there over the gains and losses of the treaty are unjustified'.[10] This Brezhnev defence came after his assertions to the Soviet audience that the treaty's benefits are clear. Obviously the benefits have not been clear to some who are powerful and sufficiently vocal inside the Soviet Union to require the foregoing public attention by Brezhnev. Among the unpersuaded are both political and military leaders, possibly men such as Suslov and the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko. Both of the latter while perfunctorily hailing the treaty undermined their lukewarm plaudits by stressing the opposition inside West Germany to the Treaty and implying thereby that the Soviets should not place their faith in the good intentions of the Germans nor should the opportunities for exploiting changes in West Germany be exaggerated without considering the cost to Soviet interests such as the impact on Soviet control in East Europe. It is in this context that Brezhnev's reference to opposition 'here and there' is reminiscent of Khrushchev's days when 'certain comrades' were castigated for opposing the latter's policy.

The current opposition to the *détente* with Germany, spearheaded by the Soviet military with support from some political leaders, may account for the erratic Soviet behaviour at the continuing Four-Power talks on Berlin initiated last year when the 'progress' reported on some occasions has been shattered by an unyielding Soviet position at other meetings. The same opposition may account for the Soviet interference last year with the air traffic to Berlin, which Gromyko ascribed to unauthorized actions by lower level Soviet authorities. Patently this was absurd: no local Soviet officials in Berlin would take it upon themselves and without high level encouragement to act negatively in such a sensitive spot as Berlin, the site of major US-Soviet crises in the past. The obstructionist moves in the Berlin context have undoubtedly been made or abetted by opponents of the treaty since the proponents in the Soviet Union know that progress on Berlin is a pre-condition for the treaty's ratification by West Germany.

The pressure on Brezhnev continued right up to the 24th Party Congress. This meeting, so important to Brezhnev's political fortunes,

[10] See *Pravda*, 3 Oct. 1970.

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opened without a West German ratification of the treaty. In consequence, Brezhnev was forced again to react in response to internal opposition to *Ostpolitik* by shifting the blame on to the West Germans: he warned them against a ratification delay even though Brezhnev gave Brandt no ground on Berlin or elsewhere for submitting the treaty to the Bundestag for ratification. One can guess that Brezhnev could give no such ground because of internal opposition. Certainly, it can be assumed that Brezhnev has been anxious to make at least some token concession since he has so heavily committed himself to the success of his *Westpolitik*. Brezhnev's anxiety on this point may have been behind Ulbricht's resignation (or removal?) as East Germany's hard line Party boss, a move possibly designed by Brezhnev to get forward motion on *Westpolitik* in the coming months.

The foregoing indication of active and powerful internal opposition to a *détente* with the West Germans should not be surprising since it draws on a long history of enmity and suspicion. For, despite the tactical reasons for dealing with West Germany at this time, some in Soviet policy circles object even to engaging in *pro forma* negotiations. Similar reservations on any softening of policy to Germany date back to the days when Khrushchev initiated conciliatory moves towards West Germany (via the mission to Bonn of his son-in-law, Adzhubei, early in 1964 and a trip he himself planned to make that was aborted by his downfall) and even earlier to 1953 when Beria was eliminated, in part because of conciliatory changes he intended to make in Soviet policy towards Germany.

In the current context, there is the underlying suspicion of *Ostpolitik* as a whole. It is viewed as designed to weaken Soviet influence in East Europe and restore pre-war German influence. The outcome of the September 1969 West German elections which produced a coalition led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has not reduced and is unlikely to reduce the basic Soviet suspicion of West Germany. In practical terms, the Soviets recognize that SPD's narrow margin of victory in the Bundestag, and its heavy dependence on the support of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), cannot provide the basis for any long-range policy accommodation by the West Germans to Soviet desires and objectives in Germany. The recent FDP defections and losses in the state elections, e.g. Schleswig-Holstein in April being the latest, have only reinforced the Soviet wariness.

But there are more basic reasons for a negative Soviet reaction to an SPD-sponsored *Ostpolitik*. Even if there was a possibility for prolonged SPD rule in West Germany, the Soviets would remain suspicious of the SPD because of their traditional and continuing hostility to the German socialists. Historically the Soviets have viewed the SPD as their most dangerous and direct rival since it competes for the support of the same group, the German 'working class'. Indeed, the Soviet hatred of the German socialists extends back to the Nazi era and before. It should be recalled that the Soviets were instrumental in paving the way for the rise of Hitler by instigating the German communists' refusal

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to join the socialists in the early 1930s to combat Hitler in his rise to power. As a result, Hitler gained victory against a divided opposition.

In more recent times, the Soviets have distrusted the West German socialists because the latter, in the Soviet view, betrayed the working class by joining the CDU in 1966 in forming the Grand Coalition government. In Soviet eyes, the SPD joined forces with the enemies of the working class and helped give continuity to the post-war anti-Soviet policy fashioned by Chancellor Adenauer.[11]

In addition to mistrusting the German socialists as a whole, the Soviets also are suspicious specifically of the new Chancellor, Willy Brandt. In the Soviet view, he proved one of the fiercest enemies of the Soviets during his leadership as mayor of West Berlin in the days of the Soviet attempts to 'solve' the Berlin problem by ejecting the Western powers from Berlin.

Consequently, in overcoming their hostility towards Germany by encouraging *Ostpolitik*, the political leaders have evoked strong opposition from the Soviet military who have resisted any dampening down of vigilance against German 'revanchism'. They have charged Brandt with a 'cold war' strategic outlook and as one who harbours fundamentally anti-Soviet views. He has been accused of sponsoring research on the causes and consequences of the second world war that implicitly could produce long-range anti-Soviet guidelines for West Germany's foreign policy.[12] Presumably this could include so-called revanchist designs for undermining Soviet control in East Germany and restoring German unity at Soviet expense.

But even if Brandt's objectives are not that far reaching, the hostile reaction of the Soviet military has been enhanced by their view of current German defence policy. Brandt's major pronouncement, after he took the Chancellor's office in October 1969, has been interpreted as designed, among other things, to enhance the Bundeswehr's power. They are particularly disturbed that the new SPD-dominated government intends to retain the Bundeswehr's nuclear delivery capabilities. In this connection, the Soviets have taken due note of Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt's declarations urging NATO to maintain its military strength, pledging West Germany's intention of doing its part, and seeking to expand its access to nuclear weapons through NATO's Nuclear Planning Group.

UNTIL recently, the Soviet Union had little to fear from the Chinese communists. This applied in particular in the military realm in view of the current disparity between Soviet and Chinese military capabilities. Soviet lack of concern was even more appropriate during

[11] For a post-election Soviet view of the SPD and its role in post-war West Germany, see 'The West German Working Class', by Professor D. Melnikov, *Novoye Vremya*, No. 43, 24 Oct. 1969, pp. 30–32.

[12] See Colonel P. Derevyanko in *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 17, Sept. 1969, p. 23.

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the heyday of the Great Cultural Revolution in 1966–68: the internal disruption by the Maoists drastically affected communist China's military capabilities to the point that it might have been relatively defenceless in the event of a conflict with the Soviets at the time. However, communist China has now recovered and is in a period of domestic tranquillity. And in the future, more pragmatic leaders will undoubtedly 'get China moving ahead' to further increase its military, as well as overall capabilities; moreover, the Chinese internal scene will be calmed to the point that full Chinese attention can once more be directed externally, in particular against Soviet interests. That the Soviets already anticipate such a development may be inferred from the resumption last year and continuation this year of their vehement attacks on a Chinese leadership that is now, at least at the daily operating level, under the leadership of Chou En-lai, identified as the leading pragmatist in Peking. Indeed, the concern of the Soviets that China's hostility toward them is nation-wide and is not confined to Mao is reflected in the changing Soviet attitudes: during the Great Cultural Revolution and until recently, Chinese hostility was attributed exclusively to Mao and his 'clique'; now authoritative Soviet sources view the hostility as emanating from the Chinese leadership as a whole,[13] thus providing the basis for a continuation of irreconcilable differences and forcing Brezhnev to assert at the 24th Party Congress Soviet intentions to defend their national interests come what may. (The underlying Soviet political wariness and the fundamental shift in the Soviet military posture on the Sino-Soviet border, including the build-up to 45 divisions and the formation of a streamlined Central Asian Military Command, have not been offset by the sporadic diplomatic and trade moves which have been interspersed in the interim.)

In general the foregoing provides the basis for internal Soviet agreement on the need to address and 'solve' 'the China problem'. But the implementation of a China policy has currently, as in the past, given rise to differences between Soviet political and military leaders. These differences relate to (1) the political leadership's manipulation of the Soviet military in the Sino-Soviet dispute and (2) the reservations of the military about the Soviet policy toward China. Because of their differing views, the Soviet military may now or in the future resist the temptation of the Soviet political leaders to use force as a way of solving the China problem or of remedying their ineptness in dealing with the Chinese. To make up for such ineptness, some Soviet leaders apparently have advocated preventive action against communist China now; by contrast, others—including the Chief of Staff, Marshal Zakharov, and those who share his views—have opposed a military 'solution' because of their awareness of the dangers and difficulties

[13] For example, the 24th Party Congress Resolution, approving the current leadership's policies, spoke only of the hostility of *Chinese leaders*; no mention was made of Mao or his clique.

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that would be involved in an open-ended conflict with communist China.

A history of differences between the Soviet military and political leadership on an appropriate policy towards communist China already exists. Thus, even during the halcyon days of Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet military differed with the political leadership on the degree and extent of Soviet help to be pledged to the Chinese communists. A prime example was the differing behaviour of the political and the military leaders during the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis. In threatening declarations addressed to the US in September 1958, Khrushchev pledged all-out Soviet assistance to communist China. By contrast, the Soviet military leaders did not follow Khrushchev on this score, either in tone or in explicit assurance of possible Soviet assistance. Thus, not a single top military figure repeated Khrushchev's pledge that an attack on China (allegedly planned by the US during the crisis, according to Khrushchev) would be an attack on the Soviet Union and would thereby serve to invoke Soviet military assistance to the Chinese under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950. Undoubtedly, the reservations of the military stemmed from recognition that they would be put in an impossible military position, given the overall strategic superiority and the local tactical superiority, represented by the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, enjoyed by the US at the time. For this reason, not only did no high-ranking Soviet military leader repeat Khrushchev's bellicose declarations or express support of the Chinese, but the Soviet military press methodically modified Khrushchev's threats; in some instances, it even eliminated or failed to refer to his pronouncements threatening the US or supporting the Chinese.[14]

Similar reservations of the military were also evident after the Sino-Soviet dispute erupted into the open in the early 1960s. At that point, Khrushchev and other political leaders attempted to manipulate the Soviet military. Until the mid-1960s, the high-ranking commanders were forbidden to address the lessons of the Soviet second world war campaigns in the Far East, as reflected in the absence of their memoirs dealing with those campaigns, even as numerous memoirs on the Soviet second world war campaigns in the West were issued in the interim. The manipulation of the Soviet military by the political leaders was further reflected in the way Marshal Blyukher—a popular Soviet military leader purged by Stalin in 1938—was used as a symbol of both Soviet assistance to and punishment of the Chinese in the past. In popular brochures, his service as military adviser to the Chinese in the mid-1920s was juxtaposed with his role in leading the Soviet Special Far Eastern Army against the Chinese challenge in 1929 to the Soviet hold on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

[14] For a further discussion on the differing views and behaviour of the Soviet political and military leaders during the 1958 crisis, see the present author's 'Limits of an Alliance: the 1958 Quemoy Crisis', in *Sino-Soviet Military Relations*, Raymond Garthoff, ed. (Praeger, New York, 1966).

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The more ominous possibility of large scale conflict with China that has been raised in recent years has reinforced the earlier reservations of the Soviet military. The latter recognize the dangers and difficulties of such a conflict, particularly if it deteriorated into an open-ended, protracted conflict. Their views on this possibility may be inferred from their comments on the rigours of peacetime service in the Far East, appearing, for example, in memoirs of the top Soviet military leaders. The hardships would obviously be greatly exacerbated in wartime. The view of the military is undoubtedly reinforced by the monumental logistics problems that would be involved in moving and supplying large forces in the Far East should the Soviets become involved in a prolonged land conflict with communist China, e.g. it normally takes some seven days to travel by train from Moscow to Khabarovsk. The logistics problems have been recognized by the Soviets themselves in their descriptions of the massive effort that was required to move their forces from Western Russia to the Far East in 1945. There is also Soviet recognition that the Trans-Siberian railway would be vulnerable to Chinese attack because of its proximity to the border. Then, too, the Soviets recognize that in a protracted conflict with China in the Far East they may face a similar manpower disadvantage to the one the US now faces vis-à-vis the Soviets in Europe, particularly if the Chinese acquire tactical nuclear weapons to cancel out the current Soviet advantage in these weapons.

In the context of the view of the Soviet military on the use of force against China, a differentiation must be made between *offensive* and *defensive* Soviet actions. The military would be unanimous on the need for the Soviets to fight with all means at their command, up to and including nuclear-missile weapons, *in defence* of their territory. Thus, any unprovoked action by the Chinese to expand the small-scale Ussuri River incidents of March 1969 to an attempt to seize Soviet-held territory (for example, even on the pattern of their limited action against India in 1962 when they only seized territory they claimed as their own and did not act on a broader objective such as capturing New Delhi) would allow the Soviet leadership to invoke the defence of *rodina* (the Motherland) as an effective means of mobilizing the Soviet army and people, as was the case in response to the Nazi attack in 1941. In such a situation there could and would be no dissenting views within the Soviet political and military leadership on the need to counter any Chinese attempt to seize sacred Soviet territory. In this context, the nationalist feeling relating to defence of the Motherland is reflected in several illustrative events to date: photos in the Soviet press in 1968 of Soviet soldiers in the Far East taking *klyatva* (the oath), by kneeling and kissing the national and regimental colours as Russian soldiers did in Tsarist days and Soviet soldiers did in the second world war; the prompt composition in the wake of the March 1969 border incidents of a nationalistic poem by Yevtushenko—nominally a dissenter from the

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present regime—invoking the image of the Mongol hordes which razed Russia in the thirteenth century.

But different considerations would apply to any Soviet *offensive* action against China, such as an air strike against the Chinese nuclear facilities or a land invasion of Chinese border regions (Manchuria or Sinkiang), that entailed the risk of a prolonged land conflict with the Chinese. Such a possibility could arouse internal opposition, including that of the Soviet military, on the following grounds. The Soviets know that the Chinese (unlike, say, the Czechs in reaction to the 1968 invasion) would fight and do so well (as they demonstrated in Korea). The Soviet military—if anyone—can recognize the difference between the limited war fought in the Far East against Japan in 1938–39 and a possible conflict with the Chinese today. In contrast to the Japanese, the Chinese would fight with greater zeal because the conflict would take place on their own soil—not true of the Japanese in 1938–39—and invoke the unlimited Chinese nationalist and ideological hatred of the Soviets, going far beyond the more restrained and practical views that dominated the Japanese leadership in 1938–39. More specifically, the Soviet military would be aroused by the *military* difficulties of fighting a prolonged conflict, far removed from the main base of Soviet strength in European Russia. As already noted these would entail the logistic problems of supporting a massive, continuing effort in the Far East, in the main dependent on the slender line of the Trans-Siberian railway. Even a high priority clearance of the Trans-Siberian railway of all civilian traffic could not shorten significantly the seven-day transit time governing traffic between Western Russia and the Far East.

On the basis of the foregoing military considerations, some of the Soviet military would oppose any temptation of the political leaders to use force either to solve the China problem or even to teach the Chinese a lesson. The Chief of Staff, Marshal Zakharov has already evinced reservations on this score. In a broader context, the military may already feel that the political leadership has proven inept in having brought Sino-Soviet relations to the point at which the question of large-scale armed conflict with all its consequences has intruded into Soviet policy. Again Marshal Zakharov may be among those with this view.[15]

The concern of the Soviet military has undoubtedly been further heightened by this year's 'Ping-Pong' diplomacy between the US and

[15] For discussion of Marshal Zakharov's dissenting views on provoking conflict with China, see Christian Duevell's *Radio Liberty Report*, 28 May 1969 and 28 Feb. 1970. Zakharov's reservations may be inferred from his various declarations in which, contrary to some of his colleagues, he has indicated the severe hardships that accompany and follow in the wake of war. Using the second world war as an example, he has noted particularly how war has affected the Soviet Union. (See, for example, his article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 8 May 1970.) His reaction suggests he does not underestimate or seek a new war from whatever quarter. Zakharov's views are undoubtedly shared by other Soviet military. As one-time Chief of the Soviet Higher Military Academy and a respected professional military figure, he has nurtured many of the present younger but senior military officers.

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communist China. This development raises the possibility of a new strategic situation: a US shifting from a policy of deep hostility to a benevolent neutrality could, at a minimum, free China, if it found itself at war with the Soviets in the North, from concern over any US pressure elsewhere in China's 'rear'.

THE growing power of Japan has introduced a new component in Soviet concern with the two-front problem which until recently centred in the Far East almost exclusively on China. In recent months, the Soviet view of Japan has become increasingly negative. Originally this may have been due to the Japanese refusal to join the Soviets in containing China. (Japan refused to second the Soviet notion of collective security agreement in Asia, surfaced by Brezhnev in 1969 after the Sino-Soviet border incidents.[16])

Since then, however, the Soviets have been increasingly noting the potential challenge that the Japanese may pose in their own right. In a speech in February 1970, Premier Sato laid out the outlines for Japan's policy in the 1970s. The *US Press Reports and Interpretation* featured that part of Sato's pronouncement that implied a sizable Japanese military build-up while the *Japanese Domestic Comments* featured the part relating to the northern islands seized by the Soviets at the end of the second world war. The Japanese domestic commentary clearly evoked the Soviet concern. While a Japanese defence build-up may have dual considerations—it can be directed against communist China as well as the Soviet Union—any Japanese views on activating the reversion issue relating to the Soviet-held northern territory clearly can only be directed at the Soviet Union.

For this reason, and in the context of the long history of Japanese-Soviet hostility, Soviet concern with a potential Japanese challenge may in time equal that demonstrated over a Chinese threat. Indeed, given its much greater economic potential, Japan may in time override China as the main object of Soviet concern in Asia. The successful Japanese placement of a satellite in space in early 1970 underscored the Japanese potential for acquiring massive nuclear-missile capabilities, years ahead of the Chinese. From the Soviet viewpoint, the Japanese development of a military potential is governed primarily by political self-restraint, while the Chinese ability is primarily a matter of resource availability.[17]

The rise of Japan as a newly emerging factor in the post-war Asiatic scene may reinforce the views of the Soviet military against any policy leading to conflict in the Far East that ignores the complexity of the

[16] Japan subsequently was accused of lacking 'a serious approach to the idea of collective security in Asia'. Ste V. Mayevsky, 'Realism Against Revanchism', *Pravda*, 29 Aug. 1970.

[17] The Soviets already see no material or technical obstacle to Japanese ability to mass-produce both nuclear and missile weaponry. See E. Leontyev in *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya*, No. 1, 1970, p. 35. For a Soviet view on expanding Japanese strategic and political aspirations, see A. Markov, 'Japanese Answer to the American Challenge', *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No. 11, Nov. 1970.

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strategic problems facing the Soviets in Asia and that argues simplistically for using force to solve those problems. At a minimum, any Soviet involvement in a large-scale military conflict with China would reduce Soviet ability to face Japan as the other major regional rival. At a maximum, the Soviet problem could be expanded by a potential Sino-Japanese combination, similar to a German-Chinese combination already envisioned by the Soviets as a potential threat; in the Soviet view, common territorial grievances against the Soviets could, as in the case of Germany and China, provide the starting point for parallel or co-ordinated political and/or military pressure by China and Japan in the future.

IN recent years, the Soviets have faced in the Middle East what can be conceived of as the proxy quandary: in this area they want an ally who can fight his own battles effectively, requiring only material aid and obviating the need for direct Soviet involvement; instead, lacking such an ally, the Soviets may be confronted in another Arab-Israeli war with the choice of a costly political abstention or direct intervention at the risk of a military confrontation with the US. The Soviets have been put into this quandary as a result of the most important consequence of the six-day war in 1967: the clear-cut and indisputable Israeli defeat of the UAR as an effective proxy in the Middle East that could in the short run win another conflict and obviate the need for direct Soviet involvement. (Conversely, Israel has demonstrated that it is an effective US 'proxy' that lessens the need for direct US intervention in the Middle East if the conflict in the area is confined to the two indigenous forces.)

In the face of such a quandary the Soviet military may oppose the political leadership if the latter chooses deliberately and intentionally to intervene directly and massively in another Arab-Israeli war. Even in 1967, the Soviet military undoubtedly had reservations about those Soviet political leaders advocating *direct* Soviet military intervention to bail out the Egyptians in the six-day war. For example, the then secretary of the Moscow Party apparatus, Yegorychev, apparently advocated direct Soviet involvement in that war. (He had a major voice in Soviet Middle East policy-making as head of the most important Party machinery in the Soviet Union and as one who visited Cairo in April 1967 shortly prior to the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict.) Yegorychev was overruled (and subsequently fired from his post and demoted to the post of Ambassador to Denmark) by other Soviet political leaders, undoubtedly because the latter, while seeking an expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East, wanted to avoid direct Soviet involvement at that time. Premier Kosygin signalled this caution at the outbreak of the six-day war when he was the first to get on 'the hot line' in order to make clear to President Johnson that the Soviet Union intended to abstain from that conflict. But while Kosygin's action reflected the majority of the top political leaders against one extreme of direct Soviet involvement, this

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group at the same time overruled the probable opposition of some Soviet military in ordering the replacement of the equipment lost by the Egyptians in the 1967 fiasco with the latest Soviet weaponry.

There are precedents for a negative reaction by the Soviet military to placing their latest weaponry beyond Soviet borders because of the danger that such weapons could fall into unfriendly hands or would promote a militarily untenable situation. In the spring of 1962—when Khrushchev made the decision to begin diverting Soviet missiles for emplacement in Cuba—Marshal Moskalenko, the then Commander of Strategic Missile Forces, and Marshal Golikov, the then head of the Main Political Administration, were removed and replaced by Khrushchev's men, Marshal Biryuzov and General Yepishev respectively. Moskalenko and Golikov reportedly were removed, among other reasons, for opposing this Khrushchevian decision. From their viewpoint, such a move put the latest military equipment, which the Soviet military have traditionally been anxious to shield from Western examination, in the US backyard where it could have been subject to possible US capture or destruction.[18]

Similarly, in the wake of the Egyptian defeat in the six-day war, some Soviet military undoubtedly opposed shipping their latest weapons to the Middle East where these could be captured by the Israelis or could otherwise fall into Western hands. The current Chief of Staff, Marshal Zakharov may have headed this opposition. During an inspection trip to Egypt in the wake of the 1967 conflict, he saw first hand the extent of the Egyptian loss of the latest Soviet equipment. As a result, he undoubtedly had objections to the Soviets 'throwing good money after bad'. His reservations might have been reinforced by the fact that he led the criticism by the Soviet military of Khrushchev's 'adventurism' in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In the view of Zakharov and other Soviet military, that crisis placed the Soviets in an untenable military situation: to go to the brink with the US in the face of the then overall US strategic superiority and tactical advantage in the Caribbean. (In the Cuban crisis, the Soviets lacked even the tactical advantage they have enjoyed in past Berlin crises, represented by the 20 Soviet divisions around Berlin.[19]) Given Zakharov's earlier attack on Khrushchev's 'adventurism' that resulted in his dismissal as Chief of Staff in 1963, it can be surmized that Zakharov also has had reservations about the new adventurism of Khrushchev's successors in the Middle East (even though they reappointed him to his former post after Khrushchev's downfall). This new adventurism resulted not only in the Egyptian *débâcle* of 1967 but in the subsequent Egyptian loss of weapons shipped by the Soviets

[18] For a discussion of Moskalenko's and Golikov's opposition to the Cuban missile emplacement, see Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin* (Viking Press, New York, 1969), pp. 236–239.

[19] In reacting negatively to the 'adventurism' in the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet military were not criticizing Khrushchev's backing down during the missile crisis but rather the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba in the first place, given their vulnerability to US action and in the face of US strategic and tactical superiority.

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after the six-day war such as the Israeli capture intact of a seven-ton radar component of an anti-aircraft missile (SAM-2) system in December 1969.

The reservations of some Soviet military about the political leadership's Middle East policy stem from the Soviet appraisal of the Egyptian *débâcle*. Appearing in the Soviet military and political press in the wake of the six-day war in 1967, this appraisal indicated that in the short run the Egyptian military would be ineffective because:

(1) The Egyptian *soldiers* were semi-literate and therefore technically incapable of handling the latest modern weapons turned over to Egypt by the Soviets;
(2) the Egyptian *officer corps* was incompetent, composed, as it still was, primarily of the ' decadent ' bourgeois class.[20]

The foregoing Soviet appraisal suggested by implication that because time was needed to cure the two problems noted above, it would be wasteful and counter-productive in the short run to squander any additional modern military equipment on the UAR. This provides another basis for the earlier inference that Marshal Zakharov and others involved in the post-six-day war inspection trip to Cairo had reservations about replacing the equipment after the June 1967 war. The Egyptian loss of latest Soviet equipment to the Israelis, most dramatically demonstrated by the Israeli capture and removal of bulky SAM-2 components in December 1969, would have served only to reinforce those doubts.

The misgivings of the Soviet military about the risks of war in the Middle East can be additionally inferred from their warnings to the Israelis against creating the dangers of a wider conflict as if the Soviet military are trying to head off the Israelis from creating a situation (such as demonstrating Egyptian ineptitude) which may force the Soviets for prestige or other reasons to become directly involved.

The expanding presence of the Soviets in the Middle East increases the possibility of an Israeli blow to their prestige that could trigger a Soviet reaction with a corresponding risk of a US-Soviet confrontation. For example, the Soviets would be profoundly embarrassed if their pilots were being lost in numerous combat missions against the Israelis. This is a distinct possibility because the latter have had extensive combat experience and are widely recognized as high-quality pilots who could take a heavy toll of the Soviet adversary. By contrast, most, if not all, of the current generation Soviet pilots have had no combat experience. Those of the Soviet aces alive today date back to the second world war, the last time they flew in combat, and are, in any case, too old to fly the modern supersonic jets against a first-class foe.

[20] For an initial Soviet critique of the Egyptian ' military bourgeoisie ', see I. P. Belyaev and Y. M. Primakov in *Za Rubezhom*, 30 June 1967. For a later critique in the same vein, see G. I. Mirsky, *Armiya I Politika V Stranakh Azii I Afriki* (Army and Politics in Countries of Asia and Africa) (Nauka Publishing House, Moscow, 1970), pp. 87–95.

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With the full awareness of the fluidity of the current situation in the Middle East, one might nevertheless pose the following questions as illustrative of the chain of events that give rise to the reservations of the Soviet military about heavier, direct Soviet involvement in the Arab-Israeli imbroglio. If beyond the single and unacknowledged incident last summer, the Israeli pilots began regularly to shoot down Soviet pilots with accompanying widespread publicity, could the Soviets withstand the resultant political embarrassment? If not, would the Soviets, in line with their past tradition of applying overwhelming numerical superiority against a foe, begin to fly jets in massive numbers in order to overwhelm the numerically small Israeli air force? And if the Soviets intervened on such a scale, would this in turn risk a US military reaction to such an intervention? Such a chain of events undoubtedly underlies much of the reservations of some Soviet military, such as Marshal Zakharov. The latter has had to plan for contingencies, including the Cuban missile crisis, and has in the past expressed views on the unpredictability of a conflict situation. (It should be noted that the same concern over the unpredictability of developments, once a military conflict breaks out, applies to Soviet views on the feasibility of limited war between the US and the Soviet Union, particularly in Europe; many Soviet military question whether any conflict involving the US and the Soviet Union directly would not escalate to general war.)

This continuing concern about the unpredictable course of events undoubtedly accounted for the Soviet behaviour during last autumn's Jordanian crisis which threatened to involve Israel and the US. During that crisis the Soviets publicly acknowledged their effort to call off the Syrian forces invading Jordan. The Soviet caution was highly illuminating since their 'mediation' effort was not accompanied by blustering threats (the hallmark of Soviet behaviour in past Middle East crises during Khrushchev's rule) despite the tremendous improvement in the Soviet military position vis-à-vis the US both in the Middle East and at the overall strategic level.

Aside from the risk of a military confrontation with the US, the most important reason for the Soviet military to oppose the solution of the proxy quandary by direct military involvement relates to the fact that any such involvement in the Middle East would divert Soviet strength and attention from areas of higher priority such as Europe and the China border. Undoubtedly they are aware that the Middle East could become 'a Vietnam' for the Soviets, i.e. a prolonged, debilitating conflict, if the Soviets were deterred by the US from unrestrained use of their full military capabilities against the Israelis, and the Arabs, unable to win on their own without such Soviet backing, involved the Soviets in a prolonged conflict.

IN summary, it should be made clear again that any reservations of the Soviet military about the recent Soviet foreign policy developments discussed thus far, do not apply to disagreement with the broader objec-

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tives of extending Soviet influence abroad or of defending Soviet national security interests in Europe or in Asia. These reservations concern the implementation of these policies.

For example, in the case of the Middle East the Soviet military oppose sending military aid to a demonstrated failure like the UAR which has to date proven ineffective both in using the Soviet aid to win and avoid thereby the need for Soviet involvement and, equally important, in losing the latest Soviet equipment to the Israelis. The military have and undoubtedly will continue to oppose the massive re-supply of the Egyptians as long as the weaknesses of the Egyptian military and political leaders identified by the Soviet military have not been corrected. Their reservations obviously will be reduced to the degree they are given direct control over the military weapons they are ordered to position in Egypt. But unless this is accompanied further by direct Soviet control over Egyptian military actions against the Israelis, instead of such actions being left in the hands of an unpredictable or unreliable Egyptian leadership, the increasing Soviet presence in the Middle East will not eliminate the reservations of the Soviet military about the risks that direct and massive Soviet involvement in renewed large-scale Arab-Israeli conflict would entail in terms of a possible confrontation with the US.[21] Indeed the concern of the Soviet military could not have been assuaged by the dismissal in April of Egyptian Vice-President Ali Sabry. He is considered the most pro-Soviet of the Egyptian leaders and was in charge of liaison with the Soviets on military matters. Without doubt, the Soviet military realize that with Sabry's removal the Soviets may have lost some control or influence over the course of Arab-Israeli events in the near future that could lead to a US-Soviet confrontation not wanted at this time.

The differentiation between the views of the Soviet military about the general objectives of Soviet policy in the Middle East and their views as professional military about the soundness of its implementation also applies to the other foreign policy issues noted:

(1) In the Chinese case, the Soviet military have no sympathy for

[21] In the context of the risk of a Soviet confrontation with the US, the reaction of the US would—as it has all along—determine the extent of Soviet internal opposition. Thus, any indication that the US was not prepared to uphold the interests in the area that it has identified and acted on in the past would obviously mute those in the Soviet policy-making circles concerned with the consequences of such a confrontation. But even signs of US vacillation would not silence these leaders entirely because of the Soviet image of the US: the US has behaved 'erratically', if not 'irrationally', in the past, viz. seemingly 'writing off' a distant area and then implausibly, in the Soviet view, storming back to reassert its interests in the presumably abandoned area. (This, for example, is how the lesson of US behaviour toward South Korea in the 1950s has been read. For a discussion of the Soviet view of 'erratic' US behaviour, see John R. Thomas, 'Limited Nuclear War in Soviet Strategic Thinking', *Orbis*, Spring 1966.) And, while the conflict in Vietnam has led to internal questioning of US overseas commitments, the Soviets have taken due note of the fact that even strong opponents of the Vietnamese conflict in Congress and elsewhere strongly advocate support of Israel (illustrated currently by congressional pressure on the administration to sell planes to the Israelis as an offset to Soviet military hardware shipments to the Egyptians).

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the Maoists or reservations about China as a general threat to Soviet interest; rather, their reservations relate to implementation by the Soviet political leadership of its policy towards China that might include the use of military force and thereby involve the Soviets in a protracted, debilitating conflict with China.

(2) With regard to *Ostpolitik*, the reservations of the Soviet military are that any softening of the Soviet attitude towards West Germany and mitigating its 'revanchist' threat will create problems for Soviet political influence and military control in East Europe.

(3) With regard to Czechoslovakia, the reservations of the Soviet military about the invasion did not stem from approval of the Czech reform movement in 1968 but from concern over the damage that the invasion would inflict on Soviet-Czech military relations.

Whether the Soviet military can effectively voice their reservations about the implementation of Soviet policy toward the various areas (as illustratively noted above) cannot be forecast with certainty. What can be predicted is that as long as the Soviet political leadership pursues an activist foreign policy that involves the Soviets and their prestige in many areas of the world where the Soviets were not a factor before the 1950s and, in turn, adds to the strategic problems for the Soviet Union or requires execution by the Soviet military, there will be continuing, if not growing, tensions between the Soviet political and military leaders on specific policies to be pursued or appropriate implementation. Indeed, an expanding global policy, adding complexity to today's already gigantic political-strategic burdens of the Soviets, can lead to future charges by the political leaders of infringement by the Soviet military on their prerogatives in the formulation of policy and strategy, a charge levelled at one time—as noted earlier—against Marshal Sokolovsky, a one-time Chief of Staff in Khrushchev's days.

The overall conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing examples is that recent Soviet foreign policy has not been a record of unblemished success. Beyond this, or because of this, the military have not wholeheartedly supported Soviet policy in the Middle East, Western Europe, Sino-Soviet relations. In turn, this further suggests that it is not the Soviet military, as has been suggested by some, but the Soviet political leaders who have in the past and continue today to make policy. This applies to defence policy, including the recent Soviet military build-up. This situation does not exclude and is often confused with the following. Other groups outside the Party leadership—such as the military—may support a particular policy of the moment, but only as long as it is successful; or, they may support such a policy with reservations until failures confirm or successes discredit their reservations. For example, the Soviet military undoubtedly have supported the recent military build-up because this met their own professional estimate of Soviet national security needs. But many of these very same military would undoubtedly oppose, as they have in the past, a dangerous misuse of Soviet power and prestige such as putting the Soviet Union into a

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dangerous conflict situation in which either the strategic or the tactical disadvantages (or both) may be against the Soviets. (The 1962 Cuban crisis was the most dramatic, but not the only, example of such a situation.)

In the current context, the political leadership has engendered internal opposition because it has put the Soviet Union in actual or potential situations that are dangerous from a military viewpoint or counter-productive in political terms. The foreign policy issues examined in this paper are in those categories:

(1) Situations of high military risk or costs arising from *direct* Soviet military involvement are exemplified by the Middle East, through a possible confrontation with the US, and by communist China, through a possible debilitating, protracted conflict; each of these situations, if it did not escalate to all-out war in the first instance, could at a minimum involve the Soviet Union in a Vietnam-like situation of draining massive Soviet resources in a prolonged conflict without the prospects of a clear-cut military victory.

(2) Situations of high political cost which worsen relations between the Soviets and their allies are exemplified by the 1968 Czech invasion; the effect of the latter was to demonstrate further the involuntary adherence of the allies to and the Soviet dominance of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and to engender in particular mutual distrust between the Czech and the Soviet military.

Underpinning the Soviet political-military strains deriving from the situations noted above is the key internal problem of poor economic performance in recent years. Brezhnev acknowledged the gravity of the economic issue in his still secret speech in December 1969. Despite this, he committed himself to continue the heavy defence outlays at the expense of economic growth, as reflected in the *Pravda* editorial of 23 February 1970 that reiterated his earlier stand. Such a commitment entailed heavy political risks because last year's economic performance fell significantly short of earlier plans which had to be scaled down to make the 1970 performance look good. Indeed, the pressure of such risks may account for the attention to consumer welfare Brezhnev was forced to pay at the 24th Party Congress.

WHAT are the implications of the foregoing appraisal? The Soviet policies which have failed to date (such as the economic slowdown and the Czech invasion) or which have created dangerous situations for the Soviets (such as the Middle East and Chinese situations which could lead to possible undesired direct Soviet military involvement) suggest that some changes in Soviet policy or the Soviet leadership could occur in the near future. Without playing the highly speculative game of predicting specific personality changes, it can be suggested in general that some of the current Soviet leaders will have to pay the price for the recent Soviet failures, just as Khrushchev did in 1964.

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The analogy with the latter event may not be out of order, including the possibility that the current leadership may for a time succeed in placing the blame for its failures to date on someone else. But ultimately it will have to pay the price itself. (It should be recalled that Khrushchev was able to blame others, e.g. the 'anti-Party group' in 1957 and Belyaev over the virgin land programme failure, but eventually had to go himself. It will be further recalled that Khrushchev's downfall in 1964 appeared to have been brought about by an agreement of other Soviet leaders at the time that the failures of Soviet policy under his tutelage required a new leadership.)

As noted in this paper, a similar accumulation of Soviet policy failures has taken place since Khrushchev's removal despite limited Soviet success in selective fields. (The primary success to date since 1964 has been the Soviet closing of the strategic gap between the US and the Soviet Union revealed dramatically by the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. But even this success has owed more to the policy instituted by Secretary of Defence McNamara to hold US strategic forces approximately at the present levels and less to Soviet effort. In effect, the US has allowed the Soviets to catch up.)

In any possible changes in the current Soviet leadership, the Soviet military may play a role similar to the one in Khrushchev's downfall in 1964. Even though the Soviet military were initially favoured by, and many owed their promotion to, Khrushchev, they either joined the opposition or did nothing to assist him in October 1964. The Soviet military took this position despite the possibility that it was Khrushchev rather than his successors who laid the basis for the recent military build-up. (It takes some five years to develop and emplace ICBMs; the first emplacement of new model missilery began in the mid-1960s, suggesting that Khrushchev gave the go-ahead, spurred on undoubtedly by the US-Soviet strategic gap revealed to him by the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.)

A similar pattern in Soviet political-military relations may apply in the near future. Thus, the military leaders may join an effort to renovate or alter the current leadership despite its apparent commitment, particularly that of Brezhnev, to favour Soviet defence needs and continue the recent military build-up which has so significantly closed the strategic gap between the Soviet Union and the US.[22] The military may turn away from the current leadership despite its support of heavy defence allocations because of the foreign policy issues noted above, which have placed the Soviet Union in militarily dangerous or untenable positions. The negative attitude of the Soviet military would be formed

[22] At the meeting of world communist parties in 1969, Brezhnev said that he favoured continuing high allocation to defence even if this had to take place at the expense of economic growth. As already noted, Brezhnev's pledge was repeated in *Pravda* last year, on the anniversary of the founding of the Soviet armed forces. The latter development seems to reflect Brezhnev's continuing effort to court the military and retain their support.

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more on the basis of professional judgment about the risks and consequences of implementing specific policies as shaped by the political leadership to date and less by basic disagreement with the broad objective of those policies to expand Soviet influence or to defend Soviet national security interests.

In casting a final look at Soviet foreign policy and its impact on the interaction of Soviet political-military relations, this paper does not gainsay that the Soviet Union may be able to claim some success in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, particularly at a time when the United States and its allies may be over-extended. However, to view the current enlarged Soviet commitments as unmitigated successes, based moreover on leadership consensus or unanimity spearheaded by the military, would be an error. For, each of the illustrative issues addressed in this paper may be viewed objectively and, more important, subjectively within the Soviet leadership as failures. In this context, the military could attribute the failures to the political leadership which unwisely in the first instance committed or subsequently over-committed Soviet military power to potentially risky or counter-productive ventures. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is still to be fitted into an historical perspective, favourable to Soviet interests. And *Ostpolitik*, the China border problem, Japan, and the Middle East developments—the other selected cases addressed in this paper—are still unfolding or unresolved and therefore cannot be added up for the better. If any or all of the policy judgments on these issues to date engender negative ratings within the Soviet leadership because of self-evident failures or increasing risks—despite initial appearance of success, as in the case of the Czech invasion or the current Middle East penetration—these ratings may not only profoundly influence future Soviet policy but materially affect the top leadership formulating and carrying out policy.

Changes in the top Soviet political leadership may still be forthcoming in the wake of the 24th Party Congress. This meeting did little or nothing to resolve the basic strategic and foreign policy problems and dilemmas discussed above. Consequently, it could not prevent them from impacting negatively on internal political-military relations. Indeed, despite the apparent domination of the Congress by Brezhnev, political-military differences were in evidence even here as reflected in the differences between Brezhnev and the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko. Brezhnev posited a world situation which did not carry sufficient risks or threats to Soviet interests or security to preclude major attention to domestic needs; Grechko, by contrast, pointed to world developments that could not permit a relaxed Soviet attitude. By implication, Grechko was suggesting that the political leadership had placed the Soviets in risky or dangerous situations and that the military therefore have to argue for an appropriate belt-tightening by the Soviet people and for enhanced Soviet military capabilities if they (the military) are to face the possible dire consequences of the political leaders' policies.

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Even if the differences symbolized by Brezhnev and Grechko at the 24th Party Congress produce no immediate leadership changes, the tensions within the Soviet leadership which have been addressed in this paper will continue to exist and affect the Soviet scene because the issues addressed here are enduring and will not disappear unless the Soviets alter their foreign policy, by such drastic measures as retreating into their pre-second world war semi-isolationalism.

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Contents of Volume 11, No. 2, June 1971:

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An *Ostpolitik* for the European Community

John Pinder *

FROM the European Community's genesis in the Schuman declaration, its champions have always seen it as a great political enterprise. The Community might therefore be expected to play some part in dealing with Europe's great political problems. Now it would be hard to deny that the division of Europe between East and West is one of the greatest of these; or that economic matters, in which the Community has its competence, are an important aspect of relations with countries where economics is as highly politicized as it is in Eastern Europe [1] and the Soviet Union. Yet the Community's policy towards these countries has been slight. The member governments have agreed on lists of products freed from import quotas; quotas have been imposed on imports of steel from the East; and certain East European countries have been persuaded to agree not to sell sunflower seed oil, wines and turkeys below the price levels fixed under the Common Agricultural Policy. Why is the discrepancy so wide between the insignificance of these policies and the importance of the problems?

The answer is, of course, that the Community was not allowed to have a substantial policy precisely because the problems were politically so important. His Eastern policy was central to de Gaulle's design of both ending American hegemony over Western Europe and maintaining French hegemony over Germany. Interference by the Community could therefore not be tolerated. At the same time West Germany's relationship with the East has been extremely sensitive, and this would itself have made it hard for the Community to have an Eastern policy [2] even if de Gaulle had allowed it.

Now, however, de Gaulle is gone and the French government is becoming less *anti-communautaire*. The *Ostpolitik* is rendering the Federal Republic's relations with the East much more normal than they were before. These barriers to the formation of a common Community policy have therefore been greatly reduced. The sharp differences that used to characterize the economic policies of West European

* A longer version of this article was presented as a paper to the conference of the Institute for International Studies, University of Leiden, 13–14 May 1971. It will be published in Ph. P. Everts ed., *Europe and the others: What will be the role of the enlarged European community in the world?* (Universitaire Pers Rotterdam, 1972).

1 Eastern Europe is defined here as Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the DDR, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. 'The East' is used (with apologies to China, India, Indonesia, Japan et al.) to refer to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union together.

2 The Community had of course explicitly renounced any intervention in the relations between East and West Germany, in the Protocol to the Treaty of Rome, relating to 'German Internal Trade and Connected Problems'.

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countries towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with respect, for example, to credits and import liberalization, are also much less than they were; and this applies as much to an enlarged Community as to the present Community of six. Bureaucratic inertia and a lack of political will among the member governments will doubtless remain to hinder the development of a Community *Ostpolitik*. Whether these obstacles are overcome will depend on whether the enlarged Community enjoys a political upsurge, and on how far the member governments will have grounds to feel they have an interest in a common policy that has substantial weight. The first question is beyond the scope of this article, which is, however, designed to throw some light on the second. But before any answer can be ventured, we have to consider the point of view of the Eastern countries and the problems that are inherent in the economic relations between East and West.

THERE is no equivocation in the attitude of the Russian authorities to the Community. They are against it.

This attitude is supported by their conceptions of both ideology and interest. Ideologically, the possibility that the imperialist states of Western Europe may transcend some of their 'contradictions' is disquieting; and the traditional principles that underlie much of Soviet foreign policy indicate a preference for a divided Western Europe as being more amenable to Soviet interests than a united Community.

The Soviet reaction to proposals for enlarging the Community has not, on the face of it, been so consistent. In 1961–63 the Russians seemed to be in favour of British entry and now they are against it. But the inconsistency is only superficial. In 1961–63 the Russians might have expected that the enlargement of the Community would lead to its dilution, as well as to a weakening of what then seemed to them to be an anti-Soviet Franco-German axis. Now they do not expect the British to weaken the cohesion of the Community; and British policies are if anything less palatable than French and German ones.

The Russians have therefore refused to accord the Community legal recognition and have constantly denounced it as a discriminatory trading bloc which should extend its internal tariff reductions to third countries. They have also tried to use their diplomatic influence to prevent British entry. Yet they have recognized the Community *de facto* on occasions when it suited their interests to do so, for example in signing international commodity agreements at the same time as the Community and taking part in meetings of the Economic Commission for Europe in which Community representatives have participated and spoken.

East European governments have been more forthcoming in their attitudes towards the Community. Not only have most of them had numerous informal contacts with the Commission, but Hungary, Poland and Rumania have made formal agreements with the Community (those on sunflower seed oil, wines and turkeys, mentioned above), and

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Yugoslavia has formally recognized it. The East Europeans have a greater interest in trade with the Community than the Russians have. They send a higher proportion of their exports to the European Community than the Soviet Union (in 1968, 8 per cent of Bulgaria's, 10 per cent of Czechoslovakia's, 10 per cent of Poland's, 12 per cent of the DDR's, 12 per cent of Hungary's, 17 per cent of Rumania's and 28 per cent of Yugoslavia's, compared with 7 per cent of the USSR's); and in each case exports are a much larger proportion of total production. Exports of farm products are, moreover, particularly important to some of the East European countries, which are consequently concerned about the trade-restricting features of the CAP.

Politically, East Europeans have an interest in offsetting the Soviet Union's power over them by cultivating links with Western Europe. This has been explicitly done by Rumania and Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia was clearly travelling the same road when cut short by the Soviet invasion in 1968. That demonstrated to the other governments, if any demonstration were required, the need for caution in pursuing such a policy. The political as well as the economic logic of their situation nevertheless impels them to pursue it, and this, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, they most of them do.

IT is often suggested that, in addition to their more direct reactions to the challenge of the Community, the Eastern governments have reacted by pursuing their own integration in Comecon.

The suggestion is not entirely unfounded. The establishment of Comecon by Stalin followed the launching of the Marshall plan, and Khrushchev's attempt to introduce supranational planning followed the establishment of the EEC. Although the organization when Stalin set it up was little more than a name, and Khrushchev's initiative foundered on the obdurate opposition of Rumania to any dilution of national sovereignty, there is still a great deal of talk about integration in Comecon and a substantial amount of economic cooperation does in fact take place.

There are significant forces that are conducive to integration. Thus the East Europeans increasingly feel the need for a larger market to give them the benefits of specialization and large-scale production; and the Russians tend to want closer political control over the East Europeans, as witness their intervention in Czechoslovakia and its justification through the theory of limited sovereignty in the Socialist Commonwealth. But strong forces likewise work against it. The East Europeans on the whole resist closer control by the Russians, which would inevitably accompany integration with such a massive country; and the Soviet Union, although favouring the principle of economic integration, is big enough to lack much incentive for further economies of specialization or scale.

More important, however, integration seems to go against the grain of the economic systems in Comecon. For the 'directive' or 'com-

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mand' economy, depending for its operation on millions of instructions given by the planners to enterprises, can be integrated in any proper sense only by having supranational planners give millions of instructions —and, since the Russians would by their sheer weight inevitably dominate any supranational planning body, this means that each economy would be subject to very detailed Russian control. The Rumanians are not by any means alone in resisting that (even if the others are usually content to hide behind Rumanian resistance).

A further complication has been introduced by the more radical Hungarian reform to a 'guided market'[3] economy, in which many decisions on prices, investment and foreign trade are taken by the managers of enterprises, not by the planners. It follows that the Hungarians are beginning to face, in their relations with the directive economies that are maintained, even after reforms, by the other members of Comecon, many of the difficulties which have been found by Western market economies in their relations with the East, and which will be outlined below. While integration between a group of guided market economies would be much easier, because far fewer decisions would have to be taken supranationally, integration between directive and guided market economies would probably be still harder than the integration of directive economies alone.

What is called in the East integration is consequently not likely to amount to more than would, by Western definitions, be called co-operation, unless the Russians are moved for political reasons to force through a tough supranational planning organization, or a sub-group of guided market economies in Eastern Europe were to integrate gradually without incurring a hostile Russian intervention. The former is not likely to happen unless the Russians believe, as they did in the case of Czechoslovakia, that countries are in the process of defecting from the bloc; and the latter will not happen until more East European countries have adopted a guided market system (only Hungary and Yugoslavia have yet done so) and unless they are so shrewd as to integrate at a pace slow enough and in a manner unspectacular enough for the Russians to accept.

THE foremost fruit of a common external policy for the Community was fairly obvious from the start and was dramatically demonstrated by the Kennedy round. Hitherto the United States had had no partner of comparable weight among the industrialized countries, and bargaining for tariff cuts in the GATT, based on the principle of reciprocal benefit, had therefore lost momentum. By confronting the Americans with a customs union of equivalent importance, the Community induced President Kennedy to initiate this major negotiation, and trade barriers were sharply reduced, not only for the two big partners

[3] The term is taken from Kaser, M. and Zielinski, J., *Planning in East Europe* (The Bodley Head, London, 1970).

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but also for the other countries that were too small to have set such a process in train.

By analogy, the Soviet Union being so much bigger than any other European country, the Community might be expected to bring a better equilibrium into the relations between its members and the Russians, with a corresponding fall-out of benefits for the other European countries. Yet there is little evidence as yet of any idea as to how this might be done. Partly this is because Western Europe's trade with the East is small in comparison with trade with the United States and other industrialized countries. But a further reason is that tariff bargains count for little in East-West trade and there is as yet no very clear conception of what might take their place at the centre of trade policy and negotiations between East and West. The economic systems prevalent on either side of Europe's great divide are so different that negotiations have to deal with quite different problems; and these problems must be clarified before a valid policy can be proposed.

Before embarking on the analysis of these problems, it is necessary to qualify some simplifying assumptions on which such analysis is usually and conveniently based, and which should be somewhat modified because of certain changes that have occurred on both sides. These assumptions are that the Western countries have market economies in which private ownership and free competition prevail, and the Eastern countries have command economies in which enterprises are state-owned and directed by the central authorities, and all foreign trade is conducted by state-trading monopolies. In fact Yugoslavia, and now—though to a lesser extent—Hungary, have given a substantial degree of autonomy to their enterprises and allow them to deal directly with firms in other countries; and the extent of oligopoly and of public purchasing and state ownership in the West is such as to raise many of the problems that the simplified model would attribute only to relations between East and West. As mentioned above Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Hungary, encounter problems in their trade with other Eastern countries similar to those that Western countries encounter; by the same token the relations between Yugoslavia, Hungary and the West are becoming relatively freer of these problems. While intra-West trade is not by any means immune to them the problems may be less acute in the relations between the East and the oligopolistic and public sectors in the Western economies than is the case with the more traditional private sector.

Despite these qualifications, however, the simplified model which is the basis of the following analysis demonstrates the problems that are still prevalent in East-West economic relations, with the virtually complete exception of Yugoslavia and the partial exception of Hungary, to which reference will therefore be frequently made.

A FREQUENT Western reaction to East-West trade is that the Western firm is dealing with a state-trading monopoly, that mono-

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polies are prone to unfair trading practices, and that the treatment of the Western firm is therefore likely to be unfair. Yet in practice there are very few complaints of unfair treatment. Why this apparent paradox?

One reason is that most of the state-trading monopolies of the East European countries are quite small in relation to the size of the world market for the range of products in which they deal. Their share, and hence their capacity for applying monopolistic pressure in the world market for a given product, is often less than that of a big Western firm. The average Russian state-trading company is, however, much larger than the average East European one and hence more likely to be able to exert some market power at the world level.

There seems to be more scope for the exercise of bargaining power by the Russians, or the East Europeans, when they import than when they export, because they may place orders for large numbers of a given product or for large items, such as complete factories, either of which will be a very important transaction for the Western supplier. This gives the Eastern state-trading company a leverage that may be considerable. It can be exerted by imposing on the Western exporter onerous conditions of sale, and the suggestion has accordingly been made that a code of fair practices should be negotiated between Western and Eastern governments that would provide a framework within which any such abuses could be mitigated.[4]

Where the state-trading company is using its power to exert leverage on price, however, a code of fair practice does not seem likely to help, and the remedies that have been put forward include the establishment (as in India) of state-trading companies in the market economies for the very purpose of conducting these negotiations, or the formation (as in France) of associations of firms interested in exporting a particular product to the East.[5] Such attempts to organize reciprocal monopoly power encounter the weakness that a Russian state-trading company may still be a large buyer of a product in relation to the whole export capacity, for that product, of a middle-sized Western country. If effective countervailing market power is to be instituted, the Community is in a better position to do it than the separate member states.

The unfair exploitation of Eastern buying power does not up to now seem to have caused great distress to Western firms, and action to counter it may therefore not be held to be urgent. The new enthusiasm for technical cooperation deals might, however, raise the problem more acutely; for the Russians have been promoting a number of projects each of which is worth many millions of dollars. The car factory being built by Fiat in the USSR is well known; the Japanese have undertaken the development of forest resources in Siberia and a major project relating to the construction of the Port of Vrangel; and major projects for a lorry plant, for the provision of irrigation equipment and

[4] Samuel Pisar, *Coexistence and Commerce* (McGraw Hill, New York, 1970), Chap. 25.
[5] Loc. cit. pp. 478, 479.

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for the development of Siberian mineral resources have been discussed with various possible Western partners. These projects are so vast, both operationally and financially, that the West European countries would seem fully justified in confronting the Russians with a consortium, including at least all those West European firms big enough to be the subject of a separate approach by the Russians. Such transactions are essentially of the kind where the strength of the whole Community is needed to counterbalance that of the Soviet Union; and the Community could use its power of control over external trade to ensure that the West European contribution in any such project was channelled through a consortium containing the relevant companies from the member states, which should where possible take the form of a European company, and which would negotiate and then direct the work.

When, however, one considers the disruption that might be caused by Eastern exports to the market economies, in the light of the differences between the two systems in pricing methods and economic structures, it is astonishing how little trouble there has been. Some cases have been recorded of the sale of commodities such as tin, cotton or aluminium at prices far below the world level, and other instances have been reported from time to time, but their number is remarkably small. The reason is that the policy of the state-trading companies is to sell at world market prices. Their motive is simple. They get more money on each sale than they would by selling below that price. They have doubtless had the experience of an anti-dumping duty imposed on goods sold more cheaply, and asked themselves why, if somebody is to collect a levy equal to the difference between the market price and any lower price at which the state-trading company might have been willing to sell, it should not be the authorities in the Eastern country rather than those in the West. They have been reinforced in this practice by a stipulation, inserted at the request of the British government in some of its bilateral trade agreements with Eastern countries, that exports to Britain under the agreement are not to be sold below local prices (and the same applies, it will have been noted, to imports into the Community of sunflower seed oil, wines, and turkeys from some East European countries). If the buyer is foolish enough to ask for a higher price, after all, why should the seller scruple to charge it?

One may well ask why a Western government should be so charitable as to ask an Eastern government to collect money which could be collected as taxation in the Western country, and take some of the burden off the local taxpayer, if the price is such as to justify the levying of an anti-dumping duty? The point is well taken; but there is a still more pertinent question to be asked. Does not much international trade take place because of differences in price? And if all differences in price are removed because the exporters always adjust prices to the level that prevails in the export market, will not a great deal of potential trade never take place?

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The answer is not a simple one, because the prices in Eastern countries do not usually reflect costs as these would be understood in the West, so that a price difference does not necessarily signal that trade would lead to a better allocation of resources according to the criteria of a market economy. However, even after the complications of the differing price systems have been analysed, the answer remains, as we shall see in the next section, that much trade is lost, and that this appears to be a much more serious defect in the conduct of East-West trade than any unfair use of monopoly bargaining power.

The same may be said of the effect on trade of the obligation to deal with a state-trading company which is separate from the final buyer or seller in the Eastern country. This is an additional problem over and above that of dealing with a monopoly, which could (and in the case of a state enterprise in a Western country almost certainly would) be the final buyer or seller instead of an intermediary. The necessity of negotiating with such a middleman offers endless scope for misunderstanding and delay, which is not only frustrating for the Western businessman but doubtless also prevents some transactions from going through at all. In so far as exports from the East are frustrated by this, the level of trade in both directions is kept down, for any export earnings are spent by the Eastern countries on imports. The growth of Hungarian exports since the economic reform of 1968, which allowed producing enterprises a degree of direct access to export markets, indicates that a big potential export capacity may remain untapped unless Eastern countries reform their systems so that the middlemen—the state-trading companies—have a less dominant position.

Here, and later in this article, we can see how certain economic reforms in Eastern countries can be helpful to economic relations with the West. Because the Cold War has rendered these questions politically sensitive, and the Eastern authorities might react to pressure from the West for changes in their economic systems by a hardening of those systems and a deterioration of relations with the West, one feels a certain diffidence in putting forward such a conclusion. However, it is argued that such reforms would be equally conducive to economic efficiency and welfare in the East, and that they imply—as the reform in Hungary has shown—no change in fundamental political principles regarding the ownership of the means of production; and for these reasons the reforms in question are advocated by many economists in the East. It seems, in these circumstances, better to see where the economic analysis takes us, and rely on the responsible authorities to use any of the findings in ways that are politically and diplomatically realistic.

THE fixing of prices and the taking of investment decisions are key determinants of the short-term and the long-term development of the economy. In the Eastern directive economy, the procedure for both is radically different from what is normal in the West, giving much scope both for complaints of unfair competition and for the misallocation

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of resources. As we have seen, the complaints of unfair competition are surprisingly few; but this probably reflects an even greater misallocation of resources than might be expected.

In the directive economy, the prices are fixed by the central planners. Since there are several million of them to be fixed in each economy, the planners do not get round to fixing each one of them at sufficiently frequent intervals, and the price system is usually out of date in relation to the state of technology. The fixing of prices and incomes being done by the authorities, moreover, changes in them are a political decision of public moment, and some changes that could be economically justified (e.g. higher food prices in Poland so that farmers will produce more and will increase their very low incomes) are harder to make than they would be in an economy whose prices are more impersonally determined in the market. For these reasons prices in Eastern directive economies tend to be irrational by Western standards.

It is not certain whether this problem is inherent in the directive system or whether it can be removed by new techniques which the planners could employ for fixing prices. The Hungarians, in devising their New Economic Mechanism under which a large proportion of prices have been freed from central control, clearly believed that the directive system could not do the job properly. Others hope that a reformed and simplified directive system will be efficient enough in this respect, particularly as modern methods of data-processing come to be employed. However, the price systems in the directive economies are still generally irrational by almost any standards, and it will certainly be a long time before computers can remedy this—if they ever can—so that problems of unfairness in East-West trade could be acute if the internal price level were not insulated from world prices by the state trading companies, which are in effect applying taxes and subsidies to the goods traded in order to make up the difference.

Even if the planners in a directive system could find ways to fix prices exactly according to their intentions, there would still be problems in the relationship between Eastern and Western prices. For a long time the planners put no price on capital or land, so that capital-intensive or land-intensive products were under-priced by the standards of a market economy. With the reforms in directive systems, interest charges have been imposed, though almost always below Western market rates, so that the discrepancy has been reduced though not eliminated. According to market criteria, therefore, free trade would cause a flow of capital-intensive goods from East to West which would represent a misallocation of resources. Economic theory would therefore justify a compensating tax on capital-intensive imports from the East, and by the same token a subsidy on labour-intensive imports. Eastern planners do in fact themselves compensate, at least in part, by favouring the workers in 'heavy industry' (which is broadly the more capital intensive), thus giving them high wages and allocating lower incomes to those in light industry, services and agriculture. And in any

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case, whatever the rational price of the Eastern product would be according to market standards, the planners do not of course apply it in trade with the West, but effectively tax or subsidize their goods so as to sell at the 'world' prices, i.e. at prices fixed on the basis of Western factor costs. (The taxes/subsidies on goods sold internally in the directive economies have a quite different purpose, which is to make the capital goods cheap and the consumer goods dear to the final buyer, in order to maintain the very high rates of investment with as little inflation as possible.)

The irrationality of the price systems, by the criteria of the market economies, is compounded by that of the investment decisions. Of course if prices are not a reliable guide to the relationship between supply and demand, they are not a good guide for investment decisions. But the investment strategy in the directive economies is determined not as a response to prices but by a political decision; and its central feature has been a concentration upon heavy industry—mainly metallurgy and capital equipment. During the course of successive economic reforms that have followed the death of Stalin, this concentration has become less extreme; but it is still pronounced in relation to what would seem to be the optimal strategy for a fast-growing market economy. This point, too, is confirmed by the Hungarians, who have further reduced the emphasis on heavy industry at the same time as introducing the guided market economy.

Thus even if the planners in the directive economies had been willing to sell their exports at 'rational' prices, they would still have been unable to supply the light manufactures in the amounts that importers in market economies would have demanded, because the goods were simply not being produced in sufficient quantity. In order to secure the most benefit for both sides from East-West trade, it would be necessary for the planners to invest more in the production of light manufactures. If the policy were extended so as to provide more consumer goods for the local populations as well, this would doubtless increase their welfare too, even after applying a suitable rate of discount as between present and future generations. (The workers in Poland have clearly been feeling this rather strongly.) But the minimum that is necessary, in order to optimize East-West trade, is enough investment to provide the quantities of these goods required for that trade. (This will not be sufficient, however, if a larger home market base is required in order to gain large-scale, specialization or external economies.)

Relatively slight changes in the policies of planners in the directive economies—the allocation of more investment funds to the production of light manufactures for export and their pricing at levels somewhat below those of the world market—would cause a substantial improvement in East-West trade. These changes would be easy enough for the planners to make. But the change of pricing policy would encounter resistance in the West, because the more the trade is increased, the more complaints of unfair competition and of dumping there would be.

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Because of the irrationality of the pricing systems in the directive economies, moreover, the Western authorities would have no better basis for imposing anti-dumping duties than the fact that prices of the goods were below the local prices and injuring a local producer; and we would be back where we were before, with exports from the East priced at world market prices and trade that should take place being frustrated. Clearly under these circumstances the Eastern planners would not use such a pricing policy, because it would merely imply a transfer of revenue from their exchequers to those of the West. The hope that such trade could take place must wait, therefore, on Eastern countries adopting a guided market system with a price reform at least as radical as that of Hungary, if not of Yugoslavia; or on the directive economies adopting methods of price formation that are sufficiently rational and transparent to enable Western governments to make rational decisions about anti-dumping duties. For this reason, discussions about the methods and logic of price formation in East and West could be very productive for East-West trade in the longer run. The Economic Commission for Europe would be an appropriate organization in which such discussions could take place.

THE pricing systems, investment policies and trading institutions of the directive economies are such as may be expected to cause, as we saw in the previous section, not only a misallocation of resources and hence a distortion (by almost any standards according to which these things are judged in the market economies) of the pattern of East-West trade, but also the frustration of a large volume of trade which would take place, to the benefit of both sides, but for these organizational obstacles.

The alignment of the exports from Eastern countries on world market prices, their concentration on the development of heavy industry at the expense of light manufactures, and the inhibiting complexity of their system of importing and exporting exclusively through state trading monopolies all give reason to suspect that East-West trade is far below the optimum level. This suspicion is confirmed by the figures, which show such trade to be well below the pre-war percentage of the European countries' total trade. There are, moreover, other weighty causes that contribute to this result.

The bilateral balancing of trade is well known to be prominent among them. A market economy usually has surpluses with some of its trading partners and deficits with others, with the sum of the surpluses balancing (apart from any persistent capital flows) the sum of the deficits, when one year is taken with another. Without the 'triangular' trade that is represented by these bilateral imbalances, the total trade would be greatly reduced—precisely, indeed, by the sum total of the bilateral imbalances. But the elimination of these useful imbalances is exactly what the planners in the directive economies set out to do. They have a general preconception that trade with each trading partner should be

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balanced; and the trade statistics confirm that they generally succeed in this aim. The trade in each direction between an Eastern country and a Western trading partner is usually at a remarkably similar level. This is not, as is sometimes believed, because payments are made in bilateral blocked accounts which must be cleared from time to time. The bulk of payments are now made in convertible currencies. Nor is it for any other reason that is inherent in the nature of the directive economy. This is shown by the fact that the Soviet Union runs a surplus of about £100 million a year with Britain, the earnings from which the Russian authorities use to buy commodities from overseas sterling area countries. Clearly the Russian planners find it convenient to organize their bilateral balancing with the sterling area as a whole instead of with its several member countries such as Britain or Malaysia—although there is nothing inherent in the sterling area as a monetary system which should lead them to treat it in this way, since sterling is a convertible currency. It would be equally logical, from this standpoint, for the Russians to regard all the countries of the West as belonging to a single IMF currency area, and to balance bilaterally, not with individual Western countries, but with the West as a whole—or more precisely to the point in the context of this article, with the European Community as a whole instead of with the individual member states, as should indeed be done if the common commercial policy towards the East is to be introduced in 1973.

This treatment of the sterling area as a unit shows, indeed, that bilateral balancing with each country is not inherent in the external trade system of a directive economy. If they come to regard a particular area as the unit with which a balance must be struck, they can quite well strike that balance, allowing surpluses and deficits with individual countries within the area to cancel each other out. Conceptually, there is no reason why this unit should not comprise the whole convertible currency area of the world. The practical difficulties for the planners are not such as might at first sight be expected, and they clearly led the Russian planners who developed the system to believe that a simple bilateral balance was required. For an examination of international trade statistics shows that the surplus or deficit between a pair of countries is often quite stable from year to year, so that the planners, once having discovered (as the Russians did with the sterling area) where their 'natural' bilateral imbalances lie, could build these imbalances into their trade plans. Annual fluctuations could be dealt with, as they are now, by means of credit balances; and changes believed to be secular could be built into successive trade plans.

Unfortunately, once the directive economies have introduced the system of bilateral balancing, we find resistances in the West against its removal, on the grounds that multilateral dealings would be unfair, given the special characteristics of the Eastern system. The parallel is striking with our earlier observation that an apparently simple change in Eastern pricing policies to reflect the Eastern countries' comparative

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advantage would not by itself be practicable because Western countries, confronted by more competition from an economic system which has a method of price formation that appears to be irrational, would cry dumping and enforce the restoration of the trade-frustrating practice of alignment on world market prices. The resistance to multilateral trade comes from the Western countries that would have deficits with Eastern countries. Clearly, if the Eastern countries are to have deficits with some market economies they must (assuming for the moment that an Eastern country cannot pay for a deficit with the whole group of market economies with the earnings from a surplus earned within the Eastern bloc) have surpluses with others. But a surplus for an Eastern country is a deficit for its market-economy trading partner; and once the authorities in the market economies have got into their heads the idea of a trade agreement that provides for bilaterally balanced trade, it seems hard to get them to accept the idea of negotiating for a bilateral deficit. This is understandable enough in the case of countries suffering from chronic global deficits which they find it hard to rectify. But some of the countries that resist a bilateral deficit with the East have strong balances of payments, and those that do not would in most cases do better to resolve their difficulties by global measures such as adjustment of the exchange rate, rather than by detailed distortions of the pattern of trade. The Western countries that might have to accept a deficit do, however, have a good argument on their side. This is that they are being asked to make their currency convertible for the Eastern country to spend where it wants, but that the Eastern country will not respond by making *its* currency convertible should the balance of trade change and the Western country earn a surplus. In so far as bilateral imbalances are likely to be long-standing, because they result from structural factors in the international economy, this argument loses force. It is also subject to a criticism similar to that which is levelled against protection by the proponents of unilateral free trade. But by the same token, and by analogy with the argument for reciprocal tariff reductions such as result from negotiations in the GATT, even if the market economies would be better off by allowing multilateral trade of the type represented by a triangle with one apex in the East and two in the West, they would be still better off if the Eastern countries would make a concession in exchange—for example by allowing multilateral trade represented by a triangle with one apex in the West and two in the East, and eventually allowing Eastern currencies to be converted into Western currencies. According to this argument, the use of convertibility of Western currencies to multilateralize East-West trade should be accompanied by the convertibility of Eastern currencies earned in such trade, or by some equivalent concession on the part of the East.

Such policies have been proposed by the Hungarians since the introduction of their guided market economy in 1968. But convertibility presents great difficulties for the directive economies as they stand at present—though it will be argued below that these difficulties are not

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inherent in the system. Indeed, limited convertibility arrangements have been made in trade agreements between certain Eastern countries and developing countries such as India and Brazil, which enable each of the latter to conduct triangular trade within Eastern Europe. But the obstacle which stands in the way of such agreements with Western countries is that the Western currencies are hard and the Eastern ones are soft: that is to say, given the existing relationships between prices and exchange rates in Eastern and Western economies, it is not likely that any Eastern country would exchange its earnings of a Western currency for another Eastern currency. If this is so, convertibility would not result in any transactions; and if this is expected to be so, convertibility would be embarrassing and will not be allowed.

The Eastern countries already have experience of a convertible ruble which can be used for settlements within the Comecon. But this has not been used as widely as might have been expected, and this is a poor augury for convertibility of one Eastern country's Western currency earnings into another Eastern currency, given the much greater price/exchange rate disparity between the two blocs than exists within them.

If the difficulty lies in disparate relationships between exchange rates and the levels of external trade prices in East and West, then it could be remedied by changing the exchange rates. For the directive economies, with the insulation of their internal prices from their external trade prices, this is purely a book-keeping operation; and it seems a pity that a book-keeping change should stand in the way of a major step towards multilateral trade. If there were signs that Eastern countries would be ready to make substantial moves to convertibility, as the Hungarians have suggested, and to translate this monetary reform into real terms by a corresponding move towards the multilateralization of their external trade plans (setting off surpluses with some trading partners against deficits with others so as to reach a global balance); then it would be well worthwhile for the Western countries to guarantee the Eastern ones against the risk of an unexpected global deficit, by offering a substantial amount of credit. Just as multilateralism was introduced in Western Europe after the war through the European Payments Union, set up with the help of an American loan, so Western Europe could help Eastern Europe towards multilateralism with the help of a loan for an East European Payments Union—or, indeed, for a European Payments Union extending to the whole of Europe.

PRIVATE investment in industry is of course anathema to Marxist-Leninist ideology, and it has long seemed pointless to consider the contribution which it might make to economic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But the Yugoslavs since their 1965 reforms have allowed foreign firms to have, under certain conditions, a minority holding in Yugoslav enterprises; and in the Comecon countries arrange-

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ments described as technical cooperation, some of which have several of the attributes of direct investment, have become increasingly common.

It is by now fairly well known that international investment is becoming a more important element in the world economy than international trade, and that much trade takes place as a result of such investment, and even as between a branch of an international firm in one country and another branch of the same firm in another country. All this activity reflects economic advantages to be gained from the transfer of finance, technology, and management or specialist skills. In the West, these transfers often take the form of investment, in which they are accompanied by elements of ownership and control. This is often the most advantageous form of transfer for the investing firm, and hence maximizes the volume of such transfers; but at the same time ownership may carry with it problems of sovereignty and independence for the country receiving the investment. The Eastern countries' ideology renders them exceptionally sensitive on this issue of ownership, so that the transfers of finance, technology, and skills have to take place without that framework of fully-fledged investment which is a central feature of so many such transfers within the West. Hence the many and complicated forms of 'technological cooperation' with Western firms that have recently sprouted in the East; but hence also, because such agreements will frequently appear less advantageous to the Western firms than simple direct investment, a reason for the lower level of such transfers from West to East than might be expected if one considers their tremendous expansion within the West.

The desire on both sides to benefit from such transfers is such as to evoke a great deal of ingenuity in devising forms of agreement which will give the transferring firm as much as possible of the control, security, and profit that it wants without transgressing the ban on private ownership of industrial capital. The Yugoslavs have, as we saw, found their solution in the limitation of ownership by foreign firms to less than one half share in a Yugoslav enterprise. The Hungarians, for their part, have devised an arrangement whereby an American hotel company has management rights and what amounts to a substantial equity in a hotel in Budapest for a period of 50 years. This almost leads one to ask whether this confrontation between the thesis of private ownership and the antithesis of public ownership is leading to a synthesis of private ownership (with public participation) for a fixed and limited period of time. And it certainly raises the question whether carefully worked-out forms of cooperative arrangements which are being pioneered by some firms working together with the appropriate organizations in the East might not, as and when they prove successful in practice, be used as the bases for a series of framework agreements which would be officially agreed by the authorities on both sides to be fair from both points of view, and recommended for use by enterprises.

Since the granting of credits and the development of technology are undertaken by the public as well as the private sector in Western

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countries, the transfer of finance and technology may be directly negotiated between Eastern and Western governments; and here again is a field of policy which may be quite as important in East-West relations as tariffs.

PRACTICAL businessmen often suggest that lack of skill in marketing is the main reason why Eastern exports to the West do not rise faster, and that this is therefore the chief constraint on East-West trade in both directions, since imports into the Eastern countries are limited solely by their earnings of foreign exchange. An economist's reaction to this may be that failure to sell will be due to a combination of factors such as quality, delivery dates, and price as well as marketing skills, and that if you think that exports are too low you should recommend a cut in the exchange rate. In this way you can arrive at a price which will attract the buyer, after the other factors have been taken into account.

But it is well known that, whereas economists may be clever, businessmen are sensible, and we should not be too surprised if there is something in what they say. What they have done, after all, when they make such a comment, is to compare the performance of Eastern producers and exporters with the standards to which they are accustomed, and to find that marketing is the area in which the East is relatively weakest; and this conclusion is consistent with what theory would lead one to expect. For the central feature of the directive economy is that the managers of enterprises respond to instructions from planners, not to signals from the market; and it is therefore natural that they should be less attuned to the consumer's needs, and hence less apt to produce and sell in a way that is most likely to lead the consumer to buy.

Those responsible for exporting from some Eastern countries have sought advice and training in marketing skills; and some of the more far-sighted among Western business people who are interested in exporting to the East, realizing that such exports will rise only if the East earns more by selling to the West, have been trying to encourage this development. Doubtless this will do some good, and the state trading companies responsible for exports will improve their techniques. But proper marketing depends on an approach that is orientated towards the needs of the consumer, in the methods not only of selling but also of production; and it is hard to see this approach percolating through the producing enterprises as well as the trading companies in economies where the focus is towards, not the point of view of the consumer, but the commands of the planner. Thus it may be that the directive economy is inherently deficient in marketing, and that the only means of radical improvement within the present Comecon system is a reform to the guided market economy.

When confronted with all these suggestions that East-West trade would be bigger and better if the directive economies made this or

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that reform in their systems, a natural Eastern reaction would be that the West should put its own house in order, and change those Western practices that stand in the way of trade. The target is usually Western restrictions on imports from the East.

With respect to tariffs, the complaint is usually about those cases where most-favoured-nation treatment is not accorded to Eastern countries. Under United States legislation, most-favoured-nation treatment is given only to Poland and Yugoslavia, though West European countries give such treatment more generally. As long as the Soviet Union refuses to recognize the European Community, however, the Community will clearly have good reason not to give the Russians most-favoured-nation treatment (the Kennedy round cuts are in fact being accorded to the USSR, though not bound, as they are towards other members of the GATT). Quotas are a more widely spread constraint and, although in the last five years many have been swept away, most Western countries still keep a hard core on agricultural products and ' sensitive ' manufactures such as textiles. Eastern countries have reason to fear that, with British entry into the EEC, their agricultural exports will come up against more restrictive barriers than before.

It was argued earlier that it would be logical for Western countries to remove their quotas from imports from the guided market economies, in so far as the latter introduce methods of price formation that are sufficiently rational by the standards of Western market economies. As regards imports from directive economies, it would seem legitimate to bargain quota removal against changes that would improve the Eastern systems from the point of view of East-West trade.

An implication of this is that only guided market economies should be eligible for treatment as full members of the GATT, with quota restrictions against them removed. For these countries, indeed, tariffs and tariff cuts can have some meaning. The Polish guaranteee, on the other hand, made on Poland's accession to the GATT, that its imports from member countries would rise by 7 per cent a year, does not seem to be a very appropriate concession. The rate of growth can be achieved only if Poland's exports rise at the same rate, so that the imports can be paid for; and who is to say that, given Poland's existing directive system, this is more suitable than a lower rate of growth? Doubtless it is useful for countries with directive economies to participate in the GATT organization, so that mutual trading problems can be discussed and agreements can be sought as to what constitutes good behaviour as between countries with such different economic systems. But although, for political reasons, this may be called full membership of the GATT, it should be seen as a special kind of membership; or, more fruitfully, the GATT may be developing into a house with a number of rooms, one of which would be the room containing industrialized market economies, with the fairly rigorous trading rules that are appropriate to them, while another would contain the directive economies.

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WHEN producing for the home market or for export to another directive economy, the enterprise in a directive economy is instructed by the planners how much to deliver in a given plan year and has the certainty that when the goods are delivered they will be taken up. When the planners conclude a trade agreement with a market economy, however, they have no guarantee that the goods agreed to be exported to the market economy will in fact be bought. It all depends on whether the importers, who are quite separate from the government signing the agreement, want to buy them or not. So planners sometimes complain that this unreliability of market economies is a great drawback to doing business with them.

In practice, the exports of Eastern countries to the West seem to be fairly stable from year to year; and this stability should be reinforced by two factors: any improvements in marketing which the directive economies may achieve (even against the grain of their systems); and the conclusion of medium-term contracts with big firms in the West, such as a recent agreement whereby components for motor manufacture are imported by Renault from Rumania. The latter factor is, indeed, an interesting example of the way in which big firms introduce planning concepts and methods into their own operations within the market economies; and it may not be so surprising that this is some help to trade with directive economies, which are based entirely on plans for deliveries over the medium term.

Once again, for the exporters of Hungary and Yugoslavia since their reforms, the nature of market economies does not constitute a special problem, because they face the need to find markets and make sales within their own economies too. The more that Eastern countries adopt such reforms, the more smoothly East-West trade will be conducted, from the point of view of East as well as West. But although the problems that the Eastern directive economies encounter in their relations with Western economies are doubtless annoying for them, those problems that arise as a result of actions by the West, with a few exceptions such as agricultural protection, do not seem to be severe. The reason is fairly simple. The Western countries have never really known how best to react to the trading methods with which the East has confronted them: state-trading monopolies, bilateral balancing and inconvertibility. The trade has been undertaken largely on the terms of the directive economies of the East, which have therefore naturally managed to avoid any great difficulties. In the following, and final, section we will consider how the largest trading group among the market economies—an enlarged European Community—might work out a policy for East-West economic relations that would satisfy its own political and economic interests as well as those of its trading partners in the East.

THIS article started by noting the disparity between the greatness of the political importance of the relations between Western Europe

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and the East and the slightness of the Community's policies towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The import quotas on steel and the agreements about the prices of sunflower seed oil, wines, and turkeys are, indeed, no more than responses to the Community's internal market problems, and are not intended to achieve any other objective in relations with the East; and, while the Commission is justly quite proud of its long 'liberalization lists' of products on which the member countries have all agreed not to impose quotas on imports from Eastern countries, the member countries were anyway in the process of rapid liberalization and the basic aim of having Community lists was not so much the wide one of achieving a substantial improvement in the conditions under which East-West trade takes place (which was certainly a main objective of the national programmes of liberalization), but the narrow one of attempting to ensure that no *détournements* of trade take place because of different quota arrangements in the different member states. In initiating the common liberalization lists, the Commission was doubtless using the Community's well-established vendetta against distortions of competition partly in order to achieve a wider political and economic aim by presenting it as a legal and technical device. But one suspects that a major motive was also the pursuit of uniformity as an end in itself; for if a wider policy towards the East is a more important aim, the right strategy would be to implement a significant first instalment of liberalization, in order to demonstrate goodwill and the capacity for action beneficial to the East, and then to make it clear that further liberalization lists would be forthcoming for Eastern countries which would negotiate about them. As will be argued below, there are extremely important subjects on which it would be desirable to negotiate with Eastern countries; and, although the Community has or could develop a number of economic instruments with which to negotiate, it seems a pity to throw away, by massive unilateral action on common lists of liberalization, one of the major ones that exists at present.

The chief economic instruments of which the Community disposes at present for bargaining with the East are the common external tariff (both most-favoured-nation and non-most-favoured-nation), import quotas, and import policy relating to agriculture. In addition the Community, despite the unhappy experience of Euratom, has, and will doubtless develop much further, a capacity to negotiate about technological cooperation. When a European company law has been established, the Community could, as has been hinted earlier, use this in order to match monopoly power in the East, and particularly the Soviet Union; and meanwhile big European companies could be encouraged to form consortia for the purpose. It is already conceivable that the European Investment Bank could make loans for projects of interest to the East, for example East-West transport links; and the Community could certainly create new capacity to offer credits in connexion with the transactions of Community firms with Eastern countries.

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At the level of institutions, the Community will have the power to conduct negotiations with the Eastern countries after 1 January 1973, and this should extend to the negotiation of the bilateral trade agreements which at present constitute the framework for most East-West trade. The Community should have a policy regarding the participation of Eastern countries in international organizations and the development within those organizations of a framework for East-West relations and, given the Community's importance in the organizations, such a policy would carry great weight.

Finally, it may be worthwhile to observe that the Protocol relating to German Internal Trade and Connected Problems would have to be renegotiated should the DDR ever be recognized by the Community's members as a state in international law. Since the DDR's exports enter the Federal Republic duty-free under this protocol, and since this trade is very substantial it is evident that there would be something to negotiate about that is of great interest to East Germany.

Having listed all these instruments, which could give the Community very considerable scope to pursue an effective policy towards the East, let us now see what the aims of such a policy might be.

IF unfair competition is narrowly (and often unfairly!) conceived as meaning the sale of goods at lower prices than those that prevail on the local market, then it is not much of a problem in East-West trade. Existing anti-dumping legislation is all that is required to deal with it; and the Community merely needs to add the right of appeal to a Community authority if one member country claims that its market is being disrupted because of inadequate anti-dumping action by another. This problem will become difficult only as and when Eastern countries reform their pricing systems radically (as the Hungarians appear to have done), so that people in the Community can accept that when an Eastern product is cheaper it has some genuine comparative advantage; and when the Eastern countries furthermore cease (as it is not yet clear whether the Hungarians will do) the general practice of aligning their exports on Western prices.

The main problem of unfairness is, as was argued above, not the type that is called 'dumping', but other methods of exploiting the market power of the really big state-trading companies, and hence particularly those in the Soviet Union. By negotiating bilateral agreements for the whole Community, by ensuring that major cooperation projects are undertaken by a consortium of firms from the member countries or where possible by a European company, and by disposing of a capacity to grant credits and offer technological cooperation at the Community level, the Community institutions can introduce the countervailing power without which the separate countries of Western Europe would, because of their smaller size, remain at a disadvantage in dealing with the Russians. This, like the EEC's participation in the Kennedy round, is an economic aspect of the political argument for enabling the

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European Community to countervail, at least to some degree, the superpowers.

The other side of this coin is that an enlarged Community would be much larger, in relation to the several East European countries, than the Soviet Union is in relation to the larger among the West European states. One might wish that the East Europeans would respond to this by establishing their own East European Community, but such a hope is politically unrealistic at present. The Community therefore should, for political as much as economic reasons, be very careful not to abuse its power in its relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. The focus of the common policy, as far as establishing equality of bargaining power is concerned, should be the Soviet Union. Apart from this, there is (except in so far as the Eastern countries introduce guided market economies and change their export pricing practices) little need for common action to prevent unfairness to groups or member countries in the Community. There is, as emerged from our earlier analysis, much greater scope in the objective of the expansion of trade.

There is no doubt that a significant growth of East-West trade would follow from the removal of quotas on the import into the Community of agricultural products and 'sensitive' manufactures. The increase of Eastern countries' exports would be followed immediately by the spending of their foreign exchange earnings on imports from the market economies. The definitive fixing of the Community's tariffs on imports from the East at most-favoured-nation levels could also provide some incentive for greater trade. The question remains, however, as to whether the Community should promote such trade expansion with the East unconditionally, or whether some conditions should be attached to what amount to important concessions. The answer depends, surely, on whether the Community has interests that could both fairly and realistically be expressed in the form of such conditions.

One such interest was discussed in the preceding section: the use of bargaining power to countervail the size and strength of the Soviet Union. For this to happen, the Soviet Union must recognize the Community to the extent of negotiating bilateral trade agreements with it. The Community should certainly be cautious about making concessions to the Soviet Union relating to most-favoured-nation tariff levels or to quota liberalization, before such recognition has taken place. Beyond this simple point regarding bargaining power, however, the conclusion of the earlier analysis of problems of East-West economic relations is that a market economy such as the Community does have legitimate interests to safeguard or promote, and that these concern more than anything else the methods by which Eastern countries organize their pricing, investment and trade.

First, it is clear that the market system in Yugoslavia and the guided market system in Hungary are removing or alleviating many of the difficulties that have arisen in trade between market economies and directive economies. It is entirely legitimate, for this reason which is

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rooted in economic fact and not political value-judgment, that the Community should offer these countries, and any others which introduce similar systems, access comparable to that enjoyed by trading partners from among the market economies, to the full extent that a given guided market economy organizes its production, pricing, and foreign trade in ways similar to those practised by market economies. Not to do so would truly constitute unjust discrimination against countries such as Yugoslavia or Hungary.

Secondly, there are changes that the directive economies can make in their systems of external trade which would make it easier for market economies to envisage a greater growth of trade, as well as enabling the directive economies to improve their own trade performance. These changes—which have already been introduced to some degree by some directive economies—would include a relaxation of the monopoly of state-trading companies, so as to allow direct transactions between Western firms and producers or buyers in the Eastern countries; a more rational and transparent method of price formation, at least as far as exports are concerned; a higher priority for those industries in which the Eastern countries enjoy a comparative advantage; and at least a degree of multilateralization of trade and payments. It is suggested that the degree to which the Community encourages and liberalizes trade with a given Eastern country should depend on the extent to which that country has introduced such changes, and is willing to discuss with the Community the remaining problems and their possible solutions. There would, then, be a spectrum of liberalization and of financial and technological cooperation on the part of the Community, depending not on purely political criteria such as attitudes of independence from Russia (that is another matter), but on the economic criterion of the ease with which the Eastern country's system allows trade to be conducted and expanded with the Community.

It must be recognized however that the strictly economic interest of the Community as a whole in such trade is rather limited, because the growth of trade will remain a small part of the growth of total trade, and its income effect (and hence welfare effect) will be a very small proportion of national incomes, in countries where the welfare benefits from further growth of incomes may be subject to rather sharply diminishing returns. The economic benefits would accrue, rather, to particular export industries in the Community, and generally to the East because of the greater importance of relations with the Community in their trade and in their total production, and because their incomes are still lower so that additions to those incomes are more desirable.

EVEN if the economic interest for the Community in greater East-West trade is not very great, however, the political interest is quite another matter. The political value of trade which takes place very much at arm's length between mutually inconsistent and perhaps hostile systems may be questionable; but there can be little doubt of the value

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of a process of harmonization or of reaching agreement regarding fair conditions for mutual transactions, or of the human relationships that are central to many of the types of cooperation agreements now being developed.

Hopes that good may come of such a trend are surely not too unrealistic. But it is as well, in a world still dominated by the presence of the nation-state, to have at the same time one's feet on the ground where foreign policy has stood for many centuries. On this ground, it is axiomatic that the preponderant weight of the Soviet Union is bad for Europe, and that a better balance between the Soviet Union and a united Western Europe should be secured if it can be. A European Community with a clear and effective external economic policy towards the East would be a very important step towards such a balance.

While a basic aim of the European Community should certainly be to safeguard itself, by common action, against damage due to the disproportionate size of the USSR in relation to any of the Community's member countries acting separately, the Community's weight should also be used, as far as is reasonable and practical, to alleviate the extent to which East European countries live in the shadow of the Soviet Union. The very existence of such a large trading partner should offer East European countries at least a certain counterweight to the abuse, from their point of view, of Russia's economic power. It should, indeed, better enable them to avoid being induced against their will into a process of supranational economic integration with the Soviet Union, which would be against both their interests and those of Western Europe (and, because of national backlash in Eastern Europe, in the long run against the interests of the Russians too). By the same token, an effective Community policy could help any such group of East European countries towards a similar process of integration among themselves, which would be as beneficial, politically, as supranational integration with Russia would be detrimental.

At the same time as safeguarding its interests according to the traditional criteria of foreign policy, moreover, the Community should be ready to seize any opportunities for increasing cooperation with the Soviet Union as well as the countries of Eastern Europe. The Community's policy-makers should in particular be alert to the possibilities for intensifying economic relations that would follow from any further trend in the Eastern countries towards economic reform.

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Documents: Soviet Union
Samizdat: Political Manifestoes

We are publishing below two documents which illustrate the evolution of non-official political thought in post-Stalin Russia. Both display a striking continuity with traditional pre-revolutionary 'progressive' and 'reactionary' attitudes. Even if they do not display a very impressive intellectual level, this in itself does not detract from their documentary value. The first document, an extract from a longer study by K. Volny, deals with 'The Intelligentsia and the Democratic Movement'. Its naive messianism is typical of the pre-revolutionary intellegentsia in its earlier period. Its sentiments though, contrast starkly with those expressed in the second document—an excerpt from a manifesto of a group of 'Russian patriots' which could have been written by Pobedonostsev himself. It is published here to give the Western reader an idea of the attitudes manifested by the rusity *(or 'russites'), a new current described in a previous issue of* Survey (No. 78) *by Michael Scammell and Jonathan Harris. This current has by now published its own samizdat journal* Veche, *which appeared in January 1971, edited by Vladimir N. Osipov.*

The Intelligentsia and the Democratic Movement

K. Volny

'. . . I love freedom more than my country: for slaves have no country. And if being Russian means being a slave (or an enslaver) then I do not wish to be Russian.'

D. S. Merezhkovsky, *Complete Works* (1911 ed., vol. 12, p. 257, from the anthology *Sick Russia,* article 'Little Red Riding Hood').

THE sixties were a turning point in the development of our intelligentsia. According to the divisions given by S. Radonezhsky in part two of his book *The World, Man, Time*, the end of the sixties marked the close of a 25-year-long 'juvenile' period in the development

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of our intelligentsia, typified generally by limited intelligence, spiritual immaturity, and an animal or artificially inculcated morality, accompanied by the first dim instincts of self-assertion. Simultaneously there began a new 25-year 'youthful' period in the intelligentsia's development during which the intelligentsia was characterized by a 'spiritual awakening, a search for new values, new human forms of morality, [and] a fierce struggle for self-assertion'.

After a self-absorbed, inward struggle, the spirit of the intelligentsia evidently began to demand an active application for its strength to the outward forms of social existence also. This is corroborated by external events. Despite intensified ideological pressure and propagandist methods the regime was manifestly and increasingly losing spiritual ground. Take for instance the fact that as early as 1946 the Higher Party School was founded and approximately 80 two-year Party schools created, and compulsory political education introduced. In 1949–50 alone more than 8 million persons were driven into the political education net. All this was merely a Russian variant of the study of quotations from Mao Tse-tung, which we have on occasion been, hypocritically, nothing loth to criticize. After a brief thaw Khrushchev was obliged to tighten the screws on the ideological press, while Brezhnev has openly proclaimed the doctrine of 'intensified ideological struggle' and has attempted to revive elements of Stalinism. But the inner processes in the intelligentsia have been growing continuously, and a series of external facts bears witness to this. We shall merely enumerate a few of them briefly in the hope that our readers will themselves amend or augment the text as they go, by the addition of facts and events not mentioned herein:

1965. Arrests of General Grigorenko, the writers Daniel and Sinyavsky, [Yulia] Vishnevskaya.

1966. Trials of Daniel and Sinyavsky, 9 Leningrad University students for publication of journal *Kolokol* [The Bell], monumentalist artists in Kiev, arrest of Chornovil, demonstration by Khaustov and Bukovsky.

1967. Trials of Khaustov and Bukovsky, 'Christian-Democratic union' [All-Russian Social Christian Union for the Liberation of the People, transl.] in Leningrad, arrests of Ginzburg, Galanskov and Lashkova for publication of journal *Phoenix-66*, appeal by P. Yakir, [Yuli] Kim and [Ilya] Gabai to the Soviet intelligentsia.

1968. Trial of the publishers of *Phoenix-66*; Ilin fires at government procession by Nikitinsky Gate of Kremlin; demonstration on Red Square by Litvinov, Bogoraz-Daniel, Dremlyuga, Delone, Babitsky, Feinberg, and Gorbanevskaya against invasion of Czechoslovakia, their arrest, appeal to the CPSU by Yakhimovich and his arrest, arrests of members of Moscow intelligentsia Gabai, Grigorenko, Krasnov-Levitin, Leningrad intellectuals Gendler, Kvachevsky, Danilov and Shashenkov, appearance of Academician Sakharov's brochure, appeal by Estonian intelligentsia to Sakharov.

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1969. Trials in Gorkii, Kuibyshev, Krasnodar, Sebastopol, Kharkov, trial of 'Union of Fighters for Political Freedom' founded by a group of officers in the Baltic Fleet led by Gavrilov, arrests of Krasin and Gorbanevskaya in Moscow, [Valeria] Novodvorskaya, 18-year-old girl who distributed leaflets in the Palace of Congresses, appearance of Amalrik's brochure, expulsion of Solzhenitsyn from Union of Soviet Writers, publication in October of 'Programme of the Democratic Movement', 'Manifesto of the Russian Socialist Party' in Leningrad, letter by Sakharov, Turchin and Medvedev to Central Committee with 14 demands for democratization.

1970. Trials in Leningrad, Kiev, Novosibirsk, Ryazan, Obninsk, publication of tactical documents of the democratic movement, Western television reporters' interview with leading figures of democratic movement P. Yakir, Amalrik and Bukovsky (a civilian feat!), arrests of Pimenov, Amalrik and many, many others . . .

Those are merely a few of the facts concerning the names and activities in the martyrology of the young intelligentsia. And may those heroes and martyrs who have gone unmentioned here through the author's ignorance forgive him. . . .

The democratic movement is the young intelligentsia's offspring which the KGB are striving with all their might to smother in the cradle.

IN 1969 alone more than 160 participants in the movement were arrested. At the present time there are two trends in the democratic movement: (a) liberal ('14 Points'), which demands democratization under the leadership of the CPSU and (b) radical ('Programme of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union' 1969) which is trying to gain the support of all organized and unorganized political forces in society in order to build a free democratic society within the framework of a law-based state.

The Democrats have proclaimed FREEDOM as their sacred and unshakeable principle—as the basis of the political, economic, cultural and national life of society.

But great difficulties lie in the way of this lofty historical mission in our country: from above, pressure and persecution by a totalitarian regime unparalleled in history, from below, a non-freedom-loving people with no understanding of law and inclined to violence, and all around, a large but culturally backward, politically immature and morally apathetic class of intellectuals. . . .

The feeling for freedom has died, faith in social movements has been lost, the notion of popular representation compromized, the traditions of self-government, both urban and in the Zemstvos, which flourished in Tsarist Russia, extirpated; the numbers of the genuine political intelligentsia are small as yet, and political parties, without which democracy cannot function, are absent. . . .

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Freedom is in the throes of birth, surrounded by universal ill will. Whatever one says, these are no small difficulties!

That is why in our cowardly and passive society where no real social life exists voices are heard [criticizing] the alleged aimlessness of the movement and [predicting] its inevitable defeat. These people do not understand that all regimes are temporary, all peoples educable (if they apply themselves in earnest!), and the historical fortunes of society are in the hands of the intelligentsia alone.

In answer to these moaners and sceptics we cite the words of a public leader [of the democratic movement] whom we deeply respect, who wrote that the democratic movement had 'set in motion an *irreversible* process of self-liberation' in our country (from a letter by P. I. Yakir to A. Amalrik, 28 March 1970). These people must understand that it is precisely these difficulties we have enumerated, and which constitute the grave sickness of our society, which bind the democrats to their sacred struggle. Only a democratic society and the struggle to attain it are a true school for the moral education of our people and [the cultivation of] an intelligent personality.

The Democrats, as honest, thinking people, openly state that the unskilful introduction of democracy might at worst, in the conditions that exist in our country, lead to the following phenomena:

(1) Anarchic violence of the masses resulting from the people's unpreparedness for freedom after the removal of their fetters; (2) paralysis of power resulting from unfounded criticism, boycott and sabotage by the masses; (3) dominance of the will of the unqualified majority feeding on narrow and unjust egoism; (4) fall in social discipline, and disobedience to the law; for freedom to relax pressure will possibly be interpreted as weakness; (5) the possibility of political adventurism by extremists, maximalists and cunning demagogues; (6) the danger of violence and civil war resulting from the inflamed egoism, envy and hatred of various social strata; (7) decline of the physical might of the state as a result of a wave of social criticism, protests, exposures, boycotts, strikes, and so on; (8) revival of bourgeois attitudes and instincts with their cupidity and greed; (9) revival of capitalism and the private-ownership psychology with its callous assertiveness; (10) decrease in the power of the state due to the secession of [certain] nations.

But these phenomena are compensated for by the following merits of democracy:

(1) Removal of the demoralizing influence of dictatorship and inculcation of habits of socio-political life and discipline; (2) responsibility of those in power to society, impossibility of their committing crimes, reduction of their mistakes to a minimum; (3) criticism and political activity by the qualified minority; (4) transformation of arbitrariness into stable law and order; formation of an honest managerial class, cultivation of the legally minded personality; (5) opportunity for society to reach political maturation; (6) opportunity for slow organic preparation for more perfect forms of society; (7) upsurge of the

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country's spiritual and moral might, emergence of its worldwide moral authority; (8) satiation of material needs leading to increase in higher spiritual needs; (9) improvement in well-being, contact with rest of world, emergence from political and economic isolation; (10) switch from hostile, great-power attitudes to solidarity with mankind in general, universal consolidation around UNO or another world centre.

It is in the strengthening and fostering of these ten positive tendencies that the *art of democracy* lies.

Russian autocracy (1,000 years), a foreign yoke (250 years), serfdom (265 years) and the tottering but inviolable village commune ('mir') gave birth to slavery and lawlessness, encouraged brutality and crushed individual initiative in our people (this we daily observe!). Freedom, which is inseparable from the concept of human dignity, is not ingrained in our people, they do not understand its meaning or know how to make use of it and apply it in their own lives. Freedom is seen as a weakness and interpreted as a signal for savage uproar and tyrannical acts of violence, blasphemy and outrage. Any free political struggle is [regarded as] an attempt to start a hooligan brawl, an intestine war. . . .

DEMOCRACY will not come simply as the introduction of laws and institutions. Those are merely its [outward] forms. Its content can only be civic maturity and freedom. And the latter is impossible unless the age-old Russian servitude and caddishness are eradicated from the soul of our people during the actual fight against dictatorship and for democracy.

For us democrats any dictatorship, any totalitarianism is merely militarism in disguise, a means towards the achievement of physical power accompanied by the inevitable cultural and moral decline of society. The experience of the twentieth century with its two world wars has shown graphically that it is only dictatorial states which provoke and unleash war; democracy for its part merely defends itself against them (France, England, USA).

What resources has the movement at its disposal?

The democratic movement relies in its struggle on a freedom-loving intelligentsia and the finest sections of the working class and the peasantry. Hence the movement embraces all classes. The democrats are not in the least disturbed by the fact that the basic mass of people in the intellectual sphere has philistine preoccupations or that the peasantry is concerned with primary accumulation, and the workers are becoming middle-class and are satisfied with their social progress from the poor kolkhoz village to the relatively well-appointed town. Even the Populists and Slavophiles, idealizing Russia, predicted for her a leap 'via the philistine-petty bourgeois' directly into the realm of the spirit. But the bourgeois way of life with its mass bourgeois culture and its bourgeois mode of existence and thought has since 1918 been, and is now, the prevailing stage of historical development. It is

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inevitable with the increase in small ownership. A triumphant petty-bourgeoisie, although barbarous, is nevertheless a form of civilized development. Surfeit of material wealth will lead the bourgeoisie to a crisis and cause it to turn to the spirit. And then the bourgeoisie will become additional social ground for a future spiritual renaissance in Russia. In their organizational policy the democrats are now on principle not courting the masses, who would at present only dilute the guard of freedom. Democracy begins with its first fighter and supporter. A single fighting democrat will do more than thousands of unstable and morally weak people. A single freedom-fighter is worth more than a million philistines. A close and indispensable ally of the democrats is the powerful religious movement in the USSR (15–20 per cent of the total population), for democracy is the best condition for a free religious life and is the first stage in the Christian life of society. Hence the universal significance of the movement.

Nationalist movements among the peoples of the USSR are natural and valuable allies of the democrats, for democracy is the best condition for genuine self-determination and the basis of the free organization of one's own national way of life. Hence the internationalism of the movement.

The democrats are aided also by a sympathetic public opinion on the part of the finest people in our society and all over the world, and inspired by the moral support of the finest sectors of mankind.

Also a positive factor in the cause of democracy are the purely external republican forms of Soviet society which have become established, the spirit of sober-minded economy and aspiration to equality which has intensified since the revolution. Finally, the basic force and fighting strength of democracy are the participants in the movement themselves. They number—and this is far from being a complete estimate, but is based merely on the data available to us— approximately 270 thousand in all. Their leading *aktif* numbers 20 thousand, and there are 180 thousand regular rank-and-file participants and 70 thousand who participate periodically. And we have not included here the millions of people who belong to religious and nationalist movements and are just sympathizers.

THE political liberation of our society cannot be achieved overnight. Democracy is lasting if it matures through internal, organic processes and not external, mechanical ones. Freedom has to be desired and achieved through suffering. . . . And here it is not the historic moment that is decisive, but years of historic labour.

The fire of freedom must not blaze up in an all-consuming conflagration or smoulder to extinction beneath its ashes, but grow steadily within our hearts and bring warmth and light to society.

But the punitive machinery is destined to cut through our ranks many more times yet, reaping its terrible harvest through our sufferings, our blood, perhaps even our lives. Not for the first time does our

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freedom-fighting intelligentsia ascend to Golgotha to shouts of 'Crucify him!' But we shall rise again and again, and if there remain only 250 men of our 250-million-strong society we shall carry on our lofty cause!

The democratic movement is not an attribute of our country only. It is the greatest historical movement of mankind, a movement which has grown out of man's ethical need for dignity, freedom, right and equality. Democracy is also the cultural ideal of modern man and the embodiment of his sense of justice.

Therefore we say: the Russia of the future can only be a great democracy!

MANKIND is at the present time on the threshold of a great finale. It is moving toward the fatal, sacrificial brink. Already we see the glow of impending catastrophe, the glow of suicidal war and fatal chaos, universal famine and epidemics. . . . Death is already prepared to reap his most plentiful harvest . . . And the people, like passengers on an express train rushing along at tremendous speed, pass the time in carefree drinking and merrymaking, sinning and indulging themselves without a thought, unaware that the bridge ahead has been destroyed!

There is still time to stop the train and repair the bridge, or even to hurl ourselves out of it and escape with cuts and bruises. Many people are in the grip of a dim, disquieting presentiment. . . .

Is that not the reason why we now see the feeble dawn light of a Renaissance to come? As in the fourteenth century, when they were hounded and persecuted by a violent ideocracy for their free thinking, and beset by the difficulties of printing books and freely disseminating knowledge, [so now] the intelligentsia is turning to humanitarian values and models of culture and society drawn from antiquity. The sole difference is that the Renaissance in the fourteenth century went from the spirit to man, whereas the Renaissance in our time is from man to the spirit, to a universal world principle.

And now, in the pre-catastrophic period, the principle of Regeneration and the principle of Mortality are locked together in combat. Evil is becoming more and more evil, and good better. The chief arena of this struggle is the territory of Eastern Europe.

We declare that the dénouement of this worldwide historical struggle will be upon us before the end of this century, before the year 2000!

We declare too that the majority of our generation is destined to see it!

But are many of them destined to survive it?

That is why the moral, cultural and political renewal of the peoples of Eastern Europe is a task of worldwide importance. It can only be carried out by an intelligentsia leading all people of goodwill in the intellectual sphere. There is no one else who could carry it out. The chief historical mission of the intelligentsia is the moral education and re-education of the people. But for this the intelligentsia must itself

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be born anew, experience its own cultural Renaissance and rise again for its lofty service to mankind. And [this] social force, which now constitutes already over a quarter of the working population, and, including members of families, over a third of the urban and over a fifth of the total population, will either carry out its task or perish together with its people.

The intelligentsia of Eastern Europe must first of all cleanse itself of that terrible inner foulness which distinguishes it so unfavourably from the Western intelligentsia. The consciousness of the East [European] intelligentsia is stricken with three types of lethal infection (according to S. Radonezhsky's *The World, Man, Time*): (1) creation of external idols, primitive superstitions and prejudices, disparagement of the principle of reason and criticism, intolerance, inertia and fanaticism; (2) inner slavishness, humbleness, helplessness, time-serving, submission to brute force, aversion to freedom; (3) great-power chauvinism, apotheosis of the people, rapacious desire for worldwide physical power, avidity for foreign lands, violation of other peoples' rights, forcible annexation of [other peoples]. We must put an end to this! It is still not too late!

We must discover our inner strength and overcome also the ordinary human obstacles within us: (1) lack of understanding of the meaning of our own lives and common human values, and their aims and purposes; (2) fear in the face of suffering and sacrifice; (3) preoccupation with the meaningless tumult and hurly-burly of everyday life; (4) alienation from people of kindred spirit; (5) inactivity, submissiveness, non-resistance to evil.

The intelligentsia must educate itself according to three principles: (1) Ecumenical spirit; (2) Supreme freedom; (3) Universal brotherhood.

It must become: (1) understanding; (2) fearless; (3) free from idle preoccupations; (4) united and loyal; (5) active and ready for sacrifice. Without these qualities it is unprepared for bearing its weighty but noble burden—for its mission of glorious Renaissance.

The Renaissance of the East must relate to the three basic principles of our earthly life: moral, cultural and political.

THE age of revolution, overt and covert civil war, the slavery of dictatorship and the gospel of communism have engendered a profound amorality in our society. Decline has set in, both civic and political: at the one extreme, predatoriness, savagery and violence, and at the other, cowardice, down-troddenness and treachery. The social consequences of this are terrible: obliteration of personality, degradation of higher feelings, narrowing of the mind, decrease in energy, trivialization of life, loss of common human interests, their reduction to personal well-being. . . .

And now what is more important for us is not a change of ideas but the regeneration of the spirit. We must restore to their age-old sovereign rights conscience, reason, common human experience and

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historical intuition. We must put an end to self-worship and complacency, which are always indications of immaturity. We must set about moulding our personalities creatively by way of moral self-perfection. But in order to do this we require on the one hand discipline, patience and powers of endurance, and on the other [a spirit of] unrest, daring and courage. Lordly indolence, physical effeteness and debility have essentially been the cause of the social alienation of the intelligentsia from the people. The young intelligentsia must be tempered in physical labour and sport, able to uphold its dignity, and capable of making protracted efforts and suffering privations. The intelligentsia must also live through and endure the absence of rights and freedoms, and inwardly cultivate a disciplined, law-minded personality, for only such [a personality] can serve as the foundation for a free, legally-minded society of the future. The new moral world order must find its expression in the high [degree of] law and order of democratic society. The lofty inner preparation of the intelligentsia must correspond to its lofty task—service to the common good of mankind.

THE relationship of the intelligentsia with the people through the centuries has always been a burning question for us. For over one-and-a-half centuries our long-suffering intelligentsia has been ground between the terrible millstones of the Romanov-communist autocracy and the people. It has been cramped on the one hand by unconcealed hatred and on the other by absolute incomprehension. Hecatombs of the intelligentsia were sacrificed to the tsarist legend fostered for so many centuries. And the anti-tsarist legend demanded even greater sacrifices. The people was always accustomed to regard gendarmes and chekists, and not the intelligentsia, as 'its own' people. The people had disintegrated and atomized into thousands of village communes out of which an alien force, imperious and cruel, could build any kind of state in its own style and to its own taste. The people showed a striking inability to uphold its own will and rights. It did not lift a finger in defence of the Constituent Assembly elected by itself when the Assembly was dispersed by a group of armed Bolshevik sailors in 1918. Living under a regime of terror, it was unconscious of the fact, and allowed an energetic minority to mould it like clay and twist it round their little fingers. Such passivity was always a temptation for people endowed with the will to power but devoid of any sense of morality or legality and it served to encourage crimes against mankind unexampled in history.

In the last half-century the people, having lost its religion, has entered into a period of vulgar rationalism, and begun to have blind faith in books, in the printed word, and to aspire to instruction (which it calls 'education'). The positive result of all this is a boundless increase in the influence of the intelligentsia. The negative result is the fact that the intellectual growth of the popular consciousness is in excess of the standard of public moral education, due to the blocking

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of channels of true information. With the loss of the religious concept the people lost its moral principles. The freedom of the February revolution was taken by the people as an opportunity for hooliganism, arbitrariness and violence. The October revolution proved to be the final awakening of the dark instincts of the Asiatic nomad-conqueror which slumbered within the people, and let loose the evil element in its soul. But the celebration of 'savage liberty' was short-lasting. When the people felt the whip of Bolshevism's iron dictatorship it fell grovelling to its knees. . . .

When we look back along the path we have taken, we see no grounds for worship or idolization of the people. Our former respect for the people, whom we saw as marvellously suffering, has dwindled. In the eyes of the intelligentsia the people has been transformed from martyr to predatory tyrant. Only the people itself is to blame for the terrible sacrifices it has borne during the last half-century. In betraying and destroying the intelligentsia, its sole defender, it has itself bled profusely. The blood of the intelligentsia has gushed down upon its own head. Future sacrifices might be even greater, and it is the people alone who will be chiefly responsible for them, regardless of who it is who leads it along the criminal path. It is not the path of might and complacency that our people is destined to take, but the path of repentance and redemption, the path of moral purification. The guilt of the people before the intelligentsia, who have repeated the fate of the crucified Jesus, is boundless. But the new intelligentsia must forgive the people its past crimes in the name of a future brotherly alliance. But it must not forgive and encourage crimes of the present day. And no senseless or criminal will of the people can be respected or supported by the intelligentsia. Complicity in crime is itself a crime. At the present time the relationship of the intelligentsia with the people can only be the relationship of tutor with pupil, the relationship between light and darkness. The education of the people must be conducted on a high moral level and require the people [to accept] personal responsibility for its deeds. The cultural education of the people must be conducted on the basis of the finest achievements of national and world culture, and its political education with reference to the heroic republican ideals of ancient Greece and Rome, Western democracy, and the self-government of the people of Novgorod. . . .

We renounce self-adoration. We renounce also the idolization of a half-savage and egoistical people. We serve not the various imperfections of the herd, but the lofty ideals of Good, Truth and Beauty. Our ideals will never disappoint or abandon us unless we ourselves trade them. . . .

Bearing torches aloft, we must fight our way out of the besieged fortress to the people and bring it light.

The people is historical flesh awaiting spiritualization. Only the intelligentsia can be its spirit. In the life-giving spirit of the intelligentsia lies the key to the destinies of Eastern Europe and the whole world.

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Therefore the intelligentsia of the future must be made up of people who are not only highly cultured and politically mature, but also morally universal!

RUSSIA, its peoples, its power and its conduct in the world, are of immense, almost fatal, significance for the life of mankind.

Russia, as an intermediate world between Asia and Europe, has borrowed many positive values from both. But she has absorbed to an even greater extent their evil elements. The bad influence is far in excess of the good.

Our people at the moment is like a powerful physical body without a head, full of dark instincts and indifferent to moral and spiritual values. Armed with monstrous weapons of destruction but lacking in moral grandeur and cultural superiority, the people is a threatening animal force. It is capable if not of annihilating mankind, then [at least] of gravely wounding it in the name of chimeras conjured up in the depths of its subconscious. They threaten, if provoked to rage, to grind into the dust many peoples of the world who are superior to themselves. It has already once annihilated the people who might have been its conscience and who were utterly devoted to it. And the new intelligentsia, still only a slender shoot, may meet the same fate, for the people is already suspiciously hostile towards it and will not yet accept its leadership. Rejecting its [outstreched] hand of salvation, the people has forgotten the lessons of the past and cannot see its disastrous future, living as it does in the present by its ignorant inclinations. Our people is leading a suicidal life, is gravely ill. It is unloved by Europe and hated by Asia. Peoples with whom it is forcibly linked are hostile to it. It is being forsaken by the honest intelligentsia. It stands in moral isolation like a dangerous lunatic armed with a sharp axe and used by dogmatists to suit their own ends.

That is why our intelligentsia is the true, the only ray of light in a realm of darkness. That is why our intelligentsia has been entrusted with a global mission—to be the illuminating and ennobling principle, the intellect and conscience of our people.

No other source of light and warmth exists, and there is nowhere they could spring from. For light is intellect and warmth is conscience! If the intellect of the intelligentsia is poor and superficial, limited and short-sighted, the people will take a path which is wrong and unworthy and which it knows to be ruinous. If its intellect is lucid and profound, a way will be laid open to the people which is lofty, noble and elevating. Even more important is the conscience of the intelligentsia. If its conscience is guilty and grasping, the hands of our people will inevitably be stained with the blood of [other] peoples and its historical path will be marked out by the bloody stakes of the most loathsome crimes against humanity. Only an intelligentsia with a conscience that is clear and concerned with the whole of mankind will be able to open

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for our people the way of love and brotherhood between all people of all classes and nations, the way of truth and justice in human relationships.

The borderline between the second and third millennia is a period of responsibility, redemption and drama in the history of mankind. It is here that all the vicious and unhealthy tendencies in our development have become aggravated and [now] woven into a single nest of vipers. This period may be the concluding act of the tragedy of mankind's redemption, its last hour. Perdition or Rebirth! That is the choice. There is no third choice.

That is why we summon our intelligentsia yet again to its difficult and dangerous, noble and selfless discipline of our people, and of itself.

The democratic intelligentsia will, in the bowels of a sombre totalitarian regime, form *its own* society, make *its own* fatherland, create *its own* culture, nurture *its own* leaders and zealots, thinkers and artists. . . . And amidst general outcry it states, for example, that A[lexander] Solzhenitsyn is *our* martyr and writer, and belongs to *our* culture!

The intelligentsia must raise its intellect until it reaches cosmic, not merely national, limits, and its conscience, until it comes to have a universal, not merely a personal, significance. It must achieve its sacred aim, which is to make its lucid intellect and its clear conscience the vital, inalienable property of the entire people. But in order that this should come to pass, our people must take the path of repentance for their unworthy deeds and atonement for their grievous crimes, so that they might rise again morally to live a new, exalted life in a radiant and ennobled world.

A Word to the Nation

THE basic accusation, [and the one] most frequently levelled at the present system in our country is its undemocratic nature. On that score no small amount of tears has been shed, but the trouble is, that the people remain obstinately indifferent to the panacea they are offered. We hear complaints that 'the opinions of the finest minds are being disregarded'. But here again: who are they, these finest minds? Where are they from—the same Sanhedrin as the wise men with whom we are already familiar, or a different one? Who declared these minds the finest? What are the criteria for saying that they really are the finest? All these questions remain unanswered. We attempt to form some notion of the ideas of these mercilessly suppressed 'finest minds' by way of the fragments that reach us through their admirers. And what do we find?

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The greater part of their activities consists of histrionic raging and storming at the bureaucratic elite. Simultaneously they give a most profound analysis of its essence. It appears that this elite 'does not represent either the people or any social class; it represents only itself'. But permit me to remind you that such thoughts have already been voiced earlier by one mind—true, far from being one of the finest—that of P. N. Tkachev. It was he who made the discovery, worthy of Copernicus, that the Russian state '*is* suspended in the air' and supported only by itself. This discovery was at the time justly ridiculed by Engels, but perhaps the situation has changed now and untruth has become truth? Alas, this has not come to pass. There are still arrogantly yawning gaps in our wise men's analysis. There is still talk of the working class as a whole, and utter disregard for the fact that it has long since ceased to be a single entity, and that the stratum of the working-class aristocracy has long since become detached from it—a stratum, true, of no great proportions, no more than 5 per cent, but one deliberately claimed by some people to represent the entire working class and mistakenly regarded by others as such.

Considerable distress is voiced too at the dogmatism and narrow-mindedness of representatives of the ruling class, which prevents them from observing new phenomena in good time, evaluating them correctly and reacting sensibly to them. But is it only a matter of this? Do our rulers really not understand something merely because no wise man has found time to explain it to them properly? In that case yet another luminary will join with Tkachev—Ch[arles] Fourier, who was amazed when the ruling [elite] did not wish to listen to him. It seems that people have still not come to understand that it is not a matter merely of ability to comprehend but also of the interests that make one act in the teeth of another person's comprehension. And 'comprehension' is by no means always more correct than action.

Those who imagine themselves to have understanding would like to turn that precious quality of theirs into a bridle for restraining statesmen; it is they who cry 'Hands off' in the case of any interference, often indispensable, in the affairs of other countries, like the wife who, hearing a cry for help outside her house, clings to her husband and will not allow him to go out. She understands that her husband is taking a risk, and she understands that perhaps someone will be killed if he does not go to his help, but that 'someone' means nothing to her and so her second insight is rendered ineffectual. What is such an insight worth? What is the difference between the high-principled liberal and the mediocre philistine? The courage of the deserter?

To counterbalance the doctrine of class struggle [these people] proclaim the renunciation of the principle of class egoism, and a sort of harmonious unity—the means of its attainment are not specified—between all the sides that are now in conflict: society and the ruling elite (evidently when the latter will begin to harken to the oracle and to the opinions of the 'finest minds'), urban and rural population (after the

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disappearance of all the relapses of the primary socialist accumulation accomplished by Stalin in accordance with Trotsky's prescription which brought the peasantry as a class to the verge of extinction and led to a chronic crisis in agriculture), workers and intelligentsia (when the former will rally closely round the intelligentsia, since the 'finest minds' have posited that to rally round someone is of necessity their wont, and will follow its spiritual leadership, explaining to their starving families the superiority of democratic ideals over economic wellbeing). Delightful fantasies, are they not?

IN reality we have: 1. *A strong centralized state.* Only such a state satisfies popular demands and traditions; such it has been, is, will and must be (we have in mind, of course, not its concrete form but its essence). But what does strong mean? Can a state which fires cannon-balls at sparrows and trembles at every little sound be called strong? No. Such signs were never indicative of strength. A really strong power knows exactly when, how and against whom to use force. And that is the heart of the matter. Democracy and dictatorship are both empty words; both the former and the latter may be either good or bad—everything depends on the concrete circumstances. Nothing should be given the status of an absolute, and freedom should not be carried as far as the right to indulge in mutual slaughter, or the fight against drugs as far as the prohibiting of soda-water.

2. *A privileged stratum.* A stratum of this kind has again always existed, does exist and will exist in a state, and the only question is, what this concept involves. Firstly, the presence of such a stratum must be announced loud and clear, and indication must be given of who enjoys what privileges and why. Egalitarian theories are devoid of any qualitative criteria and, having as their aim the annihilation of the aristocracy, merely replace it by an ochlocracy. Secondly, the very nature of the privileges enables us to judge the quality of the stratum: a true aristocracy will never regard privileges, especially material ones, which evoke most annoyance among the people, as an end in themselves.

Today the concept of the privileged stratum is merging with that of the ruling class. This is the role already played by the bourgeoisie and the workers' aristocracy, and [now] the intelligentsia are starting to lay a claim to it. But representation in the privileged stratum cannot be the monopoly of one class. And with the present-day atomization of society and specialization of industry and science it is difficult to foresee the emergence of any class as a single force; internal fragmentation makes this ever less likely. The class basis for the unification of social forces has been exhausted, as have the creative possibilities of the ideology stemming from that principle.

3. *Centralized economic planning.* A multitude of reproaches are hurled at this system, but we still do not know what decentralization will bring and whether it will be better or worse. Experiments with industrial self-management can and should be conducted, but a sharp

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transition might, in the given circumstances, fail to achieve the desired results.

An increase in the rights of [industrial] enterprises is already on the agenda. But on closer examination these rights appear for some reason to be not so much the rights of the enterprises (that is, of workers' collectives) as the rights of the managers alone. However, even in dictatorship conditions it is possible to have a very high degree of workers' self-management; proof of this is the system of workers' councils in Yugoslavia or other forms of participation by workers in the management of industry. The catastrophically low productivity of labour will grow only in instances when the workers are given the opportunity to participate directly in the management of enterprises and the distribution of profits, when the workers feel themselves to be and really are the masters. The excessive pretensions of a state in the field of economics are rooted in a theory which attributes to economics a decisive importance. The state clutches at economics, seeing there the source of its power. However, political forms do not depend on economic structure but are determined by entirely different factors, first and foremost by national traditions which have arisen as a result of certain habitual kinds of long-term interaction with neighbouring peoples. A state with a powerful 'popular opinion' has no need to create a complex system of driving belts to ensure uniform motion of arms in any work processes.

Another question on the agenda is the transformation of a class dictatorship into a state belonging to the entire people. Not only the 'exploiting classes', it seems, are the victims of doctrine; a wide breach has appeared between the working class and the peasantry. Trotsky's view, inimical to the peasantry, that the village is an 'internal colony' which was to provide the means for the industrialization of the country, in practice, despite Stalin's official denunciation of it, underlay the latter's policy in this field; hence the so-called extremes of collectivization, hence the 'discrepancies', hence the symbolic prices for agricultural products, which led to the total destruction of the village. The phantom of hunger forces one to make concessions, but such forced concessions have been made on more than one occasion now. The situation only had to improve ever so slightly for them to begin the old tricks again. The urban philistine in his unspeakable obtuseness nostalgically recalls the happy times of periodic price cuts, failing to understand, like the pig rooting under the oak-tree, that precisely because of those happy times he may tomorrow be feeding on gear-wheels instead of bread.

There was a time when the commune was thought of as one of the unshakeable bases of the Russian way of life. Encroachment upon it was regarded by many as the undermining of fundamental principles. Only after [great] upheavals were other modes of thought arrived at, but the reforms of P. A. Stolypin were hopelessly overdue.

Collective forms of property in agriculture are still stubbornly adhered to at the present time on the grounds that they are an inalienable

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element of socialism. However, the essence of socialism is not to herd people into a pile under any circumstances, but to attach prime importance to the general popular interest and not the interests of a narrow stratum. A flourishing agriculture is a general popular necessity, and if in order to achieve it we are required to allow strong individual economies to exist, then we must do so, unimpeded by any dogmas. Why buy bread from Canada—we should rather cultivate a Canada of our own.

4. *Apparatus of repression.* The man-in-the-street in a democracy cannot conceive of a society without a police-force. However, no police-force anywhere has been fortunate enough to deal successfully with the problem of crime. Such a task is simply beyond its powers. The problem can be solved only by the organized activities of the whole of society with means of self-defence at its disposal. The only solution is to replace the hired police-force by voluntary people's brigades like those which existed in Russia from earliest times until the beginning of the eighteenth century.

THE nationalities question is a fundamental problem of modern times, but for those who advocate egalitarian doctrines it will never be a fundamental one and will never be properly understood by them.

The nationalities question today is a problem not only of the developing countries. Such highly developed countries as England, Canada, and Belgium are also confronted with it, and even all-redeeming democracy does not know how to solve it.

The nationalities problem is especially complex in our country. Somehow there has arisen the version—which is being intensively propagated—that the Russians are a privileged people. In fact exactly the opposite is the case, but for the moment the efforts of well-wishers ensure that Russia gets all the knocks. She is declared to be a country which 'has always been characterized by a backward economy, semi-barbarian social relationships and cultural stagnation'. It is alleged that Russia's sole means of salvation from her internal confusion has always been outward expansion which has been happening now for 500 years already, having begun in the fifteenth century. The absurdity of assertions of this kind is clear to any unprejudiced person. During the time of Kievan Rus we were certainly no more backward than Western Europe. The Tatar yoke dealt a heavy blow to Russia, but after it had been thrown off there began a renaissance of Russian culture. Naturally, the political system which developed during the course of history cannot be regarded as perfect: it was the cause both of severe internal crises, as during the reign of Ivan the Terrible, and of rapid advance, as under Peter I. But no other system could have arisen at that time, or ensured Russia's existence as a nation.

For several centuries there was a protracted struggle against the metastases of the Golden Horde. The liquidation of the khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan and the Crimea was an historical necessity and not

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'expansion'. And can that word be applied to, for instance, the military expeditions conducted in the nineteenth century against the Central Asian khanates during the course of which thousands of slaves were liberated by Russian troops, among them many of our fellow-countrymen?

Today the accusation is levelled against us that the Russians, who constitute [only] 57 per cent of the country's population, play a disproportionately large role. We would say that the reverse is true, that [the role is] a disproportionately small one. To begin with, all the so-called union republics have their own communist parties—except Russia. The result is a truly disproportionate strengthening of the most powerful of these regional groups—the Ukrainians.

We are told that the numbers of Russians are exaggerated at the expense of 'ethnographically special' groups such as the Cossacks. But the reproof is addressed to the wrong person. If anyone indulges in over-estimates like this it is the Georgians, for example, who include amongst their numbers the Mingrelians, who are as different from them as Ukrainians are from Russians.

Whilst on the subject of these differences: the Ukrainians and White Russians were once considered merely as a part of the Russian people and not as separate peoples. Nowadays for some reason or other the existence of the 'White Russian nation' is artificially maintained although the White Russians themselves are not aware of themselves as such and the 'White Russian tongue' consists merely of a collection of West-Russian dialects. The territory of Byelorussia was enlarged by 100 per cent notwithstanding in 1924–26.

The present-day frontiers of the Ukraine too do not correspond with its ethnographical [boundaries]. Seven million Russians and probably as many Russified Ukrainians live on Ukrainian territory, so that there are whole regions of the Ukraine which might more correctly be annexed to Russia. Not to mention such a crying injustice as the transfer to the Ukraine of the Crimea, whose predominantly Russian population is now being forced to learn the Ukrainian language.

As you know, there exists in the Ukraine a strong nationalist movement. But the aims it sets itself are utterly unreal. Were the question of the Ukraine's independent existence really to arise, there would inevitably have to be a review of its boundaries. The Ukraine would have to concede: (a) the Crimea; (b) the *oblasti* of Kharkov, Donetsk, Lugansk and Zaporozhye which have a predominantly Russian population; (c) the *oblasti* of Odessa, Nikolaevsk, Kherson, Dnepropetrovsk, and Sumi, whose population has become Russified to a considerable extent and which were opened up during the course of history by the efforts of the Russian state. What could the remaining part count upon without an outlet to the sea and without the basic industrial areas?—let the Ukrainians themselves reflect on that. Let them think also of the claims the Poles might lay to the Western regions (*oblasti*), the population of which is of pro-Polish disposition. We suggest that

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the result could only be the return of the prodigal son. And as for Ukrainian pretensions to the Kuban and the *oblasti* at the centre of the Chernozem belt, they are nothing short of ridiculous and we disregard them entirely, as we do the appetite displayed by foreigners for our territories (by which we mean the so-called 'Bessarabian question').

The status of Kazakhstan as a union republic in no way satisfies [the demands of] the constitution, since only one third of its population is indigenous. Kirghizia too has become almost half Russified. Attempts to slow down a natural historical process by granting every small people 'the right to restrict the number of foreigners to a norm acceptable for its ethnic existence' are reactionary and doomed to failure. Since when have we been foreigners on our own soil? And what if we do fix such a quota? By how much will the numbers of 'Russian democrats' then decline?

The charge is brought of unequal exchange, of draining the republics' resources. But who is draining whom? Everyone knows that the Transcaucasian republics have turned into a monstrous parasitic growth on the body of the country. The prevalence of strip-farming and mutual hostility require a counterbalancing factor. An independent Armenia could not exist on that barren plateau surrounded by hostile neighbours, and could not accommodate all the dispersed Armenians.

In Georgia there are a million Russians and Armenians plus small quantities of, for example, Abkhazians and Ossetes, who are the victims of the Georgian great-power mentality. These small peoples have a bad time under the rule of the 'poor and oppressed'. The Abkhazians have been pleading for several decades now to be delivered from the Georgians and admitted to Russia. But for some reason this privileged people is powerless!

The RSFSR itself includes several purely fictitious autonomous republics (Mordovia, Bashkiria, Karelia).

A great deal of fuss is made about anti-semitism in Russia. The Jews too claim the role of a minority oppressed by the Russians, but meanwhile by conducting a policy of national nepotism they have all but gained the monopoly in the field of science and culture. The Russian land is still capable of giving birth to Lomonosovs, but their way is blocked today by ordinary Germans while the poor 'privileged' Russians are timidly pushed aside. And what can we say about standards of living—the people have quite a lot to say on that subject. It would do those who enjoy exposing the vices of other peoples no harm to indulge in some self-criticism also.

We are offered two solutions: either a 'fraternal union of truly free peoples' or 'paternal protection'. The former leads all too frequently to attempts to ascertain if it is really so, and the latter term is too nebulous. Our slogan is: a Single and Indivisible Russia.

Indivisibility as we understand it means the territorial integrity of the state combined with total freedom of development for the cultures of all the peoples who inhabit our country, but without the expenditure

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of enormous sums on the luxurious attributes of non-existent cultures which mean nothing to the peoples to whom they supposedly belong. No representative of any other nation or race will be treated as a second-class being in Russia unless he himself gives cause for such an attitude. The peoples of Russia are masters with equal rights in [their] common home.

Those who today so passionately uphold the notorious 'right to secession' would do well to consider where they are leading their peoples. We can tell them in advance where: either into a Swedish-type morass of mediocrity, or into a state of permanent anarchy as in the Arab countries. Many peoples, after achieving independence, often as the result of a long and glorious struggle, have sunk into historical oblivion or become the laughing-stock of the entire world. Somewhere on the path of universal disintegration a barrier must at last be erected. The peoples of Russia must realize on which side of that barrier they ought to be in the name of their own interests. Those who naïvely think that deliverance from Russia is deliverance from evil are mistaken. Evil is always within oneself, though there have sometimes been exchanges of scum between our peoples; we have brought upon them a certain amount of evil and they have exported a certain amount to us. Evil has triumphed thanks to our concerted efforts, and only by concerted efforts will we succeed in overcoming it.

WE are facing the threat of biological degeneration. This danger threatens not only us but the entire white race. If we do not take timely measures we may live to see ourselves playing the part of pawns or at best passive observers in the battle between the black and yellow races for world supremacy.

Democratic institutions do not play a healing role, but rather aggravate the disease. For that reason, more important to us than the victory of democracy over dictatorship is the moral reorientation of dictatorship, an ideological revolution of sorts. A revolution of this kind can be achieved bloodlessly, like the victory of the Christians in the Roman Empire, but its task this time will be the very opposite. The ancient world perished in chaos as a consequence of the spread of cosmopolitan ideas. We are striving to bring about a rebirth of national feeling in a confused world, to make every man aware of his individual responsibility to his nation and his race. National revolution begins with the individual. It must end with the emergence of a powerful national state serving as a centre of gravity for healthy elements in all fraternal countries. In this state the Russian people must indeed become the ruling nation, and not on a false charge; not in the sense of oppressing other peoples but if only in the sense that the Russians themselves should not be victims of discrimination and even terror in certain areas of their own country. When we talk of the Russian people we mean those people who are truly Russian by blood and in spirit. We must put an end to random hybridization. Although periods

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of decadence are natural, there can be no fatal and inevitable degeneration as long as the healthy kernel of the nation is preserved, and the people understand the task facing them and have the will to accomplish it.

Long live the victory of Christian civilization over the chaos which has risen up against it!

Long live a great, single and indivisible Russia! May God be with us!

Russian patriots.

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Document: Sudan

The Forgotten Massacres

The recent coup *and counter-*coup *in the Sudan made headlines in the newspapers everywhere. But for a long time the extermination of the Bantus in Southern Sudan has been largely ignored by the world press. We publish below an Open Letter to President Kaunda in his capacity as chairman of the Organization of African Unity from Colonel Joseph Lagu, one of the commanders of Anya Nya, the Bantu military organization. It appeared in the* Zambia Daily Mail, *5 April 1971.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We Southern Sudanese, living under extreme repression in our homeland or as refugees in friendly African countries, appeal to Your Excellency to become aware of our plight and raise your benevolent voice in our behalf.

We turn to Your Excellency as a true friend of the oppressed to speak out for us in international councils. Will not Your Excellency, who has spoken for peoples under the colonial yoke throughout Africa, place before the world our story—a story of shame and misery, a story of a people who have suffered half a million deaths because their skin and their culture is different from their northern compatriots. The comparison though vile must be made: we have endured many times more deaths through murder, repression and disease than all the African freedom movements combined. And yet the Organisation of African Unity will not even allow our story to be heard in its councils.

Our Gethsemane, cruel though it has been, was made infinitely more painful by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which have undertaken to assist and direct our Sudanese and Egyptian tormentors in the genocide being conducted at our expense. Even as we write to you, Soviet tanks with Russian drivers are rumbling through our villages, killing and maiming our defenceless people and our livestock with their cannon and machineguns, burning our homes, churches, mosques and schools with their flamethrowers and crushing our garden plots under their bogie.

MiG-21 jets with Soviet pilots overhead smash our bodies and our buildings with their bombs, searing our flesh and our soul with their napalm. MI-8 helicopters with Soviet pilots, navigators and gunners strafe and rocket our men and boys and, when they are dead, leave our women and girls to be raped and mutilated by the Sudanese soldiers.

Besides being killed by Soviet arms daily, thousands die from disease and famine. Nearly six newly born babies out of ten die from malaria and a host each year from malnutrition as a result of shortages in vitamin-giving foods. Thousands perish from exposure to bad weather. Hospitals and schools have been either destroyed, closed or turned into military barracks. The entire population is a dying one, their conditions are pathetic. They have no permanent shelter, but hide under mosquito-infested trees and in caves.

When our people flee the Sudan to live a pitiable existence as refugees in neighbouring countries, the Sudan troops under the tutelage of their Soviet masters, well experienced in suppression of people's uprisings, cross the international borders and massacre our people on non-Sudanese soil. Aside from the bestial inhumanity these acts reveal, they are affronts to international law and morality. And the world does not seem to know or care that these criminal acts have been going on for 15 years and are still continuing. The only difference now is that the Russians are aiding and abetting this Sudanese genocide.

Your Excellency may ask how we know the Russians are in the Southern Sudan helping the government and their Egyptian allies? We have seen them

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moving about in the streets of Juba where they are based, flying the MI-8 helicopters and firing at us the rockets and guns of these helicopters. We have heard them communicating with each other in their tanks and in their planes. We have heard the screams of wounded Russian pilots. We have buried the bodies of Russian airmen who perished with their helicopters.

Our poor land does not have the oil of Angola, the chrome of Zimbabwe or the diamonds of Namibia. No imperialists covet our meagre resources. All we ask of life is to be allowed to live it. We do not seek foreign arms, money or men. All we beg from the rest of Africa and the world is the recognition that we are human beings, not animals, and the right to live as human beings. Is this an unjust demand?

Your Excellency, who is a peaceful man, may question why we do not surrender our arms and co-operate with the Sudanese government. We have attempted to do so many times. William Deng, an illustrious scholar and statesman, chose the path of co-operation. He was shot dead by the Sudanese army shortly after his election in Tonj Central Constituency. His name is but one of scores of the most talented southerners whose choice of co-operation resulted in their murder or incarceration. Among the ordinary people, many have tried to co-operate. They have been repaid by being slaughtered in their homes and in their churches and mosques. One example among thousands may be cited from a recent book, 'Sudan, An African Tragedy', by a Norwegian journalist. Discussing a massacre of a group of communicants in a church, the author described what he saw as 'the burned chapel, the wounded, the burned bones and skulls of the 50 innocent civilians, including children, murdered in cold blood'. This incident took place within the last six months.

The Sudanese government and its army frequently announce so-called 'amnesties' under which the 500,000 Southern Sudanese refugees in neighbouring states are invited to return to the Sudan. Those who have responded to these amnesties have been massacred.

The Sudanese government and its Egyptian and Soviet masters have tried to conceal the true nature of their genocidal war in the Southern Sudan by saying that the Southern problem is one of religion. This is nonsense. Muslims, Christians of all denominations, and pagans are working together against a single problem: the genocide of the Africans in the Sudan. Among the foremost guerilla generals in the Southern Sudan are the Moslems, Abdel Rahman Suli and Paul Ali Gbatala.

For what crime then are we condemned to annihilation? Whatever the crime it must be heinous, because we have paid the full measure of five hundred thousand lives for this crime. Is it because we were born black? Because we do not wish to be slaves? Because we dare to assert we are men?

Will Africa and the world forever look away in the hope that we will all die out and relieve the conscience of those who pretend we do not exist? Or even worse, those who recognise our existence, but pretend we do not suffer and die? Will no one speak out in our behalf?

If but one African leader or statesman raised his voice for us, surely others would follow. But no one will be first. Therefore we must suffer in a backwash of human misery, relegated to limbo of despair, until every African man, woman and child in the Southern Sudan, no matter what his tribe or religion, is dead. Dead from the machines of war or the concomitant horrors of starvation and disease. Is there no statesman to tell the story to the world? Not just one man?

Do not forsake us Excellency. Bring our case before the OAU and the world. LET US BUT LIVE. In the name of God and humanism, treat us like men. FOR WE ARE MEN.

Respectfully,

Colonel Joseph Lagu

on behalf of the Anya Nya
AEGIS COMMITTEE

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The Survivors

Ronald Hingley

WHILE Stalinism recedes into ever more distant perspective, valuable new material on the period continues to become available, as is emphasized by these two publications.*

Both studies enhance our knowledge of that tenebrous era, though in unequal measure, Nadezhda Mandelstam's contribution being the more discerning. Both authors have lived remarkable lives, but lives such as one would hesitate to wish on one's worst enemy. Joseph Berger, who is of Polish Jewish origin, became a top Comintern official after helping to found the Communist Parties of Palestine and other Middle-Eastern countries. Finding himself in Moscow, and thereby—with a dossier so deadly—rendered hyper-vulnerable to Stalinist oppression, he was expelled from the Party in 1934 and arrested in the following year. He then spent 21 years in a series of prisons, concentration camps and places of exile before his eventual release and rehabilitation in 1956. One of Mr Berger's first acts on obtaining his freedom was to demand reinstatement in the Party which he loves, and with backdated seniority. As this episode indicates, he is an outstanding example of that strange but fairly common breed of Marxist devotee whom neither intense personal suffering nor long-term panoramic views of mass oppression can wholly deconvert. Not that he has preserved his ideology vacuum-packed and uncontaminated by the world of action and evidence. Beaten, terrorized, twice sentenced to death (though he only bothers to mention one of these occasions in his text), he has emerged from the pit with head bloody but unbowed, having now abandoned his original hard-core Leninism . . . for what? Vague, diffused benevolence? A Leninist no longer, he can still applaud Lenin's ideals and 'faith in man'; and, as this last, all too familiar, phrase shows, he has by no means purged his mind of formulae antedating his change of outlook.

When Mr Berger claims to have achieved a new realization—'that any application of force which violates the principles of truth, justice and humanity constitutes a betrayal of socialism'—he is uttering a sentiment which would have been endorsed by none more heartily than that object of his genteel disapproval, J. V. Stalin. The grim Georgian would also have approved the neatness with which Mr Berger here begs a vital question: who is to arbitrate truth, justice and humanity? It was, after all, in the name of these triply bloody abstractions that the pockmarked universal genius and great humanist exercised his tyranny all along. Nor does one's heart warm to one Yurkin, Mr Berger's soul-mate and fellow-prisoner, in his lament (recorded here as occurring during a camp chat) over the recent shooting of some obstreperous peasant inmate by NKVD guards. Yurkin—who became 'transfigured' whenever he spoke of Lenin—commented on this episode as follows: 'We [old Bolsheviks] killed Tsarist officers, land-owners, bankers. But to kill a simple, innocent peasant in cold blood—we would never have

* Joseph Berger, *Shipwreck of a Generation* (Harvill, 1971) and Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope against Hope* (Harvill, 1971), translated by Max Hayward.

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dreamt of it.' That Stalin put such naively bloodthirsty arbiters of simplicity and innocence behind barbed wire must be credited as a small point in his favour if the awful tally of his misdeeds should ever be definitively totted up.

This gripe stated, one must concede the considerable value of Mr Berger's book as evidence on a period still wrapped in mystery, while regretting that he should have been so self-effacing about his personal experiences. He sheds new or confirmatory light on a variety of other dark episodes, such as the reimprisonment by the Soviet authorities of the Red Army personnel captured by the Finns in 1939–40, the Lominadze Affair, the Leningrad Affair, Stalin's fear of death and assassination, the role of Yenukidze, the shooting of several hundred Baltic officers, the special camp at Tayshet and a host of other matters. Some of his information is second-hand and derives from camp rumour, but Berger is careful to make this clear himself, emerging as a convincing witness of truth.

Mr Berger also provides many fascinating vignettes of fellow-captives . . . none more piquant than that of Inzhir, a former Menshevik. *Ci-devant* chief accountant of GULAG, this complex individual had been one of the very few individuals with access to the day-by-day 'state' of concentration camp victims at the height of the terror. How unfortunate, then, that Berger's conversations with so knowledgeable an official did not, apparently, throw up information indicating the total number of those incarcerated in the concentration camps. If so there might no longer be any need for such speculations on slave statistics as are contained, for example, in Swaniewicz's book on Stalinist concentration camps, and in an appendix to Robert Conquest's *Great Terror*. We might really know, at last, how many of these unfortunates there were . . . if only to the nearest million or so.

IT is hard on Mr Berger that his work should have appeared at roughly the same time as the memoirs of Nadezhda Mandelstam, whose saga reveals a comparable degree of courage . . . but courage refreshingly unpolluted by ideological mumbo-jumbo. One sentence in particular serves as an aptly scathing comment on the Bergers of this world, and on others to whom Mrs Mandelstam alludes as 'professional humanists'. 'The decisive part in the subjugation of the intelligentsia', she writes, 'was played not by terror and bribery (though, God knows, there was enough of both) but by the word "Revolution" which none of them could bear to give up. It is a word to which whole nations have succumbed, and its force was such that one wonders why our rulers still needed prisons and capital punishment'.

Nadezhda Mandelstam is the widow of Osip Mandelstam, the poet whom many rate the greatest of post-revolutionary Russia, and who perished in 1938 or 1939 under horrible conditions: a demented concentration camp prisoner earmarked for transit to the Kolyma. Since then Nadezhda Yakovlevna appears to have lived largely for and by her husband's memory. On their record over the Mandelstam case figures such as Ehrenburg and Bukharin are praised, while Pasternak is distantly dismissed and Gorky condemned . . . he once refused to sign an order to issue the poet with a pair of trousers.

It is a tribute to Mrs Mandelstam's good sense, and to her dry,

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ironical, tough approach, that she never becomes in the least tiresome on the subject of her fixation, as could easily have happened with a relict less redoubtable. As a contribution to the biography of a major poet, her book is of great importance. By a thousand minor touches the bard's elusive character is deftly limned . . . as when he revealed his 'childish' dislike of making contact with power by seizing his raincoat and escaping after discovering, at some point in 1918, that he risked meeting the then mighty Trotsky. On learning that Stalin himself had inscribed his copy of Gorky's atrocious verse tale *Death and the Maiden* with the words 'this thing is more powerful than Goethe's *Faust*', Mandelstam rightly concluded that 'we are all finished'. He also drew attention to the superior status of poetry in Russia—by contrast with other countries—basing his case on the frequency with which the Russians have killed their poets. Obsessed with all too natural fears, the poet once concluded, after catching sight of a peasant with an axe, that he was about to be beheaded, 'as happened in Peter the Great's time'.

Mandelstam foresaw—courted even—his own death. To him belongs the honour of being, in a sense, *the* preordained sacrificial victim of this era. The ritual drama was played out with due state, solemnity and sadism after the poet had written, in 1933, his well-known lampoon on Stalin. In the variant familiar to the political police his restrained ditty described the dreaded Joseph Vissarionovich as a murderer and slaughterer of peasants. It so captured the fancy of the security tycoon Yagoda, himself doomed soon to perish, that he learnt it by heart and could recite it during interrogations of the author. The details of this gruesome persecution, as also of Bukharin's and Pasternak's interventions on the victim's behalf, are here given in the most authentic version which we are ever likely to receive.

IMPORTANT for its contribution to a major poet's biography, the widow's tale is also much more—a monument, valuable in its own right, to a grotesquely evil epoch. Its strength lies, first, in the fact that it is not the work of a defector, but of one who has lived through and risen superior to the whole Soviet experience. Secondly, it is not a Soviet-censored text such as the emasculated memoirs of a Fedin, an Ehrenburg or a Paustovsky, but a work published outside the purview of Kremlinite controls. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it is not a collection of penal reminiscences (there are, in all conscience, quite enough of those to be going on with), but the account of one who remained a 'free' citizen throughout, albeit subjected to grave risk and voluntarily sharing the terms of exile imposed on her husband before he was freighted Kolyma-wards.

The drab, fear-crazed flavour of life, as lived even outside the prisons and camps during this period, is here more fully and convincingly conveyed than anywhere else within my own moderately extensive reading of such reportage. As the author well points out, the terror did not spring into sudden existence in 1937—it was considerably stepped up during that year, but the peculiar atmosphere of Stalinism had been established much earlier. Nor will Nadezhda Yakovlevna have any truck with the cant view of the 1920s as an idyllic period in Soviet life. Looking further forwards, she also makes the thought-provoking claim that the deaths of many rehabilitated terror victims have been mendaciously

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postdated to 1942 or 1943. This device is presumably intended to whitewash the *Yezhovshchina* in retrospect by spreading mortality statistics as thinly as possible . . . just as successful authors seek to spread their income tax liabilities over several years.

Like Joseph Berger's, this book is also valuable for the minor details which it supplies on matters hitherto obscure. For example, A. A. Andreyev, that dark horse of the Politburo, now appears as a major instrument of the purges, and as one with special responsibility for parts of Central Asia (as well as processing Mandelstam himself).

Another episode redounds very much to the credit of that ambivalent figure Ilya Ehrenberg, whose integrity is enthusiastically endorsed by Nadezhda Yakovlevna, and who once taught her a much-valued lesson. Speaking of the murderous post-revolutionary period, she writes:

> We were set on our fellow men like dogs, and the whole pack of us licked the hunter's hand, squealing incomprehensibly. The head-hunting mentality spread like a plague. I even had a slight bout of it myself, but was cured in time by a wise doctor. This happened . . . in Kiev when some visitor or another . . . read out some couplets by Mayakovsky about how officers were thrown into the Moyka Canal in Petrograd to drown. This brash verse had its effect and I burst out laughing. Ehrenburg, who was also there, at once fiercely attacked me. He gave me such a talking-to that I still respect him for it, and I am proud that, silly as I was at the time, I had the sense to listen to him and rember his words for ever afterwards.

As this episode shows, even Nadezhda Yakovlevna was temporarily infected by the disease of her age. And, as many an Old Bolshevik has discovered, he who sniggers over the fate of a 'class enemy' soon finds himself relegated to that snigger-provoking, liquidation-ripe category.

So rich is the material contained in Mrs Mandelstam's memoirs that one may read many pages of them without even noticing that they are somewhat discursive, chronologically vague, and diffuse. Still, many a study far more workmanlike is also notably less informative.

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